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Canada 
Don't Think of Self-Government: 
The Debate Over Which Language Should Govern 
Aboriginal Peoples' Relationship with the State. 
Between 1992 and 2000, Canada systematically ranked first on the United Nations 
Human Development Index. In 2001, a study by the Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada found that Aboriginal Peoples would rank 78th in the world if their well-
being was measured according to the same indicators. The question asked in this thesis 
paper is: what explains the well-being gap between Aboriginals and other Canadians? 
More specifically, what explains the persistence of this gap in light of an apparent 
agreement over a solution: self-government? The answer to this question can partly be 
located in the solution itself. Indeed, an analysis of an academic and public debate over 
an existing self-government model and model to-be reveals that "self-government" has as 
many understandings as there are degrees of separation between municipal governance 
and sovereignty proper. Thus, far from inspiring consensus, self-government is an 
extremely contentious concept. Further, it has not been a debate over increasing 
Aboriginal Peoples' well-being, but a debate over which understanding of Aboriginal 
governance should govern the debate. As a result, only a handful of self-government 
agreements have been enacted over the past 40 years. This "stall" at the policy level is, 
of course, the ultimate cause of Aboriginal Peoples' poor socio-economic standing. 
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Comprendre en politique ne signifie jamais comprendre I'autre, mais comprendre 
le monde tel qu'il apparait a I'autre. 
- Hannah Arendt, Journal de pensee 
viii 
Introduction 
July 1999: Canada makes headlines as "the best country in the world to live in" 
based on the United Nations Human Development Index. (UNHDI) (Coyne, 1999, A19) 
It is the 6th year in a row it has achieved this position, but when the Department of Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) uses the same indicators to test Aboriginal Peoples' 
well-being, it finds they trail far behind other Canadians; so far behind, in fact, it inspires 
Cindy Blackstock's tellingly entitled paper, Same Country: Same Lands; 78 Countries 
Away} (2005) More than a decade later, problems of abject poverty and loss of tradition 
and language continue to prevail in most Aboriginal communities across Canada. While 
there have been many improvements in Aboriginal Peoples' overall quality of life - and 
these should not be discounted - the gap in education levels and on some indicators of 
employment and income has widened rather than narrowed: Canadians still enjoy higher 
rates of high-school and university completion, and lower rates of unemployment; they 
also have a longer life expectancy, and are less likely to die from infectious disease and 
suicide. (Assembly of First Nations, 2010) The million-dollar question for policy 
makers, which has been qualified as "one of the country's most pressing" by Aboriginal 
Quality of Life research director at the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Leslie 
Seidle, is why? (Seidle, 2008, 1) 
The situation is unnerving, but especially perplexing in light of an agreement over 
a solution: "self-government". The Assembly of the First Nations of Quebec and 
Labrador (AFNQL), for instance, has stated that "the solution to our social and 
1
 Status Indians living on reserves were found to have a quality of life equivalent to Brazil and Peru, ranked 79lh and 
80lh respectively according to UNDHI indicators. (Blackstock, 2005, 131) 
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economical problems requires giving new impetus to global negotiations on recognition 
of self-government". (Assembly of the First Nations of Quebec and Labrador, 2010) The 
authoritative report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) specifically 
recommended that the Canadian government recognize Aboriginal Peoples' "right to self-
government" - a right they never relinquished - and grant them the full range of powers 
and resources needed to make it a success. (George Erasmus in Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, 1996a; Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996b) A Liberal 
government, in power at the time, could not help but be in agreement - after all, the 
recognition of an "inherent right of self-government" under section 35 of the Constitution 
had been "the cornerstone" of its Aboriginal policy since its election in 1993: this was 
evident in the Policy on implementing the inherent right of Self-Government (1995) and 
confirmed again in Gathering Strength - Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan (1998), the 
official response to the Royal Commission's report, which called, among other things, to 
develop "the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to negotiate and implement self-
government." (Wherret and Hurley, 1999, 6; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1995; 
Ibid., 1998) This apparent consensus raises the specific research question of this paper: if 
self-government has been unanimously approved as the policy solution to bridging the 
"Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap", why has it yet to be applied, coherently and 
consistently, on a broader scale? 
Only a handful of self-government agreements have been enacted in Canada since 
the mid-seventies2; the debate over its particular shape and scope, and how to go about 
2
 It is difficult to come up with an exact number for "self-government legislations" or "self-government agreements" in 
Canada. As this paper will show, there is dispute over the meaning of the term "self-government", it should therefore 
come as no surprise that there would be conflicting numbers of examples depending on which source is consulted. 
According to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, for instance, there are only four self-government 
legislations in Canada: the Cree and Naskapi (of Quebec) Act (1984), the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act 
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implementing it, has gone on for just as long. This persistence over time of a "debate" 
over self-government is illustrative, I argue, of the underlying cause of a "stall" at the 
policy level, which has yet to be addressed in the literature. Indeed, when the various 
positions that have been expressed in this debate are examined more closely, as I propose 
to do, they reveal an agreement over a concept that encompasses as many understandings 
as there are degrees of separation between "municipality" and "sovereignty" proper: they 
reveal that self-government is a continuum concept. Although, in and of itself, this 
observation represents no ground-breaking information - anyone who has reviewed the 
self-government literature will agree that there are very diverging ways of defining it - I 
argue that this polarization between different conceptualizations of self-government is 
actually the source of the slow "self-government making" pace in Canada, which is of 
course, the ultimate cause of Aboriginal people's current unenviable socio-economic 
standing. Indeed, as conflicting empirical, normative and even popular claims over 
different understandings of self-government have been made - and continue to be made -
over the past four decades, this has had for inevitable effect to bring the wheels of policy-
making to a standstill, as policy makers have been left to make sense of the wealth 
evidence that has resulted, or been forced to tip-toe around the issue in light of public 
concerns. The "solution" to the problem can thus be said to be the problem. More 
(1986). the Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act (1994) and the Westbank Self-Govemment Agreement (2003). 
(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1995a; Ibid, 2009) However, according to Wherret and Hurley (1999) if we 
include what are referred to as "self-government agreements", there are four more examples to speak of: the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975), the Northeastern Quebec Agreement (1977), Nunavut (1998) and the 
Nishga'a Final Agreement (2001). The Institute on Governance (1998) adds the Mi'kmaq Education Act (1999) to that 
list, which it sees as falling in a "sectoral" category of self-government that places law-making authority in First Nation 
hands through a board (such as an education board) with central service functions. Finally, another way of looking at it 
is by identifying, like Hurley (2002), which First Nations were explicitly excluded from Bill C-7 the First Nations 
Governance Act (which never passed) because they were considered to already be self-governing: the Nisga'as, the 
Sechelts, the Crees of northern Quebec, and the 6 Yukon First Nations. 
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precisely, it is a problem of conflicting ways of seeing the world, acting as vessels for 
conflicting bodies of facts, and the dead end in which these visions ultimately lead. 
In essence, it is this paper's main premise that language analysis matters in 
policy-making, particularly where debates over contentious social issues are concerned 
and have failed to lead to any tangible legislative or political action. While more 
"empirical" or "data-oriented" approaches can and have produced lucrative insights into 
what has long been termed the "Indian problem", they fail to address the belief systems 
that animate the actors they attempt to inform, which only admit the evidence that 
confirm them. What results is a debate over ideas rather than facts. Expecting a 
consensus to emerge in this situation would be like expecting to convince someone who 
espouses a "pro life" position to become "pro choice" by presenting socio-economic data 
on the impacts of teenage pregnancies, when what is really at stake is the definition of 
abortion, or rather, its product: the end of the development of a foetus, or the termination 
of human life, equipped with a soul. Similarly, in what I call the "self-government 
debate" and the broader "Aboriginal well-being debate", competing definitions of the 
product of self-government are at stake. A new approach to the problem is thus 
eminently required: one that sees language as a more important source of evidence, 
enabling an understanding of self-government - or more precisely, the language of self-
government - as the proverbial elephant in the room. 
In order to demonstrate this thesis, I structure this paper in four chapters. In 
Chapter 1,1 present what I call George Lakoff s "theory of framing", as outlined in Don't 
Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate. (2004) Although this 
4 
work essentially presents itself as a "how to" manual directed at American Democrats 
after their 2004 loss to the Republicans, and may therefore be seen as an unusual 
theoretical framework from which to build in the context of a political science thesis, it 
actually provides many instructive insights into why policy processes sometimes "stall"; 
namely, that language shapes our understanding of the world and hence, of our political 
world, enabling me to posit that if a national public policy toward bridging the 
Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap has failed to materialize, whether it be called "self-
government" or something else, a good place to begin looking for a cause is in the very 
language that has monopolized the discourse so far. 
This is what I propose to do in chapters 2 and 3, through the presentation of two 
case studies: the case of the Crees of Northern Quebec, who signed what has often been 
termed the "first self-government agreement in Canada": the James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975; and the case of the Innus of Mamuitun, who have 
been in negotiation with the governments of Quebec and Canada over implementation of 
their own self-government agreement since the Crees signed theirs, but have yet to 
progress beyond the stage of agreement-in-principle. In both cases, a debate over self-
» 
government has occurred; in both cases, this debate has yielded very conflicting 
interpretations of self-government; in both cases, these interpretations have led into the 
same dead-end: a situation where a particular model of governance is ultimately said to 
not be representative of self-government at all. In the case of the Crees, an academic 
debate over the level of self-government enabled by their model of governance has 
produced a prevailing interpretation that it simply elevated Cree communities to 
municipal status; in the case of the Innus, a public debate has instead monopolized 
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airwaves, decrying the handing over of sovereignty. This dichotomy in understandings 
within each debate - self-government v. municipality; self-government v. sovereignty -
is illustrative of the continuum nature of the concept of self-government. When we 
further take into account that both models are, for all intents and purposes, identical, the 
dichotomy in understanding that results between the debates provides an increased 
understanding of the policy-making impasse in which the language of self-government 
leads, and - I ultimately argue - of the larger force at work in Canadian Aboriginal 
politics. Indeed, as it turns out, it has never been a debate over increasing Aboriginal 
well-being, or over self-government, but over which language should govern Aboriginal 
Peoples' relationship with the State. 
If the "problem" is language-based, a solution should logically be language-
driven. This is Lakoff's final prescription to the Democrats: refranting the debate. 
Would changing the language have any impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
policy response in the case presented here? Some reflections will be made on this 
question in Chapter 4. What is sure, it is not for a lack of will that Aboriginal Peoples' 
quality of life continues to stagnate. Rather, a dispute over the meaning of self-
government has detracted from a more concerted discussion on the practical means of 
resolving the concrete problem at hand: bridging the well-being gap, not defining self-
government. The situation in which so many Aboriginal communities still find 
themselves is even more unnerving in that we have already developed solutions that 
empirical evidence has shown have had an impact, but have been unable to improve and 
adapt, where needed, and apply more systematically, because there has been dispute over 
what the result should be called. If Lakoff is right, the first step toward arriving to a real 
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solution may be as simple as imagining the desired end in different terms. Indeed, if 
language shapes the way in which we see the world, changing our language "is social 
change." (Lakoff, 2004, 1) 
7 
Chapter I: Theoretical Framework 
It is difficult to speak of a "theoretical framework" when describing George 
Lakoff s contribution to this paper. His book, Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your 
Values and Frame the Debate, has been described as a "primer" on the language of 
American politics; the "definitive handbook" for understanding the American Democrats' 
loss in the 2004 election; an "essential guide" on communicating more effectively.3 
Don't Think of an Elephant! is in fact, very much of a "how to" manual - more precisely, 
a "how to win the debate" manual directed at the lay, liberal Democrat population with 
whom Lakoff openly shares allegiances. The book thus not only provides little 
theoretical substance, but it also has an obvious ideological bent. This is why I refer to a 
"Lakoffian approach", because what Lakoff s work really offers - and what I borrow 
from it to guide my own analysis - is a road-map and a strategy: a step by step guide on 
the "framing trap" in which he argues American Democrats fell in the 2000 and 2004 
elections and a tangible way out of that trap. 
Essentially, Don't think of an Elephant! presents itself as a simple exercise in the 
age-old art of rhetoric, but it does so efficiently and is able to do so because it is 
grounded in a well-established literature from cognitive science that shows that 
"language matters" because it structures the way in which we understand experience. 
Although this idea is not novel, nor presented in a way that would generally appeal to the 
academic, there are several reasons I have decided to use Lakoff s work to support my 
thesis. First, out of all of the public policy theories I have been brought to examine over 
3
 These qualifiers can be read on a number of online bookstore, such as Amazon.com, which offer short summaries of 
the book. 
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the course of my studies, Lakoff s was the only approach that was capable of shedding 
light on the question of why policy problems are sometimes immune to resolution by 
appeal to facts, and indeed, it was the first one I recalled when I was first faced with my 
research question. Institutionalism, incrementalism, path-dependency theory, the 
garbage-can model, pluralism, elitism, rational choice theory, etc - none of these theories 
address language as a driving force in the shaping of perceptions and opinions with 
respect to political issues; Lakoff s theory of framing not only addresses this factor, but it 
provides an explanation as to why it is so powerful. 
Second, a positivist approach to research, which still dominates the discipline of 
political science, as illustrated in the mandatory quantitative research course in the 
Masters Public Policy and Public Administration Program at Concordia University, tends 
to not acknowledge a language factor in policy making and outcomes either, because it is 
not generally seen as a source of "empirical" data. Positivism has held great prestige in 
the social sciences precisely because it has been perceived as being more "scientific" (it 
follows the scientific method) and more trustworthy (results must be replicated), and 
thus, as having a greater impact on policy and public opinion. Over the past decades, this 
research approach has in fact provided and continues to provide very accurate pictures of 
the politics around us and has positively influenced public policy by informing debates 
between policy makers and demanders with real facts. However, in cases whether the 
issue at stake is contentious in nature - as revealed by the polarization of the debate over 
such issues - an approach that favours statistical evidence, or "hard data" over other 
types of evidence, sometimes runs into the problem of not seeing the forest for the trees -
the case of the Crees, outlined in Chapter 2, representing a chief example. Indeed, in the 
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past 40 years, a myriad of quantitative analyses have been conducted and published on 
Aboriginal people's socio-economic conditions - many of which will be presented in this 
paper. Although these studies provide instructive insights on the reality of the socio-
economic situation of Aboriginals in Canada, and these will be useful if and when the 
concerned parties choose to reintegrate the debate with an eye toward resolution, they fail 
to recognize that the people they attempt to inform share different worldviews and that 
only the evidence that confirms those views is likely to impact currently held positions. 
This is not to say that a positivist, or scientific approach does not have its place in this 
area of research — but it yields increased explanatory power when it is applied in 
combination with a Lakoffian approach, which does see language - or the way in which 
arguments are framed - as an extremely important source of evidence, as will be seen 
more clearly in Chapter 3, where I apply the empirical method to an Innu case-study. 
Third, and following from the two preceding points, a language-driven, or more 
precisely "frame-driven" approach, as offered by Lakoff, has received little attention in 
political science and the study of public policy and public administration in particular. A 
search for the key words "framing" and "public policy" in academic search engines, for 
instance, reveals hundreds of peer-reviewed articles in the fields of psychology, 
journalism, communications and education, but none in public policy journals. Some 
authors (Schon and Rein, 1994) have attempted to bring "framing" to policy analysis, but 
these are sociologists; further, their works date back to the 1990s. A related, more recent 
literature (Campbell, 2002; Walsh, 2000; Jacobs, 2009) has emerged in political science, 
which posits that "ideas matter", but although it similarly assumes that societal beliefs 
drive policy-making, or that "taken-for-granted paradigms" constrain the range of 
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policies that policy makers are likely to consider, it neglects, like the previously 
mentioned theories and approaches, the language factor in shaping those beliefs and 
paradigms in the first place. (Campbell, 2002, 23) 
Finally and more importantly, my decision to use Lakoff s work rests 
principally in its simple delivery. Indeed, it is my belief that another important factor 
contributing to the "stall" at the policy level with respect to self-government making is 
that so many theories have been competing with each other for explanatory supremacy 
that the real problem - the contentious nature of the very concept of self-government -
has effectively been lost in the translation. Thus, I draw on Lakoff to decomplexify the 
playing field; to step out of the theoretical confines of political science, and look at the 
problem from the perspective of an outsider - a cognitive scientist - and in a way that 
may appeal, not only to academics, but to policy-makers as well, who are not necessarily 
knowledgeable in policy-analysts' and political scientists' specialized, theoretical 
languages and yet, have the most to gain from adding this approach to their tool-box. 
The fact that Don't Think of an Elephant! is directed at a lay population thus, should not 
be cause to discredit its application to policy-making. The focus should rather be on this 
question: does a Lakoff s book help explain the poor socio-economic situation that 
persists in Aboriginal communities? The answer, as I will show in this paper, is 
undeniably yes. This satisfies my ultimate goal: not to make a theoretical contribution to 
an already abundant literature on self-government, but to provide practical tools, a 
different lens, through which to view polarized, social issues, transcend the debate and 
inspire concrete, social change. 
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In this chapter, I summarize George Lakoff s advice to American Democrats 
after their 2004 electoral loss. First, I define the concepts of "frames" and "worldviews", 
which Lakoff borrows from another literature that I also briefly outline. Then, I discuss 
the "art of framing", which will yield some general precepts that will govern my analysis 
in the following chapters. Finally, I present a short a discussion on metaphors, as defined 
in Lakoff s The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (1993) and his and Mark Johnson's 
Conceptual Metaphors in Everyday Language (1980). The dynamic and effect of 
"frames" and "conceptual" or "structural metaphors" is very similar and admittedly, at 
times, difficult to differentiate. Outlining a concept of metaphor will provide additional 
nuance to the concept of "frame" and, ultimately, additional substance to a discussion of 
my findings and Lakoff s "solution" in Chapter 4. 
Don't Think of an Elephant 
Through an examination of Republican/Democrat politics, specifically, the 
"frames of reference" contained in the language of their respective electoral campaign 
arguments, George Lakoff demonstrates in Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your 
Values and Frame the Debate, how Republicans captured the public vote two elections4 
in a row. Indeed, to the bewilderment of Democrats, Americans poorest had voted en 
masse for a president whose policies served the interest of the rich, according to Lakoff. 
He provides this explanation: Conservatives have mastered the "art of framing" or 
"communicating values." (Lakoff, 2004, 16) Effectively, through their think tanks, they 
4
 The 2001 and 2004 elections. 
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had figured out how to frame every campaign issue around their values and Democrats, 
having not invested as many resources in their own think tanks to frame issues around 
their values, had been reduced to "arguing the facts" or revamping conservative frames 
with liberal spins. Essentially, they had fallen in the "framing trap" - the same trap in 
which I argue the debate over Aboriginal well-being ultimately leads when it is framed in 
terms of "self-government." (Ibid., 19) 
Frames of Reference 
The notion of "frame of reference", or "frame" for short, is not unique to 
Lakoff s work. It is a term used in linguistics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and 
even computer science and has produced a very wealthy literature over the last decades. 
It is within the psychology of perception theory of Gestalt that a "framing theory" finds 
its source, in 1912. A key assumption of this theory is that the operational principle of 
the brain is "holistic"5 and has "self-organizing" tendencies. (Ehrenstein, Spillman and 
Sarris, 2003, 434) Thus, when faced with the ambiguous pattern of the Necker cube 
(figure 1), one's mind will "impose a frame on sense-perception to make it 'make sense', 
insisting on seeing the cube in one perspective or another." (Atherson, 2010) The 
product of this involuntary "organization" is essentially a frame. Actually, with the 
Necker cube a sort of shuffling in the mind between two frames occurs: one where the 
lower-left face of the cube is its "front" and one where the higher-right face is. This 
process of "making sense" of information is a necessity for perception and the premise of 
5
 From the German, "gestalt". which translates as "essence or shape of an entity's complete form." (Ehrenstein, 
Spillman and Saris. 2003. 434) 
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Gestalt theory, which also guides George Lakoff s work as a cognitive scientist and 
linguist. (Ibid; Rice, 1980, 153) 
From the field of developmental psychology, Jean Piaget's model of 
assimilation and accommodation also argues that frames are "a psychological necessity." 
(Rice, 154) Human perception is said to based on the existence of "schemata", or 
"abstracted patterns into or onto which information can be organised." (Ibid., 153) When 
faced with new "sense-data" an individual will either "assimilate" it to his or her 
schemata by modifying it to the point of conformity or create a new category in which to 
"accommodate" it. (Ibid.) This process is easily observed in children, who were Piaget's 
main subjects of study. For instance, upon seeing a zebra for the first time, a child will 
see "a horse with stripes". At this stage, the information has been assimilated to a 
"horse" category. An accommodation occurs when the striped horse becomes a "zebra." 
These ideas have had an obvious influence on anthropological theories of 
stereotype and prejudice, which, taken as concepts, represent two other forms of frames 




interpretations of the world." (Ibid., 154) Here, frames are more specifically seen as 
"networks of nodes and relations" which serve as "a data structure for representing a 
stereotyped situation": they both impose order on experience and process it. (Ibid.) For 
example, if one has a concept of a particular ethnic or racial group as being x, y and z, he 
or she will only assimilate information regarding that group that conforms to that "x-y-z" 
frame. If this same individual is put in a situation of having to interact and get to know 
members of that said group, however, there may arise a need for a reorganization of the 
schema that informed the previous view, and thus, an "accommodation", or the creation 
of another frame. 
For Lakoff, who is interested in how "language characterizes knowledge", what 
he terms "frame of reference" is more specifically defined as "a conceptual structure used 
in thinking." (Lakoff, 2004, 2) Essentially, when one hears a word, its frame is 
automatically activated in one's mind. The title of Lakoff s book, Don't Think of an 
Elephant, exemplifies this process, where one cannot help but think of an elephant when 
asked not to think of one. This is because frames always evoke images "and certain 
knowledge about them." (Ibid., 4) The frame for an apple for example, evokes the image 
of a fruit, which is round and can be red, green or yellow. Frames are "made up of 
ideas", which not only evokes what we "know" from seeing something, but what we 
"experience" like the non-visible "crunchy" and "sweet" of an apple. (Ibid.) 
In effect, for Lakoff, a frame is akin to an entry in a dictionary: raw meaning. It 
is a mental concept of things as we see them and think of them. It is on this point that 
problems arise when debates such as the one at the center of this paper are at stake. 
Indeed, where there are no physical representations for particular concepts, the same 
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image and information will not necessarily be activated in everybody's mind. This is 
because frames are also culturally grounded, or to put it differently, they are informed by 
"worldviews." 
Worldviews 
The concept of worldview emerged in the 1970s from a desire by psychologists 
and ethnoscientists to create formal systems that would explain how individuals go about 
"understanding" in predictable ways, or how "people go about believing". (Rice, 153) 
The theories of accommodation and stereotype mentioned above represent some 
examples. Recalling Piaget's model for instance, schemata were subdivided into 
categories: universal, idiosyncratic and cultural, where universal schemata were the result 
of basic human cognitive capacities, idiosyncratic schemata emerged "through the 
vagaries of each individual's experience", and cultural schemata lied on the continuum in 
between the two. (Ibid., 154) These cultural schemata, or "socially-given perceptual 
modes" are those that operate "to produce a recognizable 'Weltanschauung,'" or 
"worldview." (Ibid.) 
Worldviews, like frames, thus govern perceptions. As one's mind shuffling 
between a front or back-facing Necker's cube, they impose order on sense-experience. 
The nuance between the two concepts is that rather than being based, like Piaget's 
idiosyncratic schemata, on personal experience, worldviews, are culturally-grounded and 
represent the "fundamental cognitive orientation" of a whole cultural group. (Ibid.) This 
understanding would be similar to Lakoffs if "cultural group" is seen as including 
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political affiliation. Indeed, for Lakoff, liberalism and conservatism are worldviews, and 
he has in fact devoted a whole other book on this subject: Moral Politics: How 
Conservatives and Liberals Think (2002), where these "worldviews" as respectively said 
to be based on a "nurturing mother" and a "strict father" model. Although the legitimacy 
of this understanding of conservatism and liberalism is debatable, it is Lakoff s 
description in Don't Think of an Elephant! of how frames evoke different ideas 
depending on whether we have a liberal or conservative disposition that is pivotal to my 
thesis and, ultimately, a better understanding of the stagnation at the policy level with 
respect to Aboriginal "self-government". Indeed, conceptualized as it is by Lakoff, 
"worldview" explains why people sometimes appear to not "understand" each other, 
much as is the case in the two self-government debates that will be presented next. For 
example, while it may not make sense to some Democrats that one could be both "pro-
life" and "pro-capital punishment," it is equally incomprehensible to many Republicans 
that one could espouse the opposite beliefs. When these apparently contradictory views 
are placed within the context of the larger worldview to which they belong, however: 
conservatism and liberalism, they then begin to make sense. (Lakoff, 2004, 6) 
An ideology can thus be a worldview, but a worldview is not necessarily an 
ideology. A worldview is the container for all the ideas and beliefs through which we 
interpret the world. The fundamental assumption that emerges from this understanding is 
that different worldviews, or different normative understandings of the world, would 
necessarily impact which ideas are evoked by a particular frame. This is illustrated in 
Lakoff s judicious example of taxation policy. (Ibid. 4-5) If we are a Democrat, we 
probably see taxation as a "necessity to advance the public good"; if we are a 
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Conservative, it probably evokes something more negative, like: "impediment to job 
creation because multinational companies do not invest where taxes are high" or "undue 
intrusion of the government." How democratic and republican political candidates go 
about persuading the electorate that their view of taxation should govern their 
understanding is dependent on how knowledgeable they are in the "art of framing." 
Framing 
What Lakoff calls the "art of framing" essentially consists in selling the values 
of our worldview. (Ibid., 6) More specifically, if we are a political strategist, it consists in 
selling these values to "the people in the middle," or to keep with Lakoffs example, the 
people who share both liberal and conservative beliefs, which he sees as representing the 
bulk of the electorate. (Ibid., 4-5) For instance, if we are a Republican and want to sell 
the conservative value "taxation is a burden," we should refrain from using the frame 
"cuts" because a significant amount of people may accept a liberal belief of taxation as 
"necessity" and "good" and "tax cuts" might evoke the idea "cutting good". (Ibid.,4) The 
frame "relief' on the other hand, evokes the end of an affliction; combined with "tax", it 
creates a new metaphor: "taxation is like an affliction." (Ibid.) Combined, yet again, with 
"creates jobs", what were initially "tax cuts" have effectively been transformed into 
"public good", enabling George W. Bush to call for an increase in "tax relief' from $350 
billion to $550 billion, as he in fact did, and still win the vote of those very Americans, 
who had absolutely nothing to gain from and additional $200 billion in what were really, 
as the Democrats had correctly pointed out, "corporate tax cuts." (Ibid., 5) 
18 
Through this example and others6, Lakoff argues that Republicans won the 2004 
election by incorporating strong frames of reference to their electoral campaign 
arguments. But framing efficiently was not the only factor in their success; a second 
factor was that Republicans were aware, thanks to their think tanks, of two myths derived 
from the Enlightenment and revolving around the notion of rationality, and in which 
liberals and progressives, according to Lakoff, firmly believe. The first myth is "the truth 
will set us free." (Ibid., 17) According to this idea (which finds salience in rational 
choice theory), since humans are rational beings, facts are the key to persuading them. 
The second myth: "people vote in their self-interest." (Ibid., 18) In reality, according to 
Lakoff (not only in Don't Think of an Elephant! but also in his and Mark Johnson's more 
erudite and acclaimed Metaphors We Live By (1980)), people vote their "moral identity 
and values", which are not derived from in any "rational" or "fact-based" system of 
thought, but are experientially derived and find resonance in language. 
This was the ultimate cause of the Democrat's failure to win the 2004 election, 
despite their very good arguments that the Republicans' taxation policy did the opposite 
of what it claimed to achieve. Georges W. Bush was re-elected because the mass of those 
who had voted their moral identity and values of "additional taxation is an impediment", 
at the expense of their economic interests, were those "people in the middle" - the masses 
- to whom the Democrats had been unable to appeal because they had failed at framing 
their values in a way that evoked their associated liberal worldview. According to Lakoff, 
they had made two other important mistakes: first, they negated the Republicans' frame 
"tax relief ' rather than come up with a new one. When they retorted that "tax relief will 
not create jobs," as Republicans had been claiming on every television panel that would 
6
 For example, the war on "terror". 
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have them, this may have been stating an economic fact, but stating it repeatedly, as they 
did, simply had for effect to reinforce the frame "relief', and hence the idea of taxation as 
an affliction. (Ibid., 4-5) Then, they made a second mistake: they borrowed the 
conservative frame. Indeed, seeing as Bush's tax relief plan appeared to be more popular 
in public opinion polls than their arguments that "tax relief does not create jobs", the 
Democrats came up with their own tax relief plan. In doing so, not only did they reinforce 
the metaphor that went along with the republican frame, but also, the conservative 
worldview that requires taxation "relief ' by using its frames to sell their ideas. (Ibid.) In 
doing so, the Democrats had effectively fallen in the "frame trap" that had been set by 
their opponents. They had been reduced to "arguing the facts" or revamping their 
policies with conservative spins. (Ibid., 16) It is this same trap, I argue, that awaits at the 
end of the debate over self-government. 
General Precepts 
Four general precepts emerge from Lakoff s work: first, and most importantly, 
frames shape our understanding of the world. When a person holds a frame, only the 
facts that fit that frame will be integrated to his or her worldview; facts that contradict 
that vision, just as Democrats' corporate taxation facts, will simply bounce off. Facts 
alone do not alter beliefs. This explains the persuasiveness of another republican framing 
success: a "war on terror." If no other frame is provided, if the Democrats do not provide 
a replacement frame, only the facts that conform to a "terror" frame will matter to voters, 
rather than the findings of a 9/11 Committee, which Democrats routinely cited. This is 
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not because voters lack the intellectual ability to distinguish the truth from fiction, but 
because it is the way in which cognitive science shows that human beings think. 
Essentially, we rely on frames because they provide simple answers to complex 
questions, like: what happened on 9/11? If the answer has been framed as an attempt to 
terrorize Americans, we should thus go to war against terror. Anyone who says 
otherwise must not have American citizens' security at heart, much as anyone who argues 
against "tax relief ' becomes a villain attempting to slay the hero that came up with the 
plan. 
Second, negating a frame has for effect to evoke it, which, in turn, reinforces it. 
In the case of taxation for instance, there already exists a worldview that supports the 
view of taxation as an "affliction". If taxation is an affliction, he who proposes tax relief 
is logically seen as the "good guy". Negating "tax-relief', as the Democrats did, therefore 
not only reinforced the frame, but created a perception of complicity with the "bad guys", 
or "the people who want us to pay more taxes", leading to this public outrage: do we not 
already pay out enough of our pay-checks to the government? and this result: millions of 
ballots cast by America's poorest in favour of those who promised relief. 
Third, borrowing a frame, just like negating it, reinforces it, a situation akin to 
providing free advertising for the opponent and the aboutissement of the frame-trap. 
Lakoff s ultimate advice to the Democrats, thus: never use their language. If you want to 
win the debate, you must provide a new language and reframe the debate instead of 
negating or borrowing frames that evoke the values of a worldview contradictory to your 
own; in other words, not a new tax-relief plan, but a freshly-worded plan altogether. This 
proposed solution and final precept will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Although it 
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essentially forms the basis for Lakof f s "how to win the debate" manual for Liberals and 
progressives, it unfortunately does not come equipped with a methodology as to how to 
choose these new frames, i.e. how to determine which frames will be more successful in 
capturing the public imagination, aside from a suggesting that the search should begin 
with knowing our values. As for the first three precepts, they will be useful in assessing 
the evidence presented in the next two chapters. Indeed, the parties involved in what I 
call the Innu and Cree "self-government debates" have similarly been reduced to arguing 
the facts, negating or borrowing frames and essentially, getting caught in the "self-
government frame trap". 
Before turning to these case studies however, some final words must be said on 
the concept of "metaphor", which, as has been seen so far, is intimately related to the 
concept of frame and admittedly, at times, hard to differentiate from it. A better 
understanding of metaphors will not only make the distinction clearer, but it will provide 
an increased understanding of the dynamics of some debates, as well as provide more 
substance to a discussion in Chapter 4 on the power of particular frames that will have 
emerged from my analysis of the Cree and Innu case studies. 
Conceptual and Structural Metaphors 
As seen in Lakoffs taxation example, the product of applying the frame 
"relief' to "tax" was a metaphor: taxation is like an affliction. "Metaphor" is broadly 
defined as "a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of 
object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them." 
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(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2010) Similarly, what Lakoff and Johnson 
alternately call "structural" or "conceptual metaphors" are those concepts we borrow 
from one domain to structure concepts from another, or "general mappings across 
conceptual fields." (Lakoff, 1993, 1) This would echo the various definitions of frames 
that have been outlined previously, which define them as "organizing" structures or sets 
of rules that create order in experience. 
Why do we sometimes borrow concepts from one area to describe another? 
Because metaphors, like frames, simplify the task of explaining. Consider Lakoff and 
Johnson's example: "argument is war". "War", here, is a structural metaphor for 
argument. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 454) It qualifies argument. It says: argument is 
something that is something like war. Do we not "win" or "lose" debates, "shoot down" 
our opponents arguments, "defend" our "positions" and use different "strategies" when 
our "weak points" are "attacked" or prove "indefensible"? War is thus a structural 
metaphor for argument because it "structures the way we think about argument and the 
actions we perform in arguing." (Ibid., 455) The same analogy can be made with the 
well-known expression "time is money", where money is the structural metaphor of time. 
Time cannot be seen or physically handled, but in Western societies, it is seen as a 
valuable commodity - it should therefore come as no surprise that time has come to be 
conceptualized in terms of money. We buy it, waste it, save it, spend it, invest it. (457) 
Like "argument", the activities related to time are metaphorically structured and hence, 
the language used to describe time is metaphorically structured. (Ibid.) This is not to say 
that time is a species of money or that argument is a species of war. A metaphor of 
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money or war simply enables a better understanding of the experience of argument and 
time. (Ibid.) 
The only information that should be retained from this brief presentation is that 
although we tend to think of metaphors as literary devices belonging to the realm of 
poetic expression, making our thoughts more colourful and interesting, and therefore, as 
being more pertinent to the study of literature than politics, they are actually necessary, 
like frames and worldviews, for human perception. (Lakoff, 1992, 1) They help us make 
sense of the world we live in because, as it has been shown throughout this chapter, "our 
conceptual system, in terms of how we think and act" is fundamentally language-driven, 
or more specifically, "metaphorical in nature." (Lakoff and Johnson, 454) This brings us 
back to the first precept of a Lakoffian approach and the reminder it ultimately provides: 
controlling the way in which the discourse is framed essentially means controlling the 
image that is put inside. 
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Chapter II: A Case-Study of the Crees of Northern Quebec 
Prior to the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples in 1996, opinion in the literature regarding the 1975 James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) was largely that it had traced the path to Cree self-
government by providing Cree communities with "considerable authority over their 
political, economic and social affairs."7 (Feit in Dickason, 1996, 405; Vincent, 1988b, 
215; Tetreault, 1987, 117; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1993; Institute on 
Governance, 1998, 16; Wherret and Hurley, 1999; Cree-Naskapi Commission, 1987, 11) 
In a brief submitted to the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Self 
Government, in December of 1984, the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec (GCCQ) 
reaffirmed that understanding, stating: "the Agreement itself provides for self-
government in many areas and provides for a substantial measure of regional self-
government through a range of Cree-controlled entities and institutions." (Grand Council 
of the Crees (of Quebec), Cree Regional Authority et al., 1984, 2-3) Indeed, as we will 
see in this chapter, the JBNQA called for the creation of a number of institutions that 
would allow the Cree people to have a "substantial measure of autonomy" in those areas 
over which they had jurisdiction: the Cree Regional Authority, the James Bay Native 
Development Corporation, the Cree School Board and the Board of Health and Social 
Services of James Bay; it thus gave them administrative powers not only over areas that 
had never been within their jurisdiction before, but some of which fell within provincial 
7
 A note on sources: many citations in this paper have been translated from French documents. Where such 
translations occur, a footnote will follow the quotation marks, and the original citation will be provided. All 
translations, unless otherwise specified, are my own. The original citation for the quote above: "une autorite 
considerable sur leurs affaires politiques, economiques et sociales." 
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jurisdiction, most notably health and education. (Quebec, 1991, s.14, s.16) Further, the 
Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act (1984), which gave force to the Agreement's chapter on 
"local government" officially removed Cree bands from under the jurisdiction of the 
Indian Act, enabling them to pass laws for the "good government" of their lands and the 
general welfare of their residents, without the need for the minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs' final stamp of approval. In light of this evidence, it appears reasonable 
to conclude that the Crees indeed practice a form of "self government", as Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in fact concluded in its authoritative report, although 
it would go on to say this "delegated form of self-government" ultimately only made 
possible the exercise of "municipal powers." (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996a, 317) 
The reason I choose the Crees of Northern Quebec as a case-study is precisely 
because of this sudden break with general opinion. The Royal Commission's position not 
only ignored legal provisions in the JBNQA and Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act that 
clearly provide for much vaster powers than those of ordinary Canadian municipalities, 
but empirical evidence suggesting that these are correlated with the Crees' higher quality 
of life, as compared to other Aboriginal communities, which confirmed the Royal 
Commission's position outlined in introduction: self-government could produce the 
desired results. However, invested with 58 million dollars to attempt to find solutions to 
the problem this paper seeks to bring to light, the Royal Commission would only devote a 
few paragraphs to the Cree model of self-government - in appendix to a chapter on 
Aboriginal governance, no less. This treatment, I argue, is illustrative of the problematic 
nature of the concept of "self-government": the actors in the academic debate define self-
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government differently and from different theoretical standpoints. It is not been a debate 
over how to enable Aboriginal peoples to return to their once self-governing status, but a 
one over which language should govern the debate, as illustrated in the tension between 
the frames of reference that have monopolize it, which will emerge in this chapter. 
Ultimately, the framing of Cree governance as "municipal governance", would "win", so 
to speak, the debate and lead to the shelving of the Cree model, rather than its full 
assessment for possible applications among other Aboriginal nations. 
To paraphrase Grand Chief Ted Moses, my intent is not to show that this model 
should be applied elsewhere, but it does provides "the first demonstration of how Indian 
self-government might work in practice. It is therefore of great significance to other 
Indian groups across the country." (Moses in Canada, House of Commons, 1984, 4:11) 
To be sure, there have been important implementation and financing problems with the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and its sister legislation, the Cree-Naskapi 
(of Quebec) Act, it took the signing of the Paix des Braves (2002), nearly thirty years 
later, to resolve them. But the fact also remains that the Crees of Northern Quebec are 
one of the most socio-economically well-off Aboriginal nations in the country. This 
cannot have occurred in a vacuum. There is thus something about the Cree model that 
warrants more attention than it has been given since the Royal Commission concluded it 
was not worth anybody's time - an opinion that largely informed the literature that 
followed. 
In this chapter, I outline some relevant chapters in the JBNQA and the CNQA 
since they "must be considered as a whole in order to capture the intent and spirit of the 
exercise and practice of Cree and Naskapi local government." (Cree-Naskapi 
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Commission, 2004, 9) This overview will also serve to document the general opinion in 
the literature prior to the publication of the Royal Commission's report, as well as shed 
some insights on empirical evidence that emerged following the JBNQA's 
implementation. Then, I present opinion in an academic debate as to the level of Cree 
self-government, which emerged after the publication of the Royal Commission's report. 
As this analysis will show, this report has not only informed the current position that a 
Cree model of governance should not be seen as a solution to the Aboriginal/Canadian 
well-being gap, but that it should not be seen as an example of self-government at all. 
Indeed, later contributors to the academic literature have framed Cree governance in a 
similar manner, leading to a similar situation where relevant evidence has "bounced out", 
as George Lakoff would put it, of their analyses, including pertinent socio-economic data 
showing that their increased autonomy over their affairs, whatever it should be called, is 
positively correlated with their increased quality of life. Any thorough reflection on the 
self-government "solution" should therefore begin with a Cree case-study. But first, I 
present a historical overview of events that culminated in the signature of the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement, starting in 1971, when a very optimistic politician 
thought he had come up with the idea of the century. 
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The Project of the Century 
II ne sera pas dit que nous vivrons pauvrement sur une terre aussi riche! 
- Robert Bourassa, 1971 
April 30th, 1971: Quebec Premier, Robert Bourassa, announces the "project of the 
o 
century" to a crowd of Liberal militants celebrating the first-year anniversary of their 
party's election. (Reid, 1971, Al) The project: a $6-billion hydro-electric development 
of 5 major rivers in the James Bay region - a project laden with nationalism and the 
promise of conquering Quebec's great, mythical North, which would create 100 000 jobs. 
(Charbonneau, 1970, Al ; Vincent, 1988a, 240) Cheers and applauds could be heard at the 
end of the high-tech, slide-show presentation that projected images of the future grandeur 
of the James Bay development to the sound of a dramatic orchestral score; no pictures of 
the Indian and Inuit populations, who resided on the coveted territories, to be seen on any 
giant screen, however. (Appendix 1) They would only leam about the "project of the 
century" the next day, on the radio.9 (Reid, Al ; Moses, 2002, 26) 
It is surprising that Robert Bourassa had not consulted - let alone informed -
these local indigenous populations. Indeed, the Rapport de la Commission d'etude sur 
I'integrite du territoire du Quebec (1971) (Dorion Report) had concluded just a few 
months earlier that legal documents10 confirmed Aboriginal peoples' rights to roughly 
8
 "projet du siecle" 
9
 The announcement also came at a time when most Cree hunters were out in the bush. This was an aggravating factor 
in the speed of the Crees' response to the project. (Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977. 6:4) 
10
 The most significant "debt'' is found in the Boundaries Extension Act of 1912. which extended Quebec's boundaries 
to include all territories (excluding Labrador) above the 50lh parallel. 
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85% of Quebec's territories, and explicitly recommended that the government "sign an 
agreement with [them] that would clearly extinguish any debt, no matter the nature -
individual or collective - of the Quebec State toward them."11 (Commission d'etude sur 
l'integrite du territoire du Quebec, 389) The Indian Association of Quebec (IAQ), the 
only Aboriginal organization in the province at the time, was understandably thrilled by 
the declaration: an official governmental document finally recognized that Aboriginal 
peoples had rights! (Trepanier, 1971, B7) Although it had reservations with respect to 
the chapter dealing with their political future, the publication of the Dorion Report 
represented an important victory for the IAQ, which had demanded recognition of these 
rights for all Aboriginals living in Quebec since its inception, in 1967. (Ibid.) 
It would be another year before negotiations concerning the rights of those most 
impacted by Robert Bourassa's project would be undertaken, however - until a young 
Charlie Watt had assembled a group of Inuits and created the Northern Quebec Inuit 
Association (NQIA) to join forces with the IAQ-represented Crees, led by an equally 
young Billy Diamond, and filed an injunction, in May of 1972, for the halting of works 
12 
on what was already being called the biggest construction site in the world. (Makivik 
Corporation, 2010) In a precedent-establishing ruling, Superior Court Justice Albert 
Malouf would grant that injunction, basing his decision, like Mr. Dorion, on the fact that 
Quebec became legally bound to resolving Aboriginal land claims when it signed the 
" "de signer avec les Indiens du Quebec une entente qui soit reconnue comme eteignant toute dette de quelque nature, 
individuelle ou collective, de l'Etat quebecois envers les Indiens." 
Mr. Dorion's conclusion that Aboriginal Peoples had "certain rights" on that territory was based on the following 
passage in the Boundaries Extension Act: "the province of Quebec will recognize the rights of the Indian inhabitants in 
the territory above described to the same extent, and will obtain surrenders of such rights in the same manner, as the 
Government of Canada has heretofore recognized such rights and has obtained surrender thereof, and the said province 
shall bear and satisfy all charges and expenditures in connection with or arising out of such surrenders." (Maton, 2010) 
12
 Naskapi and Innu populations also resided on this territory. An agreement would eventually be signed with the 
Naskapis. As for the Innus. they remain in negotiations, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
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Boundaries Extension Act in 1912. (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1993; Proulx, 
1982, 21; Vincent, 1988b, 221) Although the ruling would immediately be appealed by 
government lawyers, Premier Bourassa would not wait for the Quebec Court of Appeal's 
final decision: four days later, perhaps seeing the possibility of his dream of harnessing 
the hydro-electric forces of northern Quebec rivers turning into the front-page news 
headline, "James Bay Hydro: Unaccomplished Dream of the Century", he instead 
announced his decision to negotiate a settlement.13 (Vincent, 1988b, 221) 
A preliminary offer was put on the table: $100 million in compensation, and 
hunting, fishing and trapping rights over 2000 km2 of land. After a few months of 
13
 The Malouf ruling was overruled a week later (although legal requirement that Quebec negotiate a treaty covering 
the territory were not overturned). (Proulx. 1982, 20) It can be speculated that two other rulings handed down earlier -
the Calder case and the Paulette caveat - also played in the government's decision to return to the negotiations table, by 
showing "that it was no longer possible for governments to deny the legal existence of Aboriginal land rights." 
(Rynard, 2000, 216) A brief description of these cases is provided below. 
The Calder case: In 1969 the Nisga'as filed a suit against the government of British-Columbia arguing they had a title 
on their ancestral land, but the BC Supreme Court rejected it. The Nisga'as thus went to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which acknowledged that the existence of native rights was not only supported by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but 
also on the fact that Aboriginal societies lived according to their customs and method of organization on the territory, 
prior to the arrival of the Europeans. This decision in what is known as the "Calder Case" was rendered in February of 
1973 and led to an important revolution in the Aboriginal rights movement because it meant that the Royal 
Proclamation was not the only source of Aboriginal rights, since they could exist outside the territory referred to in the 
Proclamation. (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2003; Morin in Gagnon, 40-41) According to the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, it also led the government to adopt its first lands claim policy. (Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996a, 220) The JBNQA would be the first agreement concluded in the context of that policy. 
(Dupuis, 2002, 139) 
The Paulette caveat: In 1973, a group of Dene chiefs, led by Frangois Paulette, filed a caveat at the land titles office in 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, claiming a title over 400 000 square miles of land in the Mackenzie valley by 
virtue of their aboriginal rights. They also demanded the suspension of all future developments (such as the proposed 
Mackenzie Valley pipeline) until property over the land was clearly established. The office referred the caveat to the 
Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, where Judge William Morrow ruled in the Denes favour. Three of his 
conclusions have been especially pivotal with respect to Aboriginal rights: 1) that the Denes were "prima facie owners 
of the lands covered by the caveat", 2) that they have "what is known as aboriginal rights" and 3) that "there exists a 
clear constitutional obligation on the part of the Canadian Government to protect the legal rights of the indigenous 
peoples in the area covered by the caveat." (Morrow, 1973) The ruling was appealed by the Federal government, and 
the Supreme Court of Canada eventually overruled it, but only on a point of law - it did not refute Morrow's definition 
of Aboriginal rights. Soon after this ruling, the government accepted to negotiate with the Yukon Native Indian 
Brotherhood and provide the organization with funds to do so, implying, in doing so, that it recognized their rights. The 
government also instigated a inquiry into development of the Makenzie valley, which is known as the Berger Report. 
(Proulx. 47) Finally, the Morrow ruling also had an important impact on the situation in the James Bay. Even if the 
ruling did not confirm that Aboriginals had a title on the land, it "put the government in the position of having to 
determine through the courts or by political negotiations with the native peoples whether a legal claim did exist and if 
so what it was worth." (Native claims we now heed. 1974, A6) 
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deliberation and consultations within their communities, the Crees and the Inuits would 
reject the offer; their main grievances concerning the size of the territories awarded in the 
deal and Quebec's refusal to make any modification to the project, whatsoever - not, as 
has sometimes been suggested, the financial compensation. (Cleroux, 1974a, A l ; 
Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977a, 6:7) It should be noted that around this 
time, relations between Cree and IAQ leaders were becoming strained, as it became 
clearer to the latter that the former were more interested in negotiating a general 
settlement for all Aboriginal people of Quebec, rather than a particular settlement for 
them.14 (La Rusic, 1983, iii; Tetreault, 80; Diamond, in Tetreault, 215) In May of 1974, 
the Crees thus decided to leave the association; three months later, on August 16th, the 
Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec (GCCQ) was born. It was at this point - the 
beginnings of a real Cree political organization - that negotiations toward an agreement 
truly got under way.15 (Tetreault, 81; Proulx, 22) Within another three months, on 
November 15 th, 1974, a picture of the Crees and Inuits finally made the story: together 
with then-minister of the department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Judd 
Buchanan, and Premier Robert Bourassa, all smiles, at the signing of an agreement-in-
principle. (Cleroux, 1974b, A10) That same day, the IAQ also called a press conference: 
to denounce the "trickery" that had just occurred behind other Aboriginal peoples' back. 
(Dumas, 1974, 1) Indeed, according to its president and Grand Chief of the Kahnawake 
14
 The Dorion Report gave the IAQ a strong argument to support that position. 
15
 It should be noted that although they did share a common culture and language, the 8 Cree communities (9 today) 
that were affected by the James Bay project had little communication between each other prior to 1971 and thus lacked 
the necessary political unity to advance their cause. (La Rusic, 1979, 2; Salisbury, 1986, 4; Isaac, 1991, 20) It was 
only a few months after the announcement that construction had begun at the La Grande Complex that the chiefs of 
each community first met to discuss their strategy and mandated the IAQ to negotiate with the government in their 
name. (Tetreault, 77) 
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Mohawks, Andrew Delisle, the Crees had essentially "sold themselves off for mirrors."16 
(Ibid.) According to journalist and author, Roger Lacasse (1983), this attitude represented 
a good reflection of the general animosity within the IAQ after being snubbed by the 
Crees and the Inuits and removed from the negotiations process. (493) Delisle's snipping 
remarks would have no impact on the drafting of a final agreement, however. 
Negotiations would go on "non-stop' ' from November 15th, 1974 to November 11th, 1975, 
when the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was finally signed, with a 
collective sigh of relief, a few moments before the midnight deadline. (Ibid., 494) 
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
If the JBNQA had been summarized in two words in the 1980s or early 90s, 
they might have been "rights exchange". (Morin, 2002, 42; Gourdeau, 2002, 25; Couture, 
2002, 63; Tetreault, 91) Indeed, in signing it with the provincial and federal governments, 
Hydro-Quebec and the James Bay Energy Corporation, the Crees essentially agreed to 
"cede, release, surrender and convey" all their "Native claims, rights, titles and interests, 
whatever they may be, in and to land in the territory and in Quebec," in exchange for a 
series of specific rights that touched upon preservation and development of their 
resources, cultures and communities. (Quebec, 1991, s.2.1) Some authors have referred 
to this "exchange" as one of "poorly-defined" ancestral rights for the "clear rights" 
outlined in the Agreement. (Gourdeau, 25) Others, JBNQA critics like the IAQ, would 
16
 "se sont vendus pour des mjroirs" 
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speak of downright "rights extinction", but according to testimony by Billy Diamond, 
then-Grand Chief of the GCCQ, before the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, "the Cree people knew that by accepting the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement they were not terminating their rights and the right to being 
an Indian." (Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977a, 6:13) Instead, they felt 
they had "reinforced their identity as Crees." (Ibid.) Further, they felt that for the first 
time in the history of their relation with the government of Canada, their rights were no 
longer seen as "privileges" like the ones awarded in the Indian Act. (Diamond in Canada, 
House of Commons, 1977b, 7:14) More importantly, these rights could not be taken 
away without their consent because the JBNQA has precedence over other federal and 
provincial laws and regulations and because section 35 of the Constitution Act protects 
them by guaranteeing "existing aboriginal and treaty rights." (Ibid.; Canada, 1982, Part 
II, s.35) For these reasons, the Crees have often referred to the Agreement as their 
"Charter of Rights" or as Ted Moses put it, something akin to "the constitution of a new 
country." (Couture, 63; Diamond, 1985, 282; Moses in Canada, House of Commons, 
1977a, 8:8) 
Among the Crees' new rights: "the exclusive use and benefit" of 4722 km2 of 
category I lands.17 (Quebec, s.5.1.2) Although Quebec would retain "bare ownership" and 
"subsurface rights" on these lands, the Crees would now have a veto over the use of those 
rights by the province, which was also legally bound to provide compensation if it chose 
17
 An entire paper could be written on the land regime in the JBNQA. Essentially, 3 categories of land were created: 
category 1 lands, "for the exclusive use and benefit of Aboriginal people"; category II lands, which remained under the 
jurisdiction of the province, but on which "Native governments share management for hunting, fishing and trapping, 
tourism development and forestry'" and where the Crees retained "exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights"; and 
category III lands, "a special type of Quebec public lands" where "both Native and non-Native people may hunt and 
fish...subject to regulations adopted in accordance with the agreements," but where "Aboriginal groups have exclusive 
rights to harvest certain aquatic species and fur-bearing mammals and to participate in the administration and 
development of the land." (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1993) 
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to develop lands and resources beyond those outlined in the Agreement. (Ibid., s.5.1.3) 
Another "exclusive right" and especially important one, according to the Crees: to hunt, 
fish and trap on 69 995 km2 of category II lands - a significant improvement from what 
had initially been offered by Robert Bourassa, in 1973, and clearly, a result of their own 
insistence. (Diamond, 1985; Quebec, s.5.2) The most significant right the Crees felt they 
had gained through the JBNQA, however, was "the freedom to choose between two 
societies." (Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977b, 6:13) Indeed, thanks to a 
novel, and to this day, very successful Income Security Program for Cree Hunters and 
Trappers, they could now "lead a traditional way of life", which was secured by the 
program, or "pursue a modern industrial society way of life." (Ibid.) 
Aside from defining specific rights, resolving land claims and providing $135 
million in monetary compensation for the destruction of parts of their hunting territories, 
the JBNQA also called for the creation of a number of institutions which have been 
argued to "give the Crees considerable means to increase their autonomy and promote 
their cultural, social and economic development."18 (Tetrault, 92; Feit in Dickason, 405) 
It is useful to examine the provisions regarding two of these in particular: the Cree 
School Board and the Cree Board of Health and Social Services of James Bay, before 
moving onto a discussion of the element that has been said to be most directly related to 
"self-government" in the JBNQA: that "special legislation concerning local government" 
called for in Section 9, which would eventually become the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) 
Act. (Quebec, s.16, s.14, s.9.1) Indeed, the academic debate over "Cree self-government" 
has not only been centered on provisions contained within that particular legislation, but 
18
 "des moyens importants aux Cris afin qu'ils puissant accroitre leur autonomie et favoriser leur developpement 
culture], social et economique." 
35 
also, and unsurprisingly since they are generally associated to the provincial realm, on the 
Crees' increased latitude in the administration of education and health. 
Cree Education 
Prior to 1975, schooling in the Cree communities of the James Bay region was 
controlled by Catholic and Anglican missionaries; in the 1960s, by the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND); and from 1968 on, by both DIAND 
and the Commission Scolaire du Nouveau Quebec. (Namagoose, 2004, 3; Canada, House 
of Commons, 1984, 27) Throughout this period teachers were all non-Aboriginal, the 
curricula and textbooks were created and written by non-Aboriginals and classes 
followed a Western school-calendar.19 (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 27; Cree 
School Board, 2006, 4) After the enactment of the JBNQA however, the Crees now had 
"jurisdiction and responsibility for education within category I and II lands." (Quebec, 
s.16) This was the result of their direct involvement in negotiations toward the JBNQA, 
which included "working on education [and] setting up our own Cree school board." 
(Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 6:12) Thus, from 1977 on (when the JBNQA 
received royal assent), a newly-created Cree School Board would decide what made it on 
the school curriculum, "select suitable textbooks, hire appropriate teachers and adopt a 
distinctly Cree school calendar". (Cree School Board, 4) This gave the Crees powers 
"unequalled in other school boards across the land, and certainly beyond comparison with 
powers related to the administration of other Indian boards in Canada." (Canada, House 
19
 According to the Makivik Corporation, this calendar was problematic because it did not take into account Cree 
hunting seasons. In the summer, the Crees tend to remain in their villages, while in the fall and spring they go hunt in 
the bush for months at a time. Many children would miss school for extended periods for this reason. (Makivik, 2010) 
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of Commons, 1983, 29) More significantly, an amendment to the Charter of the French 
Language ensured education in Cree schools could now be dispensed in the Cree 
language.20 (Quebec, 1977, s.VII, a.88) As Cree negotiator, Philip Awashish, put it, this 
ability to determine the language of education would be "instrumental in the preservation 
of Eeyou culture." (Awashish in Gagnon, 156) 
Language has long been described as the essence of culture; governmental 
officials and missionaries were well aware of this relationship when they created the 
infamous residential school system, which was based on the idea that by not allowing 
Aboriginal youths to speak their language (or practice their religious beliefs and rituals), 
"the heart and soul of Indian cultures would be removed" in a process of "de-indianizing 
the Indians." (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 27) Reclaiming control over language 
of education was thus a goal of Aboriginal peoples since it was timidly voiced in Citizens 
Plus (the "Red Paper") and more assertively so in the Report of the Special Committee on 
Indian Self-Government (1983), where it was described "as an essential component in 
strengthening Indian culture and preserving Indian heritage."21 (Canada, House of 
Commons, 1983, 29) 
Empirical evidence is supportive of the claim that control over language of 
education has significant social repercussions. In the case of the Crees, according to data 
collected by the Task Force on Aboriginal Cultures and Languages and Statistics Canada, 
20
 It was also amended to make Inuktitut the language of instruction in Inuit communities. Classes are taught strictly in 
Cree and Inuktitut until grade 3. (Quebec, 1977; Makivik, 2010) 
21
 Citizen Plus was the official response of the Indian Chiefs of Alberta to the 1969 Statement of the Government of 
Canada on Indian policy (White Paper). The document argues that "the only way for us to maintain our culture is for 
us to remain Indians... We want our children to learn our ways, our histories, our customs and our traditions." (Indian 
Chiefs of Alberta. 1970, 5) It also called for the creation of an Indian Education Center, a learning environment in 
which "Indian men, women and children may develop a deep understanding of themselves", through, among other 
things, the "development and maintenance of Indian languages and heritage." (Ibid., 58) 
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while only 12% of Canada's First Nations22 still had a "flourishing language"23 in 2005, 
89% of the Crees were fluent in theirs.24 (Canada, Task Force on Aboriginal Languages 
and Cultures, 2005, 34; Armstrong, 1999, 3) In another empirical study on the Crees' 
quality of life post-Agreement, Martin Papillon (2008b) also concluded that the Board's 
ability to provide "early childhood and elementary education in Cree and Inuktitut 
certainly has a lot to do with the healthy state of Aboriginal languages in JBNQA 
communities." (10) It can therefore be said that the objective of the education section, to 
give "Cree control of Cree education" based on a desire by Cree parents to have their 
language taught in schools so their children could speak it and write in properly, has been 
achieved. (Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977b, 7:5) 
This approach to the preservation of language at the community level would in 
fact turn up as a recommendation in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, which argued that the revitalization of traditional languages was a key 
component in the maintenance of healthy communities. (Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, 1996d, 617-618) Indeed, Statistics Canada uses language as an 
indicator of community well-being precisely because it is seen as "a proxy for how 
successfully traditional culture has been preserved." (Armstrong, 1999, 16) The ability to 
"[determine] Aboriginal language status" was also seen as a "core power in Aboriginal 
self-government" by the Royal Commission, which recommended that the Canadian 
government empower Aboriginal Peoples to "[use] and [promote] their language and 
22
 21 nations out of 171. 
21
 The Taskforce calculates language vitality according to the Bauman scale (see Bauman. James. 1980. A Guide to 
Issues in Indian Language Retention. Washington: Centre for Applied Linguistics.) A "flourishing" language is defined 
as one that has speakers of all ages, where intergenerational transmission occurs and where use is supported in the 
community, the home and school. (Canada. Task Force on Aboriginal Languages and Cultures, 2005, 34) 
24
 Similarly, 82% of the Inuit, who are also signatories of the JBNQA, and who also have their own school board, speak 
Inuktitut. (Statistics Canada, 2001) 
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[declare] them official languages within their nations, territories and communities where 
they choose to do so." (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996d, 617-618) This 
stress on the language-component of governance mirrors conclusions in the Report of 
Special Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Self-Government, better known 
as the "Penner Report", which offered that while residential schools and forced education 
in French or in English had clearly played a key role in the erosion of Aboriginal 
languages, "most [Aboriginal communities] operate under the Indian Act and do not 
therefore have the legislative tools available under self-government arrangements that 
would enable them to strongly promote the use of their languages for official functions." 
(Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 18) In the case of the Crees, JBNQA provisions 
certainly ensured they would. All courses are taught in Cree until grade 3, the pivotal 
learning years. Cree is likely the "unofficial" official language in all Cree communities, 
because it has been taught in this way for the past three decades. 
Cree Health 
The JBNQA also called for the creation of a Cree Board of Health and Social 
Services of James Bay (CBHSSJB), which would be responsible for the administration of 
"appropriate health services and social services for all persons normally resident or 
temporarily present in the Region." (Quebec, 1991, s. 14.0.3) As in the case of the Cree 
School board, the CBHSSJB provides its services in the Cree language and in a way that 
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incorporates Cree traditional values. This would also have a significant impact on Cree 
health.25 
As mentioned in introduction, Aboriginal peoples' overall health is in dire straits. 
According to a report published by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development in 1980, the infant mortality rate was actually two and a half times the 
national average, while accidents, violence and poisonings were the number one cause of 
death. (DIAND in Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 14) This situation could not be 
resolved by simply "putting in more medical services"; focus had to instead be on 
enabling Aboriginal Peoples to take "responsibility for their own health." (Ibid.) Indeed, 
this state of "social disintegration and deprivation" was still evident in the mid-nineties, 
when the Royal Commission was gathering data in preparation for its own report. It 
found that Aboriginal people endured ill health "at rates found more often in developing 
countries than in Canada." (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1996b) The troubling 
comparison was further emphasized in Cindy Blackstock's Same Country, Same Lands, 
78 Countries Behind. Her findings were based on a 2001 study ordered by IN AC, which 
concluded that, when UNHDI indicators were used to calculate their respective levels of 
well-being, "considerable differences remained" between the Canadian and registered-
Indian populations. (Cook, Beavon et al., 2007, i; Blackstock, 2001, 131; Assembly of 
First Nations, 2010) 
Prior to the vesting of administrative control over health in Cree hands, their 
overall health was also in dire straits. According to data collected by the CBHSSJB, 
before it began delivering services, in 1978, "the status of Cree health reflected patterns 
25
 These services are currently dispensed in a regional hospital in Chisasibi, coastal CLSCs in Whapmagoostui. 
Wemindji, Eastmain and Waskaganish, and inland CLSCs in Mistissini. Waswanipi, Ouje-Bougoumou and Nemaska. 
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similar to that of developing countries", with high infectious disease and infant mortality 
rates, such as those that prevail in many other Aboriginal communities across the country 
to this day. (Torrie, Bobet et al., 2005, 66) As of 2003, still according to the CBHSSJB's 
findings, the infant mortality rate26 has dropped to only slightly higher than that of 
Quebec and while the total death rate from infectious and parasitic diseases was five 
times Quebec's average in the decade that followed the signing of the Agreement, this 
rate also fell - to below average - after 1986. (Ibid., 62) Similarly, gastrointestinal 
outbreaks such as those that occurred in 198027 have never reoccurred, and "tuberculosis 
rates, while historically higher than Quebec, have steadily decreased." (Ibid., 66) 
Further, this reduction in mortality and infectious diseases rates could be correlated to the 
success of the CBHSSJB's "immunization program for major infectious diseases, along 
with an effective tuberculosis control program" - programs created in response to 
particular Cree conditions, by Cree service coordinators and administrators with far more 
first-hand knowledge of Cree health and social needs than say, Department of Health 
officials in Quebec City. 
Richard Salisbury (1986) had predicted this outcome long before these data 
became available, seeing it as a given that one of the implications of the taking over of 
the administration of local and regional health services by the Crees would necessarily be 
that these would become "more responsive to local needs." (74) Other Indian reserve 
communities, still under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act, they did not see comparable 
26
 Not including infants who die of incurable genetic diseases. 
27
 In 1980, four Cree communities experienced major gastro-enteritis outbreaks. Many children died as a result. This 
occurred during a period of "administrative confusion and jurisdictional disputes" between the federal and Quebec 
governments concerning the implementation of the JBNQA. (Torrie, Bobet et al., 62) Each level of government argued 
the other was supposed to fund Cree health and social services; serious deterioration in infrastructure and services 
ensued. Media attention, Cree lawsuits and government reports finally prompted major governmental investments in 
socio-sanitary infrastructures during the early 1980s. (Ibid.) After that, public health measures and sanitary conditions 
rapidly improved. (Ibid.) 
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outcomes in the same period. For instance, according to RCAP, total infant death in 
Aboriginal communities was still about twice the national average, while tuberculosis 
rates were 43 times higher. (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996d, 108, 139) 
Although worrisome health problems such as alcoholism, obesity and diabetes have not 
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decreased in Cree communities and are in fact on the rise , the CBHSSJB expects their 
current staggering rates to follow a similar downward trend in the next decade, as it takes 
a more "Cree focused and community controlled direction," following from the signature 
of the Agreement Respecting a New Relationship Between the Cree Nation and the 
Government of Quebec29 (Paix des Braves) in 2002, which provided it with more 
appropriate financial resources "to fully implement [the health section] of the James Bay 
30 
and Northern Quebec Agreement, our first modern treaty." (Torrie, Bobet et al., i) 
Lastly, as in the case of Cree control over education, this community-based 
approach to health has been strongly supported by the Penner Report as a means to 
28
 According to the CBHSSJM, this could be explained in that, "until very recently, [the Board] offered almost no 
effective, population-based education concerning prevailing health problems and methods of preventing and controlling 
them. It was not able to predict the diabetes 'epidemic', although such patterns in other Aboriginal groups had already 
been reported. Ten years after nurses had first warned about this emerging problem, the CBHSSJB was unable to 
respond due to chronic under-financing and lack of capacity." (66) See footnotes 27 and 30 for more details on that 
"chronic under-financing." 
29The Paix des Braves, also referred to as Quebec's first "nation to nation" agreement, essentially allowed Quebec to 
pursue two hydroelectric development on JBNQA territories (the Eastmain-l-A and Rupert Diversion projects) and 
increased Cree participation in the economy, most notably in the areas of hydroelectricity, mining and forestry (by 
guaranteeing employment). It also provided monetary compensation indexed to the annual value of the resources 
extracted (including revenues derived from the two new hydroelectric projects at the source of the government's desire 
to negotiate: the Eastmain 1-A and Rupert River Diversion Hydropower Project). (Papillon, 2008b, 17) Lastly, it 
transferred Quebec's responsibilities under the JBNQA for regional and social development to the Cree Regional 
Authority, facilitating, for instance, a more focused funding of health programs in areas of need, as noted by the 
CJBSSSH above. According to the GCCQ, the Paix des Braves allowed it to more "properly carry out these 
responsibilities in accordance with priorities and means which we, the Cree, deem appropriate for our own 
development." (Grand Council of the Crees, 2010) 
30
 Although the Agreement gave the Cree significant control over their health, it admittedly took many years to 
implement these changes. The purpose of this paper is not to outline how the JBNQA has failed the Cree. but rather, 
point to those elements (powers and structures), combined with the CNQA, that have been said, in the self-government 
literature, to enable Cree self-government. Suffice it to say that complaints in the area of health mainly revolved around 
financing. This might not have been an issue had the agreement been signed in a unitary State. Indeed, the principle 
reasons for delays in financing were disputes between Ottawa and Quebec. Nevertheless, the CBHSSJB maintains that 
"significant improvements in the populations' health and in the health services available" have occurred. (Torrie, Bobet 
et al., 2005, x) The signature of the more recent Paix des Braves has helped speed improvements by providing a new. 
clearer, financing agreement. (Ibid.) 
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control the "problems to which health is linked." (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 35) 
Indeed, health is not an isolated issue that can be resolved from the top down, which is 
the current approach in other Aboriginal communities. The problem, according to Keith 
Penner, was the "array of bureaucratic and legislative obstacles that limit their ability to 
act." (Ibid., 14) Improving the state of Aboriginal peoples' health thus required "the 
exercise of Indian self-government." (Ibid., 35) 
Band Membership 
A significant other element supporting the thesis, in a "pre-Royal Commission" 
literature, that the JBNQA has put the Crees "on the path to self-government", and which 
should be mentioned before moving on to a discussion of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) 
Act, can be found in Section 3, which stipulates that any person of Cree descent or "who 
is recognized by one of the Cree communities as having been on such date a member 
thereof' is admissible as a beneficiary. (Quebec, 1991, s3.16) In the case of other 
Aboriginal communities (excluding those who have signed other self-government 
agreements, such as the Nisga'as, Sechelts and Yukon First Nations), INAC retains the 
power to decide "who is an Indian" and therefore, who can obtain the benefits derived 
from "Indian" status. As constitutional law expert Thomas Isaac (1991) noted, the Crees' 
ability to decide who is a member of their communities and derive benefits from that 
membership (i.e the specific rights and financial compensation outlined in the 
Agreement), is not only indicative of a greater degree of autonomy in their affairs, it is 
also indicative of a certain degree of sovereignty, comparable to that of the State to grant 
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citizenship. (17) Further, the Penner Report specifically endorsed "membership 
determination" as a key aspect of self-governance, arguing that "control over membership 
is not only a right, [but is] essential to ensure cultural, linguistic and ethnic survival." 
(Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 54) 
A "Special Legislation": The Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act 
While the Crees' control over health and education can arguably be said to be 
indicative of an increased autonomy in their political, social and cultural affairs, the 
provisions in Section 9 of the JBNQA are those that most clearly deal with an idea of 
"self-government." When the "special legislation" called for in this section - the Cree-
Naskapi (of Quebec) Act (CNQA) - was assented to on June 14th, 1984, the media 
reported that it "finally [gave the Crees] the authority to form governments." (Canadian 
Press, 1984, Al 1) Then-minister of DIAND, John Munro, concurred: the CNQA aimed 
at enabling "the Crees and Naskapis to take responsibility and have authority over their 
own forms of self-government." (Munro in Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, 
1984, 4488) Self-government was in fact "the central theme" of the Act and had been 
"central to all discussions and negotiations that have taken place since the signing of the 
[JBNQA]", or to put it in Phillip Awashish's words, the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act 
was "the legislative framework for Cree self-government." (Ibid.; Awashish in Canada, 
House of Commons, 1984, 4:29) Indeed, the CNQA is usually referred to in the pre-
Royal Commission literature as "the first Indian self-government legislation in Canada." 
(Cree-Naskapi Commission, 1987, 2; Dickason, 412; Institute on Governance, 1998, 17; 
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Vincent, 1988b) 
The Act essentially did two things: first, it officially removed the Cree people 
from under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act, which basically meant that Cree bands 
would "no longer be administrative extensions of the Department [of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development]". (Moses in Canada, House of Commons, 1984,4:11) In order to 
do this, all bands had to be reconstituted into corporations, or to borrow the Act's legal 
lingo, "natural persons." (Canada, 1984, a.22.1) This would resolve a problem that had 
previously been outlined in the Penner Report: the fact that "bands and band councils are 
creatures of the Indian Act." (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 19) According to Keith 
Penner, this situation meant that 
all their legally recognized powers are defined in and, more importantly, 
limited to those specifically mentioned in the Indian Act. Many important 
matters necessary to the functions of government in modern society are 
omitted from the Act. These omissions have resulted in great uncertainty 
about the legal capacity of bands and of band councils and have raised 
questions as to whether a band council can sign contracts, bring lawsuits, 
and generally act in the name of the band. (Ibid., 18) 
The moment Cree bands we incorporated, by contrast, they now had the "capacity, rights, 
powers and privileges of a natural person." (Canada, 1984, a.22) Unlike other 
Aboriginals still under the tutelage of INAC, thus, the Crees could finally sign contracts, 
own property and take legal actions in their own name. (Ibid.; Cree-Naskapi 
Commission, 1986b) Indeed, Canadian courts had previously held that bands could not 
sue or be sued, or acquire title to their land, but by incorporating as companies Cree 
bands' legal status had been clarified so that they could "carry on business ventures, own 
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land or undertake other activities for the benefit of the band." (Canada, House of 
Commons, 1983, 18) 
According to Thomas Isaac (1994), this notion of "natural person" at the basis of 
incorporation, was an important one in supporting a thesis that the Crees were self-
governing. (238) Indeed, although federal and provincial governments retained 
sovereignty and therefore, remained the only levels of government able to exercise 
powers that necessarily exceeded those of Cree corporations, their capacity to "wield 
power against the best interests of the Aboriginal peoples, in favour of other interests, 
[was] undermined significantly." (Ibid.) In essence, although the JBNQA had greatly 
increased the Crees' autonomy through the creation of various institutions, this had only 
rectified the power imbalance that had defined Cree-State relations until then on paper. 
This is because until the CNQA was adopted, the Agreement stated that "the Indian Act 
shall apply" to all category I lands. In other words, even if band councils had been 
granted powers to administer their lands through the Agreement, they could only apply 
and coordinate INAC's programs and policies in the meantime. (Quebec, 1991, s.9.0.2; 
Tetreault, 85, 139) From the moment Cree bands were incorporated however, that power 
imbalance was rectified in practice. 
The second thing the Act did was to provide incorporated bands with the power to 
act as "the local government authority" on their Category I lands and administer and 
manage the said lands as if they were "the owner thereof."31 (Canada, 1984, a. 109.2) 
This would be achieved through the vesting, in band councils, of the authority to pass 
31
 This echoes section 5 of the JBNQA, which already stipulated that those lands were put aside for "the exclusive use 
and benefit of Cree bands." (Quebec, 1991, s.5.1.2) The only notable difference between the language of the 
Agreement and the Act in this respect is that the CNQA gives the Cree rights not only over the lands, but over the 
"natural resources thereof." (Canada, 1984, art.109.2) Quebec, as in the Agreement, retained bare ownership. (Ibid., 
art. 109.1) 
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bylaws for the "good government" of their lands and "all residents thereof'. (Ibid., 
a.45.1) Effectively, this translates into the power to legislate and this, in a host of areas: 
from public order and security, health and hygiene, the operation of businesses (including 
the issuing of permits or licenses), to land and resource use and zoning, taxation32, 
environmental protection, hunting, fishing and trapping, and band council internal 
administration and elections. (Ibid., a.45.1c-48.65) Although other Aboriginal band 
councils can also pass bylaws in their communities, the most notable difference between 
Cree bylaws and say, Innu bylaws, is that the former cannot be disallowed33 by the 
Minister, Cree band councils no longer being creatures of IN AC. (Canada, 1985, a.83) 
As noted in the Penner Report, this "power of discretionary control" was extremely 
limitative because it led to "interminable technical complications to accomplish the 
simplest act." (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 21) For instance, the minister, having 
trust responsibilities "in relation to band moneys", this prevented him "from permitting 
band governments to control their own assets and to use them as they would wish for 
their own development." (Ibid.) Following from provisions in the CNQA, however, the 
Crees can enact their own budgets and direct those moneys where they feel they are 
needed. If they wanted to develop their lands, for instance, they could "enact zoning and 
building by-laws, among other matters, powers that bands [governed by the Indian Act] 
do not have now." (Ibid., 21) Further, Cree band councils, unlike Innu band councils, 
have broader jurisdictions and can legislate in the areas of land and resource use, 
taxation, internal administration and elections, as well as traditionally provincially-held 
32
 For local purposes and by other means than income tax. 
33
 Except where hunting, fishing and trapping are concerned, if they infringe on the rights already set out in the 
JBNQA. and with respect to elections, to ensure that they contain all the necessary elements for a functional electoral 
system, according to Daniel Tetreault. (117) 
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jurisdictions of successions, the environment, natural resources and hunting, fishing and 
trapping. (Canada, 1985) 
Some Criticisms 
Before moving on to a literature review on the debate over Cree self-government, 
it is worth examining the two main criticisms that have been made concerning the thesis 
that the CNQA, in particular, has enabled the Crees to be self-governing. Indeed, it 
should be stressed that the intent of the demonstration in this and the previous sections is 
not to present the JBNQA and CNQA as some sort of glorious example of what self-
government is or what it can achieve. The goal is to present a concise overview of the 
facts, as they are available in an older, but not to be discounted, Cree self-government 
literature. 
The first criticism concerns the Act's object. According to Daniel Tetreault, if it 
were conform to this object, "it would speak of legislative powers."34 (114) Indeed, the 
Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act (1986), another so-called self-government act 
adopted two years after the CNQA and largely modeled on it, does refer to legislative 
powers: instead of bylaws, the Sechelts' Act refers to the power of bands to pass "laws". 
However, as Tetreault goes on to point out, from a judicial point of view, there is not 
"much of a difference between 'bylaws' and 'laws'"35, except with respect to federal and 
provincial laws of "general application" - in the case of bylaws, these would prevail. 
(Ibid.) There is a problem with the thesis that the Sechelt might exercise legislative 
34
 "elle ferait plutot mention du pouvoir de legiferer" 
35
 "d 'un point de vue juridique il ne semble pas exister une difference enorme entre 'by laws' et ' laws'" 
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powers superior to the Crees' due to the more specific terminology in the Sechelt Indian 
Band Self-Government Act, however: the CNQA explicitly specifies that "where there is 
any inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other Act of 
Parliament, this Act shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict." (Canada, 
1984, a.3-4, emphasis mine) The same is said of provincial laws and regulations. 
Further, the areas in which the Crees have "bylaw-making" powers are identical to those 
in which the Sechelts have "law-making" powers. 
The second criticism, raised by both Tetreault and Thomas Isaac, concerns 
provisions in the Act that relate to the financial administration of Cree bands. (Canada, 
1984, a.89-100) Although these provisions allow for a relative autonomy over band 
councils' financial affairs (enabling them to adopt their own budgets, supplementary 
budgets for example, and take out short and long term loans), they also allow the Minister 
to "give written notice to the band of his intention to appoint an administrator to 
administer the financial affairs of the band" if he is of the opinion that "the financial 
affairs of a band are in serious disorder." (Ibid., a. 100) This leads Tetreault to qualify 
article 100 as a "veritable relic of the paternalist tone of the Indian Act."36 (Tetreault, 
117; Isaac, 1991, 31) Indeed, it is hard to disagree that this is "an extremely weak aspect 
of the Act, because it contrasts with the notion of self-government that aims to give 
-in 
aboriginal communities full control over their destinies." (Tetreault, 117) To provide 
some context, that would not have been available at the time of Tetreault's writing, 
however, it should be noted that the government has never made use of this power. 
36
 "veritable reliquat du ton paternaliste de la Loi sur les Indien." 
37
 "un point extremement faible de la Loi parce qu'il contraste avec la notion d'autonomie gouvernementale qui vise a 
rendre aux communautes autochtones la maitrise de leur destinee." 
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Considering the Crees' national and international visibility and their experience with the 
courts and the media, it is quite unlikely it would. 
The Debate Over Cree Self-Government: a Literature Review 
As mentioned in introduction, there appears to be a consensus amongst parties 
involved in an "Aboriginal well-being debate" that self-government represents the 
solution to increasing Aboriginal Peoples' quality of life. This was illustrated in the 
quotes provided in introduction by the Royal Commission, the Assembly of the First 
Nations of Quebec and Labrador and the Federal government; it will further be reinforced 
in the section that follows, where I present some of the academic literature that emerged 
after the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. 
First, I outline the Royal Commission's conclusions as to the best way to 
resolve the problem of Aboriginal Peoples' poor quality of life, as well as its opinion with 
respect to the level of self-government enabled by the JBNQA and CNQA. Then, I 
outline Taiaiake Alfred's take on the same questions in Peace Power and Righteousness: 
an Indigenous Manifesto (1999). The purpose of outlining these works will principally 
be to draw out the main frames of reference in their respective arguments, although some 
comments will also be made concerning the "worldview" that appears to have informed 
them. Finally, I present Martin Papillon's empirical study of Cree well-being, Aboriginal 
Quality of Life Under a Modern Treaty: Lessons from the Experience of the Cree Nation 
of Eeyou Istchee and the Inuit ofNunavik (2008b), which will serve to exemplify the first 
precept of Lakoff s "theory of framing" that when people hold a frame, only the facts that 
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fit that frame will be integrated to their understanding; facts that contradict that vision 
will simply "bounce off." This rule applies not only to a lay, American electorate, but to 
academics as well. Further, throughout this presentation, I contrast with contradictory 
statements or evidence made or provided by various other actors that have directly or 
indirectly been involved in the debate over Cree self-government. As this presentation 
will show, there are two diametrically opposed camps in the pre- and post-Royal 
Commission literature and they conceived of self-government very differently, depending 
on which side of the debate they stand, or more precisely, depending on which frame 
qualifies their understanding of self-government. 
The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was established by the Federal 
government in 1991 to investigate the evolution of the relationship between Aboriginal 
Peoples, the Canadian government, and Canadian society and "propose specific 
solutions... to the problems which have plagued those relationships." (Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996a, 2) These problems were indeed pervasive in 
Aboriginal communities across the country, as has been seen previously. Specifically, 
according to reports orderered by the Royal Commission, Aboriginals were more likely 
than other Canadians to have a lower life expectancy, die from infectious disease, suffer 
from alcoholism and drug addiction, fall victim to domestic violence, not graduate from 
high school, college and especially university, live in overcrowded and unsanitary 
conditions, and be unemployed or incarcerated. (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
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1996b) In a country that the United Nations rated as "the best place in the world to live 
in", this situation was unacceptable.38 The Royal Commission's recommendation? To 
move beyond the "colonial legacy" of the Indian Act, and change "our perspective on the 
very nature of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state." 
(Papillon, 2008b, 4) 
As Commissioner Rene Dussault explained on the day of the official release of 
the report, the systematic and sustained denial of this colonialist reality was "the core of 
the problem." (Dussault in Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1996a) While the past 
had been made up of "successive Canadian governments [trying] often intentionally, 
sometimes in ignorance, to absorb Aboriginal people as individuals into the body of 
Canadian society, thus seeking to eliminate distinctive Aboriginal societies," the future 
needed to give Aboriginal peoples the "opportunity and resources to exercise 
responsibility themselves." (Ibid.) More precisely, "Aboriginal nationhood" had to be 
recognized and Canadians had to finally accept that 
Aboriginal self-government is not, and can never be, a 'gift' from an 
'enlightened' Canada. The right is inherent in Aboriginal people and 
their nationhood and was exercised for centuries before the arrival of 
European explorers and settlers. It is a right they never surrendered and 
now want to exercise once more. (Ibid., 1996b, emphasis mine) 
The Royal Commission drew on several recommendations set forth by the 
Special Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Self-Government, which was 
appointed by the government, a decade earlier, "to review legal and institutional issues 
related to the status, development and responsibilities of band governments on reserves." 
(Wherret, 1999) Indeed, the Penner Report also recommended that "the federal 
38
 In 1992, Canada was the top-ranking country on the UNHDI. It maintained that position for the years 1994 through 
2000. (Wikipedia, 2010b) 
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government recognize First Nations as a distinct order of government within the 
Canadian federation, and pursue processes leading to self-government." (Ibid.) This 
would be achieved, in the long term, through the entrenchment of self-government as an 
"inherent right" in the Canadian Constitution and, "in the short term, [through] the 
introduction of legislation to facilitate it." (Ibid.) Keith Penner was pragmatic: although 
he felt that "the surest way to achieve permanent and fundamental change in the 
relationship between Indian people and the federal government [was] by means of a 
constitutional amendment" he also recognized that such an amendment would require the 
approval of "seven provinces constituting 50% of the population." (Canada, House of 
Commons, 1983, 44-45) Since the constitutional process could be protracted, the 
Committee therefore "considered other courses of action" including "the bilateral 
process." (Ibid., 45) 
The Royal Commission's report echoed the Penner Report, calling for the 
amendment of the Canadian Constitution to include self-government as an inherent right 
and give First Nations communities a status comparable to that of a province because, as 
Keith Penner had pointed out, a significant problem they faced was that the limited 
powers of their band-councils were "further diminished because they can be rendered 
39 
invalid by federal laws, federal regulations or the Minister's disallowance." (Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996a, 317; Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 19) 
If Aboriginal governments achieved the status of third level of government, on the other 
hand, "in the same way that provinces are immune from each other's law-making 
powers," the Royal Commission argued, "Indian First Nations laws and provincial laws 
39
 Provincial laws of general application were also said to interfere with band councils' powers. As in the case of 
federal laws and regulations, the CNQA prevails over all provincial laws and regulations where there are 
inconsistencies or conflicts. 
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would have had no effect on each other." (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996a, 317) In the case of a conflict, "federal laws in the same areas would be paramount 
over Indian First Nations laws, as is the case with provincial laws." (Ibid.) 
A fundamental assumption that underlies these recommendations was that neither 
the federal nor provincial governments had endorsed the approach in the Penner Report. 
Instead, they had simply supported the enactment of "legislations like the Cree-Naskapi 
(of Quebec) Act" and the subsequent Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, which 
only supported "a form of delegated self-government." (Ibid., 1996c, 722) This 
"delegated" self-government, far from enabling Cree and Sechelt communities to attain 
provincial status, merely provided them with powers "parallel to municipalities in 
southern Quebec." (Ibib., emphasis mine) In light of the evidence presented in the 
previous section, it is surprising that the Royal Commission could arrive to such a 
conclusion. Its framing of Cree self-government as enabling only the exercise of 
municipal powers is inconsistent with JBNQA provisions that stipulate that the Crees 
have control over health and education, and CNQA provisions that provide them 
legislative powers over the traditionally provincial jurisdictions of the environment, 
natural resources and hunting, fishing and trapping. Unfortunately, these aspects of the 
Cree model of governance would be entirely omitted from the Royal Commission's 2-
paragraph analysis of the Cree "form" of self-government, in appendix to its chapter on 
Aboriginal governance.40 (Ibid, 1996b, 414-415) 
This treatment is even more surprising in that the JBNQA and CNQA actually 
40
 The JBNQA is addressed more thoroughly in appendix of Chapter 4 of the Report: "Lands and Resources", 
however, the discussion is limited to the land regime. (1996c, 720-722) 
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resolve many of the problems outlined in the Penner Report. Recalling from the previous 
section on Cree education, for instance, the JBNQA took an active approach to the 
preservation of language by giving Cree communities the "tools available under self-
government arrangements that would enable them to strongly promote the use of their 
languages" - tools, it should be noted, the Crees had demanded themselves. (Canada, 
House of Commons, 1983, 18) Further, the CNQA resolved the problem of uncertainty 
concerning the legal capacity of bands and their band councils by incorporating Cree 
bands, and consequently, removing them from under the authority of the Indian Act. 
(Ibid., 17) In doing so, not only were the Crees empowered to sign contract, own 
property, take legal action in their own name and pass bylaws, but more importantly, no 
longer being an extension of INAC, they could directly influence the direction of their 
own programs and policies. What is more, the CNQA resolved another problem that 
Keith Penner had made note of, and which the Royal Commission cites in substantiating 
its argument above: that the limited powers of band councils were diminished because 
they could be invalidated by provincial and federal laws and regulations, or by the 
Minister of INAC himself. (Ibid., 19) Yet, if we recall the previous section on the 
CNQA, the Act is very specific that "where there is any inconsistency or conflict between 
the provisions of this Act and any other Act of Parliament, this Act shall prevail to the 
extent of the inconsistency or conflict." (Canada, 1984, a.3-4, emphasis mine) By 
comparison, municipalities being creatures of the province, provincial and federal laws 
prevail. (Isaac, 17) 
The Penner Report had seen a final significant impediment to Aboriginal 
Peoples' empowerment: the fact that the federal government was the only entity able to 
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determine "who is an Indian," and thus, who could benefit from the rights derived from 
"Iiidian" status. Consequently, it recommended that band membership be determined by 
band members themselves, instead of by INAC, because it was "the rightful jurisdiction 
of each Indian First Nation to determine its membership, according to its own particular 
criteria." (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 55) This has been the case for the Crees 
since 1975. Indeed, as was outlined earlier, whereas Indian Act provisions prevailed in 
determining membership in all other Aboriginal communities still under its jurisdiction, 
Section 3 of the JBNQA states that a person of Cree descent, or anyone who is 
recognized by one of the Cree communities as being a member, can benefit from the 
rights derived from Cree status. (Quebec, 1991, s.3.2.1, emphasis mine) 
Evidently, the Royal Commission's opinion that the government of Canada had 
refused to endorse the Special Committee's recommendations is not supported by the 
facts. Its position becomes even more paradoxical when we consider that the Penner 
Report "specifically supported the initiative of the Cree-Naskapi Act." (Munro in Canada, 
Parliament, House of Commons, 4488) For example, Keith Penner saw "the Cree School 
Board, which operates under the terms of the Agreement" as a "good example of the 
innovations possible under new structures" (Canada, House of Commons, 1983, 30) 
Further, quite aware of negotiations toward the CNQA, since the Crees were present to 
testify to it, Penner explicitly supported their Act's "objectives" and recognized that its 
approach offered "specific ways to escape from unsatisfactory current situations." (Ibid., 
48) In fact, not only did Keith Penner support the CNQA approach because it "showed 
the potential for innovative solutions designed to meet specific needs" but he also 
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suggested that "all such proposals [legislations like the CNQA] could form the basis of 
new arrangements." (Ibid.) 
It is no coincidence that Keith Penner's recommendations and CNQA and 
JBNQA provisions mirror each other on so many points. The CNQA in particular is not 
only a consequence of the JBNQA's chapter 9, but of the Penner Report as well41, which 
the Royal Commission cites in issuing its own recommendation that the Federal 
government "create their own level of government, distinct from municipalities and the 
Indian Act,"42 (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996a, 317; Dickason, 409-
412) This fact is corroborated in the transcripts of the House of Commons debates a few 
days before the passing of Bill C-46 (which would become the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) 
Act). Indeed, when John Munro, presented the details of the legislation that incidentally, 
all parties had agreed to enact into law in a bid of non-partisanship, he recalled the 
Committee's recommendation "that the legal capacity of Indian governments be clarified 
so that they may operate within their own spheres of jurisdiction." (Munro in Canada, 
Parliament, House of Commons, 4488) The CNQA respected this recommendation 
because it gave Cree bands the legal status of corporations. (Ibid.) Further, the CNQA 
rejected "the Indian Act membership criteria as a basis for establishing political 
participation in Indian government" and relied instead on "a membership provision" 
proposed by the Crees and Naskapis themselves, as Penner had recommended. (Ibid., 
4489) 
41
 The CNQA was still being elaborated at the time of the publication of the Penner Report. While the report takes into 
account Cree testimony, its final conclusions were also taken into account, if we are to believe John Munro. in the final 
drafting of the CNQA. 
42
 "leur propre echelon gouvernemental, distinct de ceux des municipality et de la Loi sur les Indiens." 
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Finally, the Royal Commission's rejection of the Cree model of self-
government on the basis that it simply elevated Cree communities to municipal status, 
seriously contrasts with the opinion of some academics, who had previously weighed in 
the debate such as Daniel Tetreault, whom, despite formulating many criticisms, still 
concluded that taking into account all the evidence, "it becomes even clearer that the 
powers [the Crees] exercise go well beyond those of Canadian municipalities."43 
(Tetreault, 117) What is more, the Royal Commission's conclusions completely - and 
quite paternalistically, it might be added - deny the experience and opinion of the Cree 
people themselves. Indeed, as has been seen throughout this chapter, they were the first 
to state they were self-governing; they argued that the JBNQA provided for self-
government through the range of Cree-controlled institutions it created; they saw the Cree 
and Naskapi (of Quebec) Act as enabling "the realization of what we consider to be Cree 
self-government,"44 by allowing them to maintain "their traditional way of life and 
customary practices while at the same time, adapting and incorporating new elements 
into their governments and institutions." (Awashish in Tetreault, 111, emphasis mine; 
Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977a, 6:12; Cree-Naskapi Commission, 1987, 
5) Further, they insisted that their governmental arrangement had been negotiated from 
the bottom up; that not only the government, but they too had developed the 
"fundamental principles and structures" in the JBNQA, and that self-government had also 
been "the central theme" throughout the negotiations toward the CNQA, which was 
"clearly reflected in the Act itself." (Cree-Naskapi Commission, 1987, 5; Ibid., 11) As 
Grand Chief Ted Moses put it before the Standing Committee on Indian and Northern 
41
 "il est encore plus evident qu'ils exercent des pouvoirs qui vont bien au-dela de ceux des municipalites canadiennes." 
44
 "la realisation de ce que nous considerions etre une autonomie politique crie." 
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Development, this had for effect to "fundamentally transform the relationship between 
the Crees of Quebec and the government of Canada." (Moses in Canada, House of 
Commons, 1984,4:10) 
That "fundamentally transformed" relationship may not have come in the form 
of a third order of government and the level of self-government it made possible for the 
Crees and consequently, the authority it took away from federal government hands, may 
not be as vast as that of a province, but nor are the powers it confers comparable to the 
limited powers exercised by municipalities, as the Royal Commission ultimately 
concluded. While Keith Penner had been impressed by Cree testimony on the CNQA's 
progress, the reason the Royal Commission had taken its position is that it felt that the 
Cree model did not go far enough. Indeed, it was far from the ideal it proposed of 
Aboriginal government as "one of three orders of government in Canada", which should 
be "autonomous within their own spheres of jurisdiction", thus sharing "the sovereign 
powers of Canada as a whole." (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996b, 240-
244, emphasis mine; Commissioner George Erasmus in Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada, 1996a) 
Effectively, the Royal Commission has framed self-government as shared 
"sovereignty". This understanding is further emphasized in a paper by Aboriginal 
scholar, David Nahwegahbow (2002), who remarked that the Canadian government had a 
"schizophrenic approach" with respect to the "inherent right to self-government." (2) 
Nahwegahbow cites as evidence a comment made by INAC Minister, Robert Nault, 
during a press conference in 2002, where he had stated that he could not help speed up 
the self-government negotiations process with some First Nations "if certain jurisdictions 
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that are asked for are outside of my mandate... for example... the whole notion of being 
sovereign." (Nault in Nahwegahbow, 2) This comment was felt to be in direct 
contradiction to "the Liberal government's self-government policy, which is stated to 
recognize the inherent right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal and treaty 
right." (Nahwegahbow, 2) Yet, the only way Nault's statement could be found to be in 
contradiction with that policy is if self-government was taken to mean sovereignty, as it 
did for the Royal Commission. This understanding of self-government, along with the 
"municipal" understanding used to describe Cree self-governing powers, will emerge 
again in the following section, where Taiaiake Alfred's work will be assessed and where 
the worldview, which informs them, will also become clearer. 
Peace, Power and Righteousness: an Indigenous Manifesto 
In Peace, Power and Righteousness: an Indigenous Manifesto, Taiaiake Alfred 
also speaks of the "colonialist legacy" of the Indian Act, but he pushes the Royal 
Commission's remark further by describing the Federal government as an entity still 
made up of "organized racists." (Alfred, 1999, 125) Like the Royal Commission, Alfred 
has been very influential in the literature, collaborating with numerous academics45 and 
acting as the director of the Indigenous Governance program at the University of 
Victoria. Although he partly agrees with the Royal Commission's take on the problem, he 
sees another underlying cause of Aboriginal peoples' "material poverty and social 
dysfunction" as one of Aboriginal leaders no longer believing in "their indigenousness" 
and steadily moving away "from the principles embedded in traditional cultures, towards 
45
 See, for instance, Alfred and Corntassel (2005). 
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accommodation of Western cultural values and acceptance of integration into the larger 
political and economic system." (Ibid., 4) In essence, for Alfred, the source of an 
Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap could be located not only in a lack of institutional 
tools and structures that would to enable Aboriginal Peoples to be more autonomous in 
social, economic and cultural spheres, as the Royal Commission had argued, but in 
Aboriginal leaders' "co-optation" by the Canadian government, or more precisely, in 
their "separation from our heritage and from ourselves." (Barnsley, 2010; Alfred, xv) 
Alfred's solution? One similar to the Royal Commission's: the creation of Aboriginal 
governments, but more precisely, governments "founded on an ideology of Native 
nationalism and a rejection of models of government rooted in European cultural values," 
or "self-government," that would embody "a notion of power that is appropriate to 
indigenous cultures" and ceases to "deny their nationhood." (Alfred, 2; Ibid., xiv-xv) 
Although Alfred does not outright refer to the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement, nor the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, he does discuss the Sechelt Indian 
Band Self-Government Act (1986) and the Nisga'a Final Agreement (2000), two other 
self-government legislations, which emerged from similar circumstances, as well as 
provided the Nisga'a and Sechelt people with very similar powers as those of the Crees; 
it is thus possible to extrapolate Alfred's view of a "Cree model of governance" by 
examining what he had to say about these legislations. First, it should be noted that 
Alfred sees the negotiation process itself as "an advanced form of control, manipulation 
and assimilation," because "what oppressive regime has ever smiled benevolently and 
handed back power to the oppressed?" (Alfred, 144) Hence, a White, colonialist 
government has still been "setting the agenda" in self-government talks, and Aboriginal 
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leaders - whether they were conscious of it or not - had been "allowed to get so close to 
the benefits of power" that they had "no motivation to fundamentally change the system." 
(Ibid., 119-120) 
For Alfred, Sechelt and Nisga'a leaders and, by extension, Cree leaders, 
represented a different kind of individual than those who are not "conscious" that the 
colonialist legacy that informed the Indian Act continues to inform the government's 
approach today. Because they have participated in negotiations with the federal 
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government and the government of British-Columbia and signed agreements with them, 
Alfred essentially likens them to modern compradors of the State. Indeed, they are 
described as "greedy, corrupt politicians", who "behave like bureaucrats and carry out the 
same old policies"; they are "seduced by the mainstream" and promote "non-indigenous 
goals and embody non-indigenous values"; they cooperate "and serve [the government's] 
agenda" by serving as "tools" for the State "to maintain its control"; they place "their 
own self-interests ahead of tradition" because they are "oriented not towards making 
peace but toward making money." (Ibid., 97-114; Ibid., ii) The difference between this 
perception of Nisga'a, Sechelt leaders and an African comprador bourgeoisie, which 
profited from the slave trade of their own, is slim. In short, they are seen as "sell outs." 
(Ibid., 91) This view is reminiscent of an outraged Andrew Delisle, in 1975, who had 
accused the Crees of selling themselves for "mirrors" by signing the JBNQA. 
Because the Sechelt Indian Self-Government Act and the Nisga'a Final 
Agreement were not based on "the idea that indigenous people own all of their traditional 
territory unless it was surrendered by treaty" and because they impose "a hierarchy of 
rights" based on "conquest," Alfred concludes these legislations are "failed attempts at 
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self-determination" representing only "a transition to a quasi-municipal status." (Ibid., 
100) This understanding mirrors the Royal Commission's opinion with respect to the 
Cree model. The reason Alfred is so critical of the Sechelt and Nisga'a self-government 
arrangements, however, and also frames them as only enabling municipal powers, is 
more specifically located in the compromise that had to be made by Aboriginal leaders in 
order to arrive to an agreement in the first place. This was also a criticism made by 
Tetreault (1988), who concluded that the CNQA, "contrary to the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement, clearly appears to be the result of a Cree compromise with 
governmental authorities."46 (137) The fact that Aboriginal peoples' inherent right to 
govern themselves still was not recognized47 by the Canadian State, the Crees thus only 
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exercised "the powers Parliament was kind enough to delegate to them." (Ibid.) 
Although Alfred and Tetreault are right - many compromises were in fact made by the 
Sechelt, the Nisga'a and the Cree people - one cannot help to wonder if it is ever possible 
to enact complex legislations like the ones at stake without compromise. Further, the 
very fact that concessions were made speaks to the consultative process that had to take 
place, which is not discussed by Alfred or the Royal Commission. For instance, unlike on 
May 1st, 1971, the Crees did not wake up to the news their daily lives would be 
inextricably changed on the radio when the CNQA was finally adopted in 1984. Rather, 
unlike all other previous acts, treaties, agreements or laws relating to the administration 
and use of resources on Aboriginal lands in Canada, it was developed in close 
consultation with their representatives, establishing, according to the Crees, a precedent 
46
 "a l'instar de ]a Convention de la Baie James et du Nord quebecois, apparait nettement comme le fruit d 'un 
compromis entre les Cris et les autorites gouvernementales." 
47
 It has since been recognized in the federal government's Inherent Right policy (1995). where it is stated that "the 
Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal right under section 
35 of the Consitution Act." (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1995a) 
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 "les pouvoirs que le Parlement a bien voulu leur deleguer" 
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in the history of Aboriginal-State relations in that this approach represented "a clear 
departure from all previous government policy - typified by the Indian Act - which 
established native policy unilaterally." (Canada, House of Commons, 1984, 4:29, 
emphasis mine) As Philip Awashish put it, this bilateral approach to negotiations, which 
had also been promoted in the Penner Report, instead enabled the combination of 
Cree principles and European principles to carry out some form of self-
government. The Crees can exercise their own customs in electing their 
own leaders and they exercise their own customs in making decisions for 
themselves and for their community and their lands. The system of 
institutionalizing self-government into some sort of corporate structure is 
European, but we have used what are considered European concepts and 
also applied Cree customs in order to exercise what we consider to be 
Cree self-government. (Awashish in Canada, House of Commons, 1984, 
4:29) 
Further, if we recall all the powers and structures outlined in the previous JBNQA and 
CNQA sections, it also becomes evident that important concessions occurred on the 
government's side. The Crees may not have gotten the full end of the "power stick", but 
certainly a much bigger end of it - at least, big enough to ensure they could directly 
influence the path of their communities' own progress: progress as they understood it. 
Thus, to those who would accuse the Crees "of selling themselves for mirrors", they 
would respond "it is only up to them to decide whether the Agreement is good for them 
or not."49 (Dumas, 1974, 1; Diamond, in Tetreault, 99) 
Ultimately though, the reason Taiaiake Alfred and arguably, the Royal 
Commission, arrives at his conclusions has less to do with battles over words and 
concepts - over self-government framed as "municipality", "nationhood" or 
49
 "a ceux qui accusent les Cris de s'etre vendus pour des miroirs. les Cris repondent... qu'il leur revient a eux seul de 
decider si l'Entente leur est ou non favorable." 
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"sovereignty" - than it does with warring worldviews. Indeed, Alfred quite clearly views 
self-government through the lens of dependency theory, a body of literature that emerged 
in the late 1960s and 70s in opposition to a liberal perspective that explained 
underdevelopment in terms of internal shortcomings. Dependency theorists argued that 
external constraints, "most notably the domination of the developing countries by the 
industrialized powers of Western Europe and North American, were responsible for most 
of the economic and political misery in the southern hemisphere." (Schraeder, 2004, 324) 
More specifically, they posited that "the domination of the developing countries by the 
industrialized powers of Western Europe and North American," was responsible "for 
most of the economic and political misery in the southern hemisphere." (Ibid.) Further, 
the maintenance of this highly unequal structure "was made possible by African 
compradors (political and economic elites) who knowingly or not served as the cultural, 
economic, military or political agents of the European colonialist." (Ibid., emphasis mine) 
This perspective is nearly identical to Alfred's opinion of Sechelt and Nisga'a leaders and 
self-government legislations. 
Essentially, Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto is a 
manifesto for a new, post-colonial society. Indeed, it is also Alfred's belief that the 
inherently exploitative relationship between "colonizing forces" and the "colonized" has 
been reinforced by "neocolonial leaders," who "remained more interested in maintaining 
ties with foreign powers than contributing to the true development of their own 
countries." (Alfred, 119-120) This is further emphasized by Alfred's conceptualization of 
the "problem" as being centered on the strain imposed on Indigenous communities by 
colonization, and the fact that Indigenous peoples have been subjected to a "systematic" 
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process of colonial rule since Euro-settlers declared this country theirs by right of being 
terra nullius. It is also the logical conclusion of his call for a "re-centring of indigenous 
self-determination politics away from expedient policies devolving western-style 
governance and political structures from dominant governments" through a return to 
fundamental, cultural values and "breaking free from the oppression of colonialism and 
achieving emancipation through the principles and values of indigenous governance" 
which Alfred ultimately sees, like the Royal Commission, as "the recognition of our 
sovereignty." (Crosby, 2007, 2; Alfred, 79) This vision is fundamentally opposed to 
liberal notions of self-government outlined in the Federal government's Self-Government 
Fact Sheet (2009), where "self-government" is defined as supporting "the achievement of 
'good governance' - governance that is participatory, accountable, responsive, efficient 
and effective, transparent and that operates by the rule of law." (Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, 2009, emphasis mine) Alfred could never see the Nishga', Seschelt, and 
ultimately, Cree models of governance as representing valid examples of "self-
government" because he departs from a Post-Colonialist worldview that was developed 
in specific opposition to a liberal worldview. 
Aboriginal Quality of Life under a Modern Treaty 
In stark contradiction with Taiaiake Alfred, in his doctoral thesis, Federalism 
From Below? The Emergence of Aboriginal Multilevel Governance in Canada. A 
Comparison of the James Bay Crees and Kahnawa:ke Mohawks, Martin Papillon makes 
the case that the JBNQA has led to "the emergence of multilevel governance practices." 
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(Papillon, 2008a, 12) Indeed, while much academic attention "has been devoted to the 
constitutional and legal dimensions of Aboriginal challenges to state authority... 
incremental yet fundamental changes [have also taken] place in the less visible but 
nonetheless important arena of policy making." (Ibid., abstract) These changes have 
enabled a transformation in "State-Aboriginal relations" by establishing Cree 
governmental entities as "distinct political authorities with their own sources of authority 
and legitimacy independent of federal and provincial parliaments." (Ibid.) Essentially, 
according to Papillon, a new form of federalism was emerging: "not through 
constitutional negotiations or treaty-making exercises...[but] from below, in everyday 
practices of governance." (Ibid.) 
In light of this position, when the proposal for this thesis was initially 
elaborated, the intention was to draw on it to emphasize the dichotomy in the Cree self-
government literature, specifically, to show that Papillon, like other authors who had 
previously weighed in on the debate, saw the Cree model from what might be referred to 
as a "semi-State" perspective, rather than the "municipality" perspective advanced by the 
Royal Commission and Taiaiake Alfred. However, in another essay, Papillon appears to 
take an entirely different stance on the situation. Indeed, in Aboriginal Quality of Life 
under a Modern Treaty: Lessons from the Experience of the Cree Nation of Eeyou 
Ishtchee and the Inuit ofNunavik (2008b), he concludes that the Crees' experience under 
the JBNQA should not be seen as a "panacea for Aboriginal peoples" and that it should 
be "assessed with caution." (2008b, 5) Although I cannot speculate as to the cause of this 
apparent about-face50, Aboriginal Quality of Life under a Modern Treaty is still a useful 
piece of evidence in supporting my thesis. Rather than serving to reemphasize what 
50
 Both texts were published in 2008 
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should already be clear - that there are two diametrically opposed understandings of the 
Cree model in the self-government literature, and these are grounded in incompatible 
worldviews - it will better illustrate the first precept of a "Lakoffian approach": facts 
that do not conform to one's beliefs will simply "bounce o f f ' of the analysis. This is 
what an analysis of this second work by Papillon reveals. 
Aboriginal Quality of Life under a Modern Treaty essentially presents itself as 
an empirical study of Cree quality of life post-JBNQA. Like Alfred and the Royal 
Commission, Papillon also departs from the idea that to move beyond the colonial legacy 
of the Indian Act, "the institutional basis of the relationship [between Aboriginal peoples 
and the State] must be rebalanced to enable [them] to regain a sense of agency and 
control over their lives, their lands and their dealings with the dominant society." 
(Papillon, 2008b, 4) What lessons can we take from the JBNQA, he asks, however? In a 
nutshell: it represents no solution to bridging the Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap 
because, in and of themselves "treaties do not change the socio-economic conditions and 
overall well-being of communities." (Ibid., 5) Papillon presents two principal arguments 
in support of this thesis. The first concerns Cree education. 
Like the Task Force on Aboriginal Languages and Cultures and Robin 
Armstrong of Statistics Canada, Papillon also notes that "aboriginal language retention 
rates of Crees and Inuits are among the highest in the country."51 He concludes "that 
early childhood and elementary education in Cree communities has likely contributed to 
the healthy state of their language" and although some might be tempted to argue that 
their relative isolation should be factored in this explanation, the proportion of Inuits who 
51
 According to Robin Armstong's Aboriginal well-being survey, the James Bay Crees speak and write their language 
in a proportion of 89%. (Armstrong, 1999. 3) 
68 
have a "flourishing language" and who live on lands encompassed by the Agreement was 
"also significantly greater than the proportion of all Canadian Inuits, who are in a similar 
geographic position." (Ibid., 10) Geographical location therefore did not appear to be the 
sufficient cause of Aboriginals' and the Cree and Inuit peoples' increased ability - as 
compared to other First Nations - to write and speak their own language. This 
conclusion would also be in accordance with the position of the Special Committee of the 
House of Commons on Indian Self-Government, which concluded that Native languages 
were on the verge of extinction because Aboriginal communities did not have access to 
the "legislative tools available under self-government." (Canada, House of Commons, 
1983, 18) 
However, Papillon goes on to say that these data should not be seen as a JBNQA 
"success" because Cree control over education "has not produced the expected levels and 
standards of education." (Papillon, 2008b, 10) This argument is supported by other data 
collected by Statistics Canada between 1986 and 2001 showing that "the proportion of 
Eeyou Istchee and Nunavik populations with a high school diploma or more" had only 
increased "from 25% to 35%." (Ibid.) This 10% increase in high school graduates could 
not be seen as significant, according to Papillon, because it was "still much lower than 
elsewhere in Quebec and in Aboriginal communities as a whole." (Ibid.) However, when 
the geographical factor that Papillon took into account in explaining the Crees' 
undeniable fluent abilities in their language is also taken into account with respect to 
general distribution of high-school graduates in Quebec, a much more nuanced picture 
than he allows for emerges. 
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Indeed, according to data from Quebec's Ministry of Education, when high 
school graduation rates in the province are examined by administrative region, the three 
regions with the lowest levels of high-school education (among students under 20) were 
those that were located furthest from any major center: the Cote-Nord, the Nord du 
Quebec and the Gaspesie/Hes de la Madeleine regions. (Ministere de l'Education, du 
Loisir et du Sport, 2002, 191) If these ratios are examined over time, another interesting 
picture emerges: while the Cote-Nord region had a high-school graduation rate of 43.3 % 
in the 1990-1991 cohort, this rate decreased, to 41.7%, in the 2000-2001 cohort. (Ibid.) 
As for the Gaspesie/Iles de la Madeleine Nord du Quebec regions, although their high 
school graduation rates went up over the same period (from 61.2% to 68.2% and 56.5% 
to 68.5%, respectively), these were still significantly lower than Quebec's rate as a 
whole, which itself had only increased by 6% (from 65.6% to 71.7%) - 4% less than in 
Cree communities over the comparable period of 1986 to 2001. (Ibid.) This correlation -
a relationship between distance from a major center and the attainment of a high school 
diploma - is confirmed by another study by Statistics Canada, which found that, "outside 
of Canada's largest communities, the drop-out rate in the 2004-2005 school year was 
16.4%, almost double the rate (9.2%) within Census Metropolitan Areas and Census 
Agglomerations (CMA/CA)." (Bowlby, 2008) In small towns and more isolated rural 
areas, the drop-out rate was found to be "comparatively high." (Ibid.) 
52 
While the overall increase in high-school graduation rates in Quebec has been 
speculated to be partly due to "changes in the labour market that require people to have a 
high school diploma," it may similarly be speculated that the poor job market in isolated 
52
 In 2000. 19,3 % of people under the age of 19 did not have a high school diploma. This proportion was 40,6% in 
1979. (Ministere de l'Education, du Loisir et des Sports, 2002, 189) 
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Cree communities is linked to their low rates of high-school graduation. (Canadian 
Education, 2010) What is sure, is that the data Papillon presents alone are not sufficient 
to conclude, as he does, that Cree administrative control over education has not produced 
"the expected levels and standard of education" - or have produced them, for that matter. 
(Papillon, 2008b, 10) Far too many factors remain unaccounted for in this explanation. 
For one, the situation has not been compared with Nisga'a and Sechelt communities, who 
have also signed self-government agreements, to establish whether or not there is a trend. 
Papillon's disregard for the geographical factor, while allowing for it in explaining 
language retention, is more illustrative of his opinion that Cree control over education has 
not yielded satisfactory results than it is of the whole body of fact. 
Papillon's second argument is that it is "hard to make a real causal link" 
between the JBNQA and improvements in health patterns following its implementation. 
(Ibid., 1, 12) He gives the example of the Crees' high infant mortality rates, which was 
found to have "decreased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s," but, according to 
Papillon's reading, remained "more than three times higher in Nunavik and Eeyou 
Istchee... than in Quebec overall" in 2001.53 (Ibid., 12) Indeed, in volume 1 of The 
Evolution of Health Status and Health Determinants in the Cree Region (Eeyou Istchee): 
Eastmain I-A Powerhouse and Rupert Diversion Sectoral Report. Volume I: Context 
and Findings, from which Papillon cites, and from which I also cited in the Cree health 
section, Cree infant mortality rates are said to "have fallen over time, but remain triple 
the Quebec average and ... are above the averages for Registered Indians in Canada." 
(Torrie, Bobet et al., 58) However, the report goes on to explain the source of these high 
^ Quebec infant mortality rates were 4.63 per 1000 in this period, while they were 12.6 per 1000 in Cree communities. 
(Torrie. Bobet et al., 2005, 58) 
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rates - and this, no further than the next sentence - but Papillon seems to have read over 
it. Indeed, according to the CHSSJB, they were "largely due to high post-neonatal 
mortality rates attributable to Cree leuko-encepalopathy and Cree leukoencephalitis," 
two related fatal genetic conditions peculiar to Cree populations. (Ibid.) When Cree 
infant mortality rates were controlled for these diseases, they were found to be "no higher 
than average." (Ibid.) 
Clearly, Papillon's choice - or disregard - of evidence has been informed by his 
understanding of the JBNQA as representing "no panacea" for improving Aboriginal 
peoples' quality of life. This is further illustrated by his omission of two other important 
sources of data: Statistics Canada's Mapping the Conditions of First Nations 
Communities (1999) and The Geographic Patterns of Socio-Economic Weil-Being of 
First Nations Communities in Canada (2001). Considering that there is not a wealth of 
statistical evidence to go around in the particular case of the Cree (who have chosen, for 
instance, not to participate in the largest and most recent pan-Canadian Aboriginal health 
survey, the First Nations Regional Longitudinal Health Survey54) this omission is 
significant. There is cause: these two Aboriginal well-being studies, compiled by analyst, 
Robin Armstrong, fly in the face of Papillon's conclusion that "contrary to popular 
assumption" the Crees are not "markedly better o f f ' as a result of the "increase in 
government transfers for social programs and infrastructure development in the aftermath 
of the JBNQA." (Papillon, 5) Yet, when Armstrong mapped patterns of Aboriginal socio-
54
 The First Nations Regional Longitudinal Health Survey is a 20-year longitudinal study involving Canada's First 
Nations and Inuit people. It was established to counter the lack of reliable information on First Nations and Inuit health 
and wellbeing due to their exclusion from major national health surveys, and enable them to control their own health 
information. (First Nations Information Governance Committee, 2005) 
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economic well-being55 across Canada, based on 1996 census data, he found that the Crees 
were not only markedly better off, but actually ranked above average as compared to 
most other First Nations. (Armstrong, 2001, 9) In Quebec in particular, out of 43 
Aboriginal communities56, only 12 enjoyed this status: 8 of them were Cree - all the Cree 
communities but one. (Ibid.) (Appendix 2) Thus, although Papillon acknowledges that "in 
strict socio-economic terms, [the Crees'] overall quality of life has improved," but that a 
"causal link with the JBNQA is difficult to assess," that link is also difficult to disprove 
when all the available empirical evidence is brought to the analysis. (Papillon, 2008b, 5) 
To be sure, all researchers have personal opinions, since we are informed by 
beliefs and worldviews, which are informed themselves by experience and these 
sometimes show through the research process because the object of the scientific method, 
"objectivity", is no bullet-proof vest against human nature. We pick and we carefully 
choose the data we present; we do this to build the strongest case we can make. But in 
the case presented here, we are not dealing with omissions on the basis that they do not 
serve to strengthen the argument; it is more a matter of the evidence poking a very large 
hole in a fundamental premise, which is informed by this opinion: "Cree self government 
no panacea for increasing Aboriginal well-being." 
I have also carefully chosen my data and my sources, and have presented them 
in a way and in an order that would strengthen my case: that Aboriginal people continue 
to live in a state of abject poverty and social desolation because opinions, beliefs and 
worldviews, rather than facts, are what have really informed the general debate over 
55
 Statistics Canada measures Aboriginal well-being according to the following variables: education, employment, 
income, housing, language and youth. (Armstrong, 2001, 2-3) 
56
 Excluding the 11 Inuit communities, which do not fall under Statistics Canada's definition of 'Indian.' 
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solutions. I have argued that the empirical evidence - although limited - shows that the 
Cree model of governance is worth more investigation. This opinion is based on those 
two studies by Robin Armstrong, which were among the first I reviewed in the process of 
researching this thesis. Indeed, they raised this question: what accounts for the well-
being gap between the Crees and other Aboriginal communities? I have done my best to 
present both sides of the story of "Cree self-government", whether in text or in footnote. 
I have nowhere suggested that a Cree model of governance should be applied across 
Canada because I do not know the full extent of the impact of the Cree model - the 
empirical data presented in this chapter, making up the majority of the evidence that is 
available, being to limited to reach any firm conclusions. However, more focused studies 
may be so few and far between precisely because, as I have shown throughout this 
chapter, the actors in the debate have been more busy defining self-government, or rather, 
defining what it is not. Yet, there are aspects of the Crees' quality of life that have 
markedly improved post-1975. Unless a high Omega-3 or game-based diet can be shown 
to have social repercussions, it is wise to conclude that their model of governance may 
have something to do with it. If the broader Aboriginal well-being debate were really 
about improving Aboriginal peoples socio-economic conditions, the facts that seem to 
point to a correlation between the JBNQA and CNQA and increased levels of education 
(even if only by 10%), increased language retention, increase health and longer life 
expectancy would not have been left out of the analysis. 
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Chapter III: A Case-Study of the Innus of Mamuitun 
Although it may be argued that different understandings of self-government, 
grounded in incompatible worldviews, acting as vessels for different bodies of fact have 
led to the shelving of a Cree model of self-government as being applicable to other First 
Nations, particularly after the authoritative Report of the Royal Commissions on 
Aboriginal Peoples declared it only enabled the exercise of municipal powers, it is 
impossible to say for sure whether academics and other actors involved in this debate 
were reacting to each other's positions, like in Lakoff s examples of Democrat/Republic 
politics, or coming up with their arguments and understandings in a vacuum, since it has 
not properly been a "debate". Indeed, there were no official transcripts to examine - only 
theorizations on self-government and assessments of current self-government legislations 
in an academic literature. Although it may be said that the nature of this literature is 
dialectical and thus, that the latter scenario is quite unlikely, the lack of tangible evidence 
showing a clear causal relation between the way in which self-government has been 
framed and the theoretical dead-end it which the debate over Cree self-government 
ultimately arrives raises the possibility that Lakoff s thesis might be wrong. The case of 
the Innus, on the other hand, does provide a direct account of the debate over Innu self-
government: in the form of press articles covering the progress of their negotiations with 
the Quebec government. This case-study thus provides more tangible data with which to 
retest my hypothesis. 
As in Chapter 2, this chapter will be divided into three sections. First, I present 
a brief overview of important events that led to the publication of the Approche commune 
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(Common Approach) "proposal" in 2000 and the subsequent signing of the Entente de 
principe d'ordre general entre les Premieres Nations de Mamuitun et de Nutashkuan et 
le gouvernement du Quebec et le government du Canada (Agreement in Principle) in 
2002, starting where I left off in the Cree historical section, after the signing of the 
JBNQA on November 11th, 1975. Second, I outline the Agreement in Principle's main 
elements, with particular emphasis on those said to relate to self-government. This 
outline will be much briefer than it was in the previous chapter for the simple reason that 
we are not dealing with a final agreement and thus, with a document of the complexity of 
the JBNQA or CNQA. Third, in lieu of an "academic debate", which has not really 
occurred here57, I examine the public debate on the progress of negotiations toward the 
Common Approach. The reason I choose the Innus as a second case-study is precisely 
because the model of self-government this document was said to lead to was the subject 
of intense media scrutiny. Further, the Innu self-government model to-be offers this 
interesting comparison in that it mirrors the Cree model on almost every point, and is 
interpreted by the actors in the debate based on similar frames, albeit, as will be seen in 
this chapter, turned on their head. 
In the context of a thesis that essentially seeks to demonstrate that language 
should be seen as a more important source of evidence in political science and policy 
making in particular, this case study is of special interest. Indeed, as a final analysis will 
reveal, problematic frames have enabled the rise of persistent myths and untruths about 
the shape and scope of Innu self-government. This will be further emphasized when 
some briefs submitted to the 2003 Commission des Institutions de l'Assemblee nationale 
57
 The literature available on the process of negotiations toward Innu self-government is very sparse or outdated. I have 
attempted to include as much of it as possible in the following presentation. 
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du Quebec, which was ordered in response to public outrage over the signing of an 
agreement-in-principle, are examined and reveal the source of the polarized 
understandings of self-government that emerge from an "Innu self-government" public 
debate. 
Left Behind 
When that picture of the Crees and Inuits finally made the story of hydroelectric 
development in Quebec's great, mythical North on the day of the signing of an 
agreement-in-principle, although it was filled with hopeful and smiling faces, it was still 
an incomplete family portrait of Aboriginal peoples living on the lands that would now be 
encompassed by the JBNQA. Indeed, the Crees and the Inuits were not the only 
populations to live above the 55th parallel; Naskapi and Innu peoples inhabited them as 
well. (Appendix 3 and 4) Thus, while the signature of the JBNQA may have been cause 
for celebration for the Billy Diamonds and Charlie Watts, it was cause for the same kind 
of grief and anxiety they had experienced the morning of April 31st, 1971, for the few 
who had been left behind and had been stripped, unilaterally - and without compensation 
- of the Aboriginal rights that had been ceded, released and conveyed to the governments 
of Canada and Quebec over the whole territory. 
Recalling from the previous chapter, the JBNQA had essentially consisted in a 
"rights exchange", where the Crees and Inuits had renounced to their ancestral rights 
(namely, their title to the land) in exchange for other "more clearly defined" rights. The 
77 
problem for the Naskapi58 and Innu peoples, who also occupied significant parts of 
northern Quebec, was that only the Agreement's "beneficiaries" were entitled to benefit 
from these rights. From the moment the JBNQA was adopted, all other "native claims, 
rights, title and interests of all Indians" were extinguished. (Quebec, 1991, s.2.6) The 
government was well aware of this problem and clearly intended to rectify it. The fact 
that it had invited the Innu of Matimekosh to the negotiations table in February of 1975 is 
indicative of that desire. But discussions with community leaders soon got off to 
nowhere; likely because they were not yet politically organized or experienced in the 
negotiation process, but also because they refused to sign a document "that would only 
benefit their community"59, seeking rather a general settlement for the land-claim of the 
Innu people60 as a whole. (Dupuis, 1993, 37; Charest, 2001, 187) 
Unsurprisingly, after having just spent countless monies and energies on the 
settlement of the Crees' and Inuits' land-claim, the Federal government refused to 
negotiate on the Innus' basis, directing Matimekosh leaders to DIAND's land claims 
office instead. This led to the rise of another problem: who would they mandate to 
represent them?61 Having been unable to appease internal disagreement following from 
the signature of the JBNQA, the IAQ - the only organization that could have spoken in 
their name - had already closed its doors. Soon enough, though, and in collaboration with 
the Atikamekw nation, they would found the Conseil des Atikamekw et des Montagnais62 
58
 The situation with the Naskapi community of Kawawachikamach would meet a much more positive end. 
Discussions would culminate relatively quickly into the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, which essentially amended 
the JBNQA to include the Naskapi as beneficiaries, in 1978. 
59
 "pour le seul benefice de leur communaute." 
60
 The Innu nation consists of nine bands. Only one, Matimekosh - Lac John, is located on JBNQA territory. 
61
 Under the Indian Act, Aboriginals cannot take legal action in their own name. 
62
 Until recently, the Innus were known as the Montagnais. It is not clear in the literature at which point this name 
became obsolete. 
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(CAM).63 Its first mandate: oppose the enactment of Bill C-9 (which would give force to 
the JBNQA) at the Permanent Senatorial Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, in February of 1977. Its main premise: the agreement affected 
"overlapping land claims." (Hilling and Venne, 2003, 2) Although it was a valid 
argument, it would unfortunately fall on deaf ears: Bill C-9 would still be assented to on 
July 14th, 1977. 
Following from this defeat, the CAM undertook the drafting of an official 
comprehensive land claim64, which would be accepted by the federal and provincial 
governments, respectively, that same year and in 1980. It laid out four basic principles: 
the recognition of rights rather than their extinguishment, compensation for damages 
incurred on the lands, the right to "self-government"65 and the right to participate in 
future developments. (Dupuis, 39) The federal government would drag its feet in naming 
a negotiator; Quebec, on the other hand, would see an opportunity to widen its 
jurisdiction. (Ibid, 41) Thus, a newly elected Parti Quebecois government would not only 
immediately name its negotiator, but, in a bid to reaffirm its good will, it officially 
recognized the CAM as the only body with authority to represent the Innu People and 
decreed a moratorium on all legal suits still pending against them.66 (Ibid., 42) Between 
1980 and 1982, these bilateral negotiations would initially focus on establishing the 
general mechanisms that would frame the negotiations, but they would soon divert to 
6?
 In its beginnings, the CAM united all of Quebec's Atikamekw communities and eight of the nine Innu communities. 
The last (and largest) community of Uashat mak Maniutenam would join the organization 2 years later, only to leave it 
in 1998. 
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 Pending suits were related to infractions to Quebec's laws on conservation and fauna. According to Dupuis. they 
were dropped in order to give the CAM some "financial breathing room". (Dupuis, 41) 
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matters felt by the Innus to require more immediate action. (Ibid., 43) It would only be 
six years after the federal government had finally joined talks, in 1988, that a framework 
agreement "relating to the work plan and timetables for the negotiation process" would 
finally be reached. (Hilling and Venne, 2) 
This snail pace could partly be blamed on the fact that various other battles were 
being waged by Aboriginal communities on the national and international fronts, 
following from the repatriation of the Constitution and the subsequent stonewalled 
ministers' conferences on the inherent right to self-government. (Cunningham, 2009, 46) 
Once achieved however, this first signature by no means represented a light at the end of 
the tunnel. It was rather the start of the disintegration of the second, largest Indian 
association in Quebec's history: the CAM. Indeed, although preserving Innu title on the 
land and its resources had been "the principal stumbling block in the negotiation /'O 
process" until then, by signing the framework agreement, CAM representatives had 
essentially agreed to give up their rights to the land in exchange for other "clearly 
defined" rights, much as the Crees and Inuits had done in 1975. (Dupuis, 39; 
Cunningham, 65) 
In 1989, a second agreement concerning "interim measures" was reached, but it 
would be terminated a year later due to increasing internal conflict over the second move 
away from the CAM's original raison d'etre it represented: instead of preserving Innu 
title to the land, by singing this Agreement on Transitional Measures, the organization 
had basically given it up by agreeing to no longer oppose development projects on the 
territory or file any other comprehensive land claims over territories covered by the 
These issues mainly concerned salmon fishing rights, hydro-electric projects in the Cote-Nord regions and the need 
for roads. (Dupuis, 1993, 43) 
68
 "la principale pierre d'achoppement dans le processus de negotiations." 
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JBNQA. (Cunningham, 65) Over the next year, multiple meetings would be held in the 
communities in an attempt to rebuild consensus within the CAM. These, however, 
would only reveal the rigidity between the positions of what could now be called a 
"Northern" and a "Western" block. (Appendix 3) Two new Innu organizations were 
incorporated: the Regroupement de Mamit Innuat (Mamit Innuat), which united the Basse 
Cote-Nord Innu communities of Unamen Shipu (La Romaine), Pakua Shipu (Pakuashipi), 
Nutashkuan (Natashquan) and Ekuanitshit (Mingan); and the Conseil Tribal Mamuitun 
(Mamuitun), made up of the Cote-Nord and Lac-St-Jean communities of Mashteuiatsh 
(Pointe-Bleue), Betsiamites, Essipit and Uashat mak Mani-Utenam (Maliotenam-Uashat), 
which constituted the western front.69 When Premier Jacques Parizeau would make a 
unilateral proposal to the CAM, after his election in 1994, which again, did not recognize 
the Innus' rights to the territory, but rather, sought to extinguish them, Mamuitun's 
insistence on taking the deal would be the last straw for the organization. (Hilling and 
Venne, 2-3) From then on, the governments of Canada and Quebec would have to 
negotiate with three groups (including a recently created Atikamekw organization) rather 
than one, putting an eventual consensus on what shape an agreement would take, yet 
again, on hold. 
Because of issues outside of the scope of this paper, Mamit Innuat, would not 
reintegrate negotiations until 2002. In 1997, only the Mamuitun communities of 
7 0 
Mashteuiatsh, Essipit and Betsiamites thus, would table a proposal for an agreement-in-
principle called "Approche commune" or "Common Approach", which resolved to 
69
 Names in parenthesis refer to the Francophone denominations of the communities, which appear on most maps. I 
refer to the communities by their original Innu names throughout this paper. It should also be noted that at this time the 
communities of Matimekosh and Nutashkuan (Natashquan) were no longer participating in negotiations. (Hilling and 
Venne, 2003. 2) This situation was somewhat ironic in the case of Matimekosh seeing as it was the only community 
located on JBNQA lands. 
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 Nutashkuan would integrate Mamuitun and negotiations soon thereafter. (Charest, 189) 
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explore "new scenarios, concepts and principles... in order to find solutions at the 
negotiations table rather than at the political level."71 (Marauitun, 2000, 1; Charest, 189) 
Indeed, although many consensuses had been achieved between Mamuitun leaders and 
governmental officials until then, the negotiation process also showed that there were 
major differences left to resolve.72 (Dupuis, 1993, 43; Charest, 189) The government, 
having already seen where that slippery slope could lead with the Malouf ruling, much 
preferred investing more time and money in the negotiation process rather than risk 
having the Supreme Court's gavel sound a final decision - something it had not been 
given the opportunity to do in the case of the Crees, since Premier Bourassa had reopened 
dialogue. 
When news that this Innu "proposal" had been tabled was first leaked to the 
media, in January 2000, most newspapers were silent on the event; after all, it was not 
really news.73 The Common Approach was only a 13-page document that outlined 
potential directions for an agreement-in-principle. However, when the actual proposal 
would finally be released, two months later, the media would jump the gun and report 
that Quebec had given "self-government to the Innus."74 (Gagne, 2000, Al ; Lessard, 
2000a, A14) Indeed, some journalists in the mainstream media referred to the simple 
proposal as an "Agreement in Principle"75 and even a "treaty"76, while in reality, an 
official agreement-in-principle would only be signed by Quebec two years later, on April 
71
 "de nouveaux scenarios, concepts et principes... de fagon a trouver des solutions a la table de negotiation plutot que 
de referer les divergences majeures au niveau politique." 
72
 For example, Uashat mak Mani-Utenam's sudden departure from the table in 1998 
73
 Only La Presse made mention of it. 
74
 From Le Soleil's front page title "Un marche historique: Autonomie gouvernementale pour les Innus et abandon de la 
poursuite contre Hydro-Quebec." (Gagne, 2000. A l ) 
75




24th, 2002.77 Further, it was reported that this "Common Approach" would give the Innus 
more in terms of financial compensation than the Nisga'as had obtained in the Nisga'a 
Final Agreement, rights over 
"300 000km of land and a new "autonomous 
government."78 (Loranger-Saindon, 2005, 204; Lessard, 2000b, A10) 
Echoes of these statements took a few months to make their way in a 
Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean regional press, where one of the Mamuitun communities was 
located; then, the media became silent; then, in January 2002, a local Cote-Nord/Sept-Iles 
paper picked up the story and news coverage exploded. Claims that Quebec was "secretly 
planning"79 to "cede"80 the whole of the Cote-Nord region to the Innus that lived on that 81 
territory began making headlines , and citizens groups, opposed to what they perceived 
the Common Approach set out (such as the particularly vocal Sept-Iles-based 
"L'Association de la protection du droit des Blancs dans le Nitassinan" and "Les 
Pionniers Septilliens") were created and began monopolizing airwaves.82 (Gougeon, 
2002, 6-7; Joncas, 2002, 3; Charest, 190) A petition began circulating, calling for a 
referendum; even politicians openly expressed their outrage and demanded a moratorium. 
Although numerous information "tours" were organized by the government of Quebec, 
where negotiators or governmental officials would dispense "the facts" to citizens, these 
were not sufficient to appease tensions. (Charest, 191) Then, after an intervention in La 
77
 It would be ratified by Ottawa in 2004 
78
 "gouvernement autonome" 
79
 " . . . [ le gouvernement] qui dans le secret, travaille depuis quelques annees a etablir le cadre de reference..." 
"Les elus... estiment que ga suffit les discussion en vase-clos." 
80
 "le cadre de reference n'annonce rien de moins que la cession de la Cote-Nord aux Amerindiens." 
81
 Similar statements were made in a Saguenay-based paper. An agreement was a "fait accomplis". The negotiations 
were "la pire fourberie ou arnaque de l'histoire contemporaine." (Bernier, 2002, A17) 
82
 According to Paul Charest, these two groups, along with Saguenay-based "Equite Territoriale", made a lot more 
noise in the media than the agreement's supporters. (191) In the town of Saguenay (then Chicoutimi) for example, they 
"monopolized call-in shows at the CKRS radio station and benefited from the unconditional support of its host" and a 
favorable editorial stance in the Quotidien. (Ibid.) Furthermore, the mayor, Jean Tremblay, regularly publicly opposed 
the agreement, even using public funds to this end. (Ibid.) 
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Presse by ex-Premier, Jacques Parizeau, who likened the Common Approach to 
"dynamite"83 on Quebec's legal and territorial landscape, the government ordered a 
parliamentary commission, where everyone - whether municipal leaders worried about 
84 
losses in property taxes revenues, or citizens decrying their "dispossession" by "the red 
Talibans"85 - would be invited to express their opinion. (Parizeau, 2002, A16; Charest, 
191; Cloutier, 2002, A l ) As the government's rationale went, citizens' worries were 
baseless - an official commission would thus serve to dispel any myths surrounding Innu 
self-government. (Bernier, 2002, 17) The result was rather a spectacle similar to that 
presented to CBC viewers during the recent "reasonable accommodations" 
Commission86, where many colourful, if not downright racist, characters presented briefs 
87 
to the commissioners. 
From the moment news coverage first exploded in 2002, to the last presentation 
at this parliamentary commission, government officials consistently denied that the Innus 
would get more rights than "Whites" or somehow become sovereign on over 300 000 
km2 of lands. The more they denied it, the more there was news coverage, the more the 
ideas of "sovereignty" and "unequal rights", as will be seen later, informed the public 
imagination. Finally, in April of 2003, a Liberal party replaced the Parti Quebecois and 
claiming it would only negotiate an agreement with the Innu nation as a whole, it 
announced its decision to take a step back. (Gougeon, 2003, 7) There would thus be no 
picture of happy Innu, INAC and SAA officials to complete this story. Seven years later 
83




 This expression, "Taliban Rouge", was frequently used by Andre Forbes, president of the Association du droit des 
Blancs dans le Nitassinan, to describe Aboriginals. 
86
 The "Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences." 
8 71 was very interested in the news coverage on this Commission when it began touring Quebec. I noticed that Radio-
Canada and the CBC provided very different coverage. The CBC put extra emphasis on the most racists (and far less 
numerous) comments, likely giving (or reinforcing) an impression among some English Canadians that most 
Quebeckers are xenophobes. 
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- over thirty years after a politically disorganized Innu people first came together, drafted 
a comprehensive land claim and undertook negotiations with Ottawa and Quebec - they 
are no closer to the enactment of practical and institutional tools to enable them to better 
direct their social, economic and cultural futures. 
A "Common Approach" 
As mentioned above, the original proposal for the Common Approach was just 
that: a proposal - one that would simply outline the principal elements that would form 
the basis of negotiations toward a future agreement-in-principle. To get a better 
perspective of what "Innu self-government" might have entailed, had an actual final 
agreement been signed, it is the Entente de principe d'ordre general entre les Premieres 
Nations de Mamuitun et de Nutashkuan et le gouvernement du Quebec et le government 
du Canada (AIP), which was to serve as the basis for the elaboration of a future treaty, 
that must be assessed. In this section, I present AIP provisions specifically concerned 
with rights, territory and self-government. This outline will not only serve to provide a 
better description of what might have been "Innu self-government", but it will also reveal 
important similarities with JBNQA and CNQA provisions - the only discernable 
differences concerning wording and a rights disposition, although it is not clear how it 
would have any different effect in practice. What will become clear in the section that 
follows this presentation, however, is that the different terminology in the AIP to describe 
similar JBNQA and CNQA powers or institutions would have a significant impact on the 
conclusion of the Innu self-government story. 
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Rights 
As the JBNQA was said to represent a "clear departure" from all other 
governmental policies typified by the Indian Act, the AIP has also been seen as 
representing an entirely new approach to Aboriginal-State relations. Indeed, because it 
did not call for the "extinguishment" of Innu ancestral rights, the AIQ could therefore not 
be said to consist of a "rights exchange", or more precisely an "exchange of undefined 
Aboriginal rights for defined treaty rights, using the terms 'cede, release and surrender'." 
(Hilling and Venne, 4) In the case of the JBNQA, there was no ambiguity: the Crees were 
to "cede, release, surrender and convey" all their "Native claims, rights, titles and 
interests, whatever they may be, in and to land" to the government of Quebec. (Quebec, 
1991, s.2.1) Conversely, the object of the Innu agreement was the conclusion of a treaty 
with Mamuitun communities and Nutashkuan while "recognizing, confirming and 
88 
preserving [their] ancestral rights" , including their Aboriginal title. (Quebec, Ottawa, 
Mamuitun and Nutashkuan, 2002, s. 2.1, emphasis mine; Hilling and Venne, 4) 
The specific terms and conditions on which these rights and title would be 
exercised are not specified in the AIP. They would be "clarified" in a final agreement; it 
is therefore difficult to assess what impact this rights provision would have in practice. 
However, as discussed earlier, there has been dispute over the meaning of the rights 
clause in the JBNQA, and a brief return on this dispute will yield a few insights in the 
case of Innu rights. Indeed, JBNQA critics, such as the IAQ, had interpreted the Crees' 
rights clause as "extinguishing" them altogether, but as was made clear in testimony by 
Billy Diamond to the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
88
 "en reconnaissant, confirmant et continuant les droits ancestraux. y compris le titre aborigene" 
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the Crees were strongly opposed to this interpretation. (Dumas, 1; Lacasse, 492; 
Diamond in Canada, House of Commons, 1977a, 6:13) Beyond what everyone has said, 
it should be reemphasized that what is at stake in the concept of "Aboriginal rights", at 
least from an IAQ perspective, is "title to the land." If we recall JBNQA provisions 
concerning the land then, these stipulate that Quebec may not develop them beyond the 
developments that have already been outlined in the Agreement, namely, the La Grande 
(today, Robert-Bourassa) hydro-electric dam. If the JBNQA had really extinguished the 
Crees' rights over their lands, they would never have been in a position to negotiate the 
2002 Paix des Braves, which, among other things, gave the go-ahead to two new 
hydroelectric developments. Thus, the lack of a "cede, release and surrender" 
terminology in the Innu AIP should not be taken as concrete evidence that the Innus 
would have greater rights over the land, as will further be demonstrated when its 
territorial provisions are examined. In fact, it might be argued - as the Cree people have 
- that the JBNQA confirmed rather than extinguished their rights to the land. Further, 
taking into account the other rights outlined in the Agreement, it might even be 
concluded that this has had for effect of making them one of the First Nations in Canada 
with the most rights - including land rights. 
Territory 
As in the JBNQA, the question of territory, which is primarily addressed in 
Chapter 4 of the AIP, is also related to rights. Here, two categories of lands are defined: 
"Innu Assi" lands, which are akin to Cree category I lands, and "Nitassinan" lands, which 
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are basically identical to Cree category II lands.89 Innu Assi lands would essentially 
consist in reserve lands, but doubled. Like the Crees over category I lands, the Innus 
would have "the exclusive use and benefit" over them, but unlike the Crees, that 
exclusive right would extend to the "soil, subsoil and resources in them." (Hilling and 
Venne, 5) Indeed, as stipulated in article 4.2.3, the Innus would have the right to exploit 
"freely and completely of these lands, and in particular, exploit the fauna, aquatic, water, 
hydraulic, forestry, flora and mineral resources within them."90 (Quebec, Ottawa, 
Mamuitun and Nutashkuan, s.4.2.3) However, article 4.2.5 goes on to say that "despite 
article 4.2.3... Quebec will retain ownership of hydraulic and mineral resources"91, which 
is another way of saying, like in the JBNQA, that Quebec retains "bare ownership" and 
"subsurface rights" on these lands. (Ibid., s.4.2.5; Quebec, 1991, s.5.1.3) 
As for Nitassinan lands, they refer to the portion of the territory said to be 
"traditionally used" by the Innus.92 (Ibid.) Although their specific size is not outlined in 
the AIP, it has often been estimated that they would cover an area of approximately 
300 000km2. Over this vast territory, community members would be allowed to "practice 
their traditional activities", or those covered by the expression "Innu Aitun", a far-
reaching concept designating all traditional or contemporary activities linked to culture, 
values and traditional mode of life, or the Innus' "occupation and use of the Nitassinan 
and their special link with the Earth."93(Quebec, Ottawa, Mamuitun and Nutashkuan, 
s.1.3) The concept of Innu Aitun thus encompasses hunting, fishing trapping and 
89
 The distinction between Cree category I, II and III lands is elaborated at greater lengths in footnote 17. 
90
 "d'exploiter les ressources fauniques. aquatiques, hydriques. hydrauliques, forestieres, floristiques et minerales qui 
s'y trouvent" 
91
 "malgre les articles 4.2.3 et 4.2.4, le Quebec conservera la propriete des ressources hydrauliques ainsi que des 
mineraux" 
92
 This is Hilling and Venne's reading. I could not locate this specific terminology in the AIP. 
91
 "leur occupation et usage du Nitassinan et leur lien special avec la Terre." 
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gathering "for social, ritualistic or subsistence means," much as land dispositions in the 
JBNQA concerning the Crees' right to hunt, fish and trap. Further, as in the case of 
JBNQA category II lands, Nitassinan lands would remain under Quebec jurisdiction. The 
only difference between these and other public lands is that the Innus' right to hunt, trap, 
harvest and fish would be constitutionally protected, like the Crees' after the repatriation 
of the Constitution.94 
Self-Government 
The AIP also called for the recognition of "the inherent right of self-
government"95, including "the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power"96 
said to be inherent to that right. (Ibid., s.3.3.3; Ibid, s.8.2.1) Although this represents a 
departure from the JBNQA in that the latter spoke of "local governments," it still meant 
that Innu communities would have the "rights, powers and privileges of a natural person 
and immunities of a legal person established in the public interest"97, much as the Cree 
corporations created through the CNQA. (Ibid., s.8.2.1; Quebec, 1991, s.9) Very few 
details as to the extent of Innu self-governing powers are provided in the AIP. It is 
simply stated that a final treaty would confirm "the power of the legislative assemblies to 
pass laws in all matters related to the organization, general well-being, development and 
94
 The Innus would also be able to "participate" in the "management of the land, environment and natural resources", 
although the final decision regarding planning would rest "with the government or the ministers responsible." (Quebec, 
Ottawa, Mamuitun and Nutashkuan, s. 6.5.7) This, again, resembles the wording in the JBNQA. 
95
 "L'autonomie gouvernementale, comme droit inherent, est comprise parmi les droits ancestraux des Premieres 
Nations." 
95
 "l'exercice des pouvoirs legislatif, executif et judiciaire inherents a leur autonomie" 
97
 "ce statut leur confere la capacite, les droits, les pouvoirs et les privileges d'une personne physique, ainsi que les 
droits, privileges et immunites d'une personne morale de droit public" 
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good government of their societies, members and institutions"98 (Quebec, Ottawa, 
Mamuitun and Nutashkuan, s.8.3.3.1) This provision, again, mirrors the CNQA. (Canada, 
1984, a.45) Would institutions like the Cree School Board and the Cree Board of Health 
and Social Services of James Bay be created? Would Innu band councils be able to 
legislate in the same areas covered by the CNQA? It is impossible to tell, the content of 
the agreement on these subjects having been left intentionally vague, although in light of 
the similarities outlined so far, it is not unreasonable to assume that they would. 
One aspect of the AIP's self-government section that is unambiguous, however, 
and represents a clear break from the language that describes the Crees' legislative 
powers, is that each Innu "legislative assembly"99 would be vested with the power to 
enact its own "constitution" that would "have the status of fundamental law"100 and to 
which the exercise of powers and competencies of Innu governmental bodies would be 
"subordinated." (Ibid., s.8.1.4; ibid., s. 12.1) These constitutions would deal with "the 
status and rules governing membership and Innu citizenship; the selection of leaders; the 
exercise of legislating power and the composition of the legislative body... [and] 
mechanisms for ratification and constitutional amendment."101 (Ibid., s.8.1.2; Hilling and 
Venne, 9) Essentially, they would serve the purpose of the JBNQA's "special legislation 
on local government": the CNQA, which similarly provided "for an orderly and efficient 
system of Cree and Naskapi local government, for the administration, management and 
98
 "Le Traite confirmera le pouvoir des assemblies legislatives des Premieres Nations de faire des lois sur toute matiere 
relative a 1'organisation, au bien-etre general, au developpement et au bon gouvernement de leurs societes, de leurs 
membres et de leurs institutions." 
99
 "Assemblee legislative" 
100
 "La Constitution de chacune des Premieres Nations aura le statut d'une loi fondamentale a laquelle sera subordonne 
l'exercice des pouvoirs et des competences des instances gouvernementales de la Premiere Nation." 
11)1
 "le statut et les regies d'appartenance et de citoyennete innue; le choix des dirigeants; l'exercice du pouvoir de 
legiferer et la composition de l'organe legislatif;...[et] les mecanismes de ratification et de modification 
constitutionnels." 
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control of Category IA and Category IA-N land by the Cree and Naskapi bands 
respectively."102 (Canada, 1984, preamble) 
The Debate Over Innu Self-Government: a Press Review 
Before undertaking an in-depth examination of the news coverage on the debate 
over Innu self-government, some comments on research design should be made since it 
proceeds differently than the previous chapter. First, and keeping with the main premise 
of this paper that language matters, the newspaper articles presented here are seen and 
have been treated as a form of data. These were amassed by conducting a search on the 
Eureka database for the terms "Innu" and "Approche Commune."103 Of the hundreds of 
articles from dozens of different sources that were produced from this search, I chose to 
limit my focus to 6 newspapers: La Presse, Le Devoir, Le Soleil, Le Quotidien, L'Etoile 
du Lac and the Progres-Dimanche. The first three papers were selected because they 
carried the most coverage of negotiations104 and because they are mainstream Montreal-
based105 (La Presse, Le Devoir) and Quebec City-based (Le Soleil) newspapers; they are 
thus seen as good indicators of general public opinion. The three other papers were 
chosen because they are distributed in the Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean region, where it was 
reported by the mainstream media that citizens were particularly outraged by the 
Common Approach; they are therefore seen as good indicators of public opinion in that 
regions. It should also be noted that although Le Quotidien is a Saguenay-based paper -
102
 The CNQA also deals with the status and rules governing membership, the selection of leaders, the exercise of 
legislating power and the composition of the legislative body and mechanisms for its ratification. 
103
 This search was initially conducted as far back as the database would go, between the years 1988 and 2008. 
104
 In terms of number of articles and word-count 
105
 Ideally, the Journal de Montreal, being the largest Quebec paper, would have been included in this analysis. 
However, its archives are only available on microfilm, making the task of searching for articles too monumental. 
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a town not directly concerned by the Common Approach or subsequent Agreement in 
Principle - it is the largest paper in the greater Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean region and 
provided the most coverage.106 As for the Progres-Dimanche and L'Etoile du Lac, 
although these papers are printed in the vicinity of Mashteuiatsh, a signatory community 
to the AIP, they have much smaller readerships and likely, fewer resources, which may 
j 0 7 
partly explain why they provided the least coverage. As for an indicator of public 
opinion in the Cote-Nord, another region said to be up and arms about the AIP, Le Nord-
Est - the only library-accessible paper printed in the greater region- was also included in 
my sample.108 However, because this paper was not available in the Eureka database, no 
key-word search could be performed; instead, each edition had to be viewed on 
microfilm. 
Second, based on this initial key-word search, a timeline of events was created, 
enabling me to narrow my focus to the specific period between January 2000 and 
December 2003. I choose to limit the analysis that follows to this particular time period 
because, prior to the publication of the Common Approach proposal, no newspapers made 
specific mention of any negotiations taking place even if the limited Innu self-
government literature clearly states that there were. The first time an agreement was said 
to be in the works was on January 25, 2000, in the La Presse article that was cited 
106
 As will be shown later, arguments largely revolve around the "handing over" of territory to the Innu. Yet, the only 
territory on which the Innu would have full ownership were Innu Assi lands, which were not in the vicinity of 
Saguenay, (or Sept-Iles, another town apparently up and arms about the Common Approach). If one community should 
have been outraged in the Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean region, it should have been Roberval, which is located next to 
Mashteuiash and which would in fact lose a small portion of its territory. The Etoile du Lac however, a Roberval-based 
news-paper, hardly covered the negotiations. Further, the brief submitted by the city to the Parliamentary commission, 
as will be seen later, was supportive of the Common Approach. 
107
 Another explanation may be that citizens in the vicinity of Mashteuiatsh were not that concerned by the Common 
Approach. 
1081 have since located another paper: the Baie-Comeau-based Objectif Plein Jour. Because it was discovered too late 
in my research process, I have not been able to include it in this analysis. 18 articles were printed over the 2000-2003 
period. Their overall tone and content is very similar to the other Cote-Nord paper, Le Nord-Est, which itself appears to 
have based its reports on articles from the Quebec-based Le Soleit. 
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previously. My timeline thus begins on that date. As for my "end date" of late 2003, it 
was chosen because it was at this time - after the conclusion of a parliamentary 
commission and a change from a Parti Quebecois to a Liberal government - that the 
written press began reporting that talks were slowing down. Indeed, it was in September 
of 2003 that then-minister of the Secretariat aux Affaires autochtones (SAA), Benoit 
Pelletier, announced his decision to take a step back on the negotiation of a future treaty. 
(Joncas, 2003, 7) Following this announcement, articles covering the pursuit of 
negotiations process were often updates on the fact that the signing of a final agreement 
had been put on hold. 
Third, from this specific period of 2000-2003, a dataset of 283 articles making 
mention of the Common Approach was created.109 This dataset consists of 34 articles in 
La Presse, 27 in Le Devoir, 97 in Le Soleil, 70 in Le Quotidien, 15 in the Progres-
Dimanche, 5 in L'Etoile du Lac and 40 in Le Nord-Est. In and of itself, this data 
distribution already sheds some light on the dynamics of the debate. Quebec City's Le 
Soleil, for instance, clearly had the strongest interest in the Common Approach (97 
mentions); it was also this newspaper, as will be seen later, that regularly covered the 
statements of the likes of Russel Bouchard110 and Andre Forbes111, who routinely talked 
of the "taking over" of the Cote-Nord and Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean regions and the creation 
of "two classes of citizens" in an attempt to bring the general population to oppose any 
future agreement that did not receive their seal of approval. (Giguere, 2002, A7; 
Tremblay, 2002a, Al; Charest, 194) What is also noticeable in this distribution is that 
109
 Except where Le Nord-Est was concerned. Because of the particular situation in Sept-Iles, coverage of tensions 
between it and Uashat mak Mani-Utenam was included as well. 
110
 A Saguenay historian, who was particular vocal (and imaginative) in his opposition to the Common Approach, as we 
will see later. 
111
 The founder of L'association du droit des Blancs dans le Nitassinan. 
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local papers like L'Etoile du Lac and the Progres-Dimanche were very quiet in 
comparison (5 and 15 mentions, respectively). As for the Sept-Iles-based Le Nord-Est, 
although it is also on the "low end" of news coverage (40 mentions), once it picked up on 
the story of the Common Approach in 2002, its reporting became comparable in quantity 
to Le Quotidien's, which raises some questions since neither Sept-Iles nor the town of 
Saguenay are located in the vicinity of AlP-signatory Innu communities, and thus, of 
Innu Assi lands - the only lands that would be in full Innu ownership, contrary to what 
was being suggested by some actors in the press.112 (Appendices 5 and 6) 
Finally, after examining the contents of these articles in more detail, it became 
evident that they could be further differentiated by category, or more precisely, that they 
could be related to the following distinct areas of argumentation: "loss of rights" (35 
mentions), "loss of territory" (24), "self-government" (7), "unilateral process of 
negotiations" (23), "need for referendum/moratorium" (8), and "finality of a treaty" 
(9).113 I ultimately chose limit my analysis to articles that presented arguments on rights 
and territory; first, because these were the most prolific (59 vs. 47 for the other categories 
combined); second, because these concepts form the basis, as has been shown in this and 
the previous chapter, of self-government conceptualizations; and third, because "peaks" 
in news coverage can be correlated to specific "rights" and "territory" statements. In the 
following pages, the press articles containing these two types of argumentation are 
112
 Although it would be interesting to assess this "newspaper by region" factor at more length, and I have in fact 
attempted to elaborate some graphics to provide a better picture of it, these have instead provided a very good 
illustration of my rudimentary Excel graphic-making skills. 1 therefore do not put too much focus on this factor during 
the presentation that follows, although allusions to it will be made (since it has undeniably had an impact on the 
"debate") and in those cases, the reader will have to trust my reading of the data, which essentially shows two things: 
1) three peaks in news coverage occurred over the course of the 2000-2003 period; 2) in some cases these peaks were 
caused by other media's reporting, while in others, they were caused by public officials' open letters to the editor. 
113
 It should be noted that this evidence is by no means considered "hard" data. Some articles appear in more than one 
category; many articles could not clearly be placed in any category. However, these data do provide a general idea of 
the situation. 
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presented in the chronological order in which they appear. After this presentation, the 
incompatibility between the government's and the general public's understandings of 
self-government that will have emerged will be further emphasized, when the contents of 
briefs that were presented to the Parliamentary Commission are, in turn, introduced. 
Apartheid Reversed774 
When that single article in La Presse, picked up the story that an Innu self-
government agreement was in the works, on January 28th, 2000, it was actually quite 
reminiscent of the actual text of the AIP. This is not surprising since it seems to have 
been entirely informed by SAA minister, Guy Chevrette and provincial negotiator, Louis 
Bernard. Both are cited as stating that the agreement represented "a first" in that it would 
create "autonomous governments115" while "[recognizing] the Innu People's ancestral 
right.110" {La Presse, 28-01-00, A10) Perhaps in a bid to reaffirm Quebec's position as a 
leader in Aboriginal self-government negotiations, they emphasized that financial 
compensation would be to the tune of "42 000 $ per individual, while they had only been 
35 000 $ in the case of the Nishga'as"117 and that Innu ancestral rights would be 
recognized on a territory spanning "300 000km2". (Ibid.) 
114
 Much as Arianne Loranger Saindon does in Les Quebecois et I'Approche Commune: une analyse du discours 
journalistique sur les negocations avec les Innus (2005), newspaper articles presented in this section are cited by paper 
rather than by author. The goal being to present a general picture of the situation, citing by newspaper contributes to 
that presentation. Authors' names have been included in the bibliographical entries of these sources, which are also 
listed by newspaper. 
115
 "gouvernement autonome" 
116
 "reconnaitront des droits ancestraux aux Innus" 
117
 "les retombees pour les Innus seront de 42 000$ par individu, tandis qu'elles etaient de 35 000$ pour les Nishgas 
[sic]." The title of the article was "Les Innus obtiendront plus que les Nisga'a" (The Innus will get more than the 
Nisga'as). 
95 
When the Common Approach proposal was finally released publicly, on March 
26th, 2000, and the news of that event hit the written press, reaction was far less positive 
and content-oriented. Would this so-called "common" approach not lead to a "reversed 
118 
apartheid, a territory where the majority would abdicate a portion of its rights" , 
Saguenay Parti Quebecois deputy, Gabriel Yvan Gagnon, asked?119 (La Presse, 26-03-00, 
A14) Regional president of the party's chapter in the Cote-Nord, Andre Lessard, shared 
similar worries. It seemed to him that the "agreement" gave "more rights to Aboriginal 
peoples than Whites."120 (Ibid.) None of the local papers (Le Quotidien, L'Etoile du Lac, 
the Progres-Dimanche or Le Nord-Est) appeared to share their elected officials' 
concerns, however. (Ibid.) Le Quotidien first reported on the Common Approach in July 
of 2000, stating, like La Presse's January article, that a future agreement would give the 
Innus "full governmental autonomy"121 and, citing Mammit Innuat negotiator, Guy 
Bellefleur, "territorial rights limited to territories comparable to the size of regional 
municipalities." (Bellefleur, Mamit Innuat negotiator, in Le Quotidien, 06-07-00, 11, 
emphasis mine) There would only be one other mention of the Common Approach in Le 
Quotidien between then and May 10th, 2001, where focus, this time, would be on Mamit 
Innuat's refusal to reintegrate negotiations. As for Le Nord-Est, if citizens in the Cote-
Nord region were indeed in as much of an uproar as Le Devoir had them, as early as July 
118
 Tapartheid a l'envers, un territoire ou la majorite abdiquerait une partie de ses droits" 
119
 Gagnon's question appeared, however, more related to his concerns about the "consequences to our sovereignist 
project" and the "unjustifiable" fact that the agreement would "recognize the [Canadian] Constitution," than the breach 
of the rights of any citizens residing in the Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean and Cote-Nord regions. (La Presse, 26-03-00, A14) 
This possibility will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter. 
120
 "davantage de droits aux autochtones qu'aux Blancs" 
121
 "une pleine autonomic gouvernementale" 
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2000, it was hard to tell from local papers, since the first mention of the Common 
Approach only appeared in January of 2002.122 (Le Devoir, 20-07-00, Al ) 
Between August 2000 and December of 2001, aside from a few statements that 
a signature of an agreement-in-principle could be expected before 2002, the press was 
largely quiet on the progress of negotiations. (Le Devoir, 25-10-01, A3) By mid-
December however, the ingredients for the first real spark in the Innu self-government 
debate were starting to come together; what would ensue would be described by some as 
123 
a veritable mass hysteria among Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean and Cote-Nord inhabitants, 
who had become convinced that they were about to be dispossessed of their land. 
(Charest, 190) The catalyst for it all presented itself in the form of the Radio-Canada 
television show Zone Libre. In its December 14th edition, Les Innus: des negociations 
historiques, it reportedly presented a map of Quebec showing a territory encompassing 
both the Cote-Nord and Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean regions as "Innu territory" following from 
the "historical negotiations" taking place. (Le Nord-Est, 20-01-02, 3) Although no such 
map could be located124, according to Le Nord-Est it "announced nothing less than the 
ceding of the Cote-Nord to Aboriginals."125 (Ibid., 2) 
122
 According to my reading of Le Nord Est editions between 2000 and 2002, business in fact appeared to be going as 
usual. For instance, the August Uashat's Innu Nikamu festival, did not lack in its usual popularity among neighbouring 
Sept-Iles citizens. 
(As mentioned in footnote 108, a newspaper was missed in my analysis: the Objectif Plein Jour. This paper's first 
report goes back to April 2000 and is titled "Quebec n'accordera pas de droit de veto aux Innus" (Quebec will not give 
a veto right to the Innus). It was very similar in tone to Le Quotidien's June article. Objectif Plein Jour did not publish 
any other reports on the progress of negotiations until April 2002.) 
123
 Paul Charest (2004) speaks of "paranoia collective". (190) By January 22nd, Sept-!les mayor, Ghislain Levesque, 
was demanding that negotiators come calm things down. (Le Soleil, 23-01-02) In an editorial for Le Soleil, Sylvie 
Lemieux wrote that citizens worries were understandable, but "when we are talking about an eventual civil war, or 
making comparisons with the taliban, there are lines that should not be crossed." (Mais de la a parler d'une eventuelle 
guerre civile ou a faire des comparaisons avec les talibans, il y a des limites qu'il ne faudrait pas franchir.") (Le Soleil, 
01-26-02, D4) 
124
 Despite my best efforts, it has been impossible to get my hands on a copy of this particular episode of Zone Libre (a 
summary is found here: http://www.radio-canada.ca/actualite/zonelibre/01-12/innus.html). I have been given various 
contradictory reasons as to why I could not view it, including issues of copyright and the producer of the episode no 
longer working for Radio Canada. 
125
 "n'annonce rien de moins que la cession de la Cote-Nord aux Amerindiens" 
97 
Soon thereafter, "L'Association pour la protection du droit des Blancs dans le 
Nitassinan" was founded and reached over 1000 members. (Le Soleil, 24-01-02, A17) 
"Since I will no longer have a country," its president, Andre Forbes, decried, "I will have 
to pay taxes to the Innus. Where did my rights go?"126 (Le Soleil, 24-01-02, A17). The 
"totality of the territory" of the Cote-Nord and Saguenay Lac-St-Jean was about to "be 
handed over to First Nations."127 (Le Soleil, 17-01-02, A13) A stunned Natashquan 
mayor jumped on the bandwagon and similarly deplored that there would "only be 5km 
left for 360 Whites."128 (Ibid.) Le Soleil provided 
near-exclusive coverage of these and 
129 
other concerned citizens' and municipal leaders' statements. It also published 
additional, erroneous information, such as "Mamuitun would already have signed the 
treaty."130 (Ibid.) The stage for the first real boom in coverage had thus already been set 
when Le Soleil would go on to report that chief negotiator for Mamit Innuat, Guy 
n i Bellefleur, had stated that "Whites" were about to start "living on reserves." 
(Bellefleur in Le Soleil, 19-01-02) The media frenzy that followed this alleged 
1 
statement is especially interesting and worth examining further, with a Lakoffian 
approach in mind, because not only were citizens and public officials reacting with 
126
 "Je devrais alors payer des taxes aux Innus n'ayant plus de pays, mais ou sont passes mes droits?" 
127
 "L'ensemble du territoire de la Cote-Nord et du Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean passerait alors aux mains des Premieres 
Nations." 
128
 "il n 'en resterait plus que 5 km2 pour loger les 360 Blancs." 
129
 Very few mentions of Forbes' statements - if any - could be found in the Montreal-based papers. 
130
 "le conseil de Mamuitun aurait meme deja signe le traite" 
131
 "se retrouveront dans des reserves." The article was titled "Les Blancs seront dans des reserves" (Whites will live in 
reserves). 
1321 have had the opportunity to have an extensive discussion with Guy Bellefleur on this issue. He assured that he 
never said such a thing. He explained that he meant that Whites already lived as neighbours with the Innus, whose 
reserve is in fact located in the city of Sept-Iles (see appendix 6). Bellefleur's version of events is corroborated by Le 
Nord-Est, where he assures that the rights of non-Aboriginals will be respected. (Le Nord-Est, 27-01-02. 2) Further, 
Bellefleur has told me that he attempted to have the journalist of le Soleil retract himself, but his request fell on deaf 
ears. Considering that the journalist in question is behind the majority of the negatively-spinned articles on the 
Common Approach in that paper, this is not surprising. I had in fact contacted Bellefleur based on that hunch. 
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outrage, but Quebec governmental officials and chief negotiators were issuing press 
releases in direct response to them. 
In the first of many press releases made by Guy Chevrette in the week of 
January 18th, he started by refuting the ideas that a "treaty" had been signed or that "the 
totality" of the Cote-Nord region was about to become "Innu territory."(Chevrette in 
SAA, 2002a) "This information is absolutely false"133, he stated; "it is unfortunate that it 
was written without being verified"134 - effectively accusing Le Soleil of poor journalistic 
integrity. (Ibid.) No treaty had been signed; no territories would be handed over to the 
Innus - especially not in the Sept-Iles region, where citizens were particularly vocal in 
expressing their discontent. (Ibid.) Indeed, the Innus of Uashat mak Mani-Utenam were 
not even involved in the negotiations; what were their closest neighbours, Septiliens, so 
worried about? (Ibid.) The only change a future agreement would bring was a 
"harmonization of rights."135 (Chevrette in SAA, 2002b, emphasis mine) 
Like Chevrette, chief-negotiator for Mamuitun, Remy Kurtness, also repeatedly 
denied that any agreement had been signed. It should not be "deduced that the Innus will 
become full owners of the whole territory,"136 he also emphasized; a final agreement 
would only give the Innus "rights, like the right to fish, hunt, trap and gather."137 
(Kurtness in Le Soleil, 19-01-02, A7, emphasis mine) None of these official responses 
would have any impact in appeasing the debate over the scope of Innu self-government 
that was now raging in the press, as illustrated in the fact that Parti Quebecois regional 
vice-president, Bernard Lefrangois, was now calling for a moratorium, and Manicouagan 
133
 "Ces informations sont absolument fausses" 
134
 "II est dommage qu'elles aient ete ecrites sans avoir ete prealablement verifiees." 
135
 "l'harmonisation des droits" 
136
 "deduire que tout le territoire revenait aux Innus en pleine propriete" 
137
 "de droits, comme des droits de peche. de chasse. de piegeage, de cueillette." 
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MNA, Ghislain Fournier, was reassuring his constituents that he would not allow the 
government to "cede [Cote-Nord] territory"138 to anyone."139 (Le Nord-Est, 27-01-02, 6-
7; Ibid., 2) 
Andre Forbes, reinvigorated by this apparent wave of political support, started 
making clearer demands for his group's inclusion in the negotiations process, to preserve, 
as he put it, "our rights, because we have rights too."140 (Forbes in Le Soleil, 22-01-02, 
Al) There was no way he would let what had now been transformed into "over 400 000 
km2"141 of lands become "the property of Aboriginals."142 (Le Nord-Est, 27-01-02, 2, 
emphasis mine) Le Soleil, was hung on every of Forbes' words; the consistent news 
coverage it provided his statements would undeniably play a key role in enabling the rise 
of the next myth that would monopolize airwaves: that "a quarter of Quebec"143 was 
about to erased from the map by rich Montreal lawyers and politicians with no 
knowledge of or regard for the northern regions, which were struggling socio-
economically, like the Innus. (Le Soleil, 24-01-02, A17) 
A Territory Reduced to the Dimensions of a Stamp 
Unable to debunk the pervasive beliefs that rights and territory would somehow 
be taken away from non-Aboriginals, Chevrette resigned from the SAA on January 29th, 
2002. (Le Soleil, 01-30-02, A3) Soon after his resignation, a new story emerged 
138
 "ceder du territoire" 
159
 "et demandera l 'appui de son parti. le Bloc Quebecois, des la rentree, le 28 janvier." 
140
 "nos droits, car nous aussi on a des droits" 
141
 "plus de 400 000km2" 
142
 "la propriete des autochtones." 
143
 "le quart du Quebec" 
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suggesting that if the Innus could claim "ancestral rights"144, so could "the descendants of 
Vikings, the Basques, Normand fishers and Bretons"145 - and consequently, Septiliens 
and citizens of Saguenay too.146 (Forbes in Le Nord-Est, 17-03-02, 5) A petition against 
the "secession" of the Cote-Nord territory started circulating; by February it had amassed 
over 4500 names.147 By March, giving into the pressure, a newly appointed SAA 
minister, Remy Trudel, agreed to create a table de concertationl4S to allow Septilians to 
have their say in negotiations. (Ibid.) He also promised to come to the Cote-Nord in 
person and provide citizens with more information. (Ibid.) Unsurprisingly, none of these 
assurances would make Quebec's signature of the official Agreement in Principle, on 
April 24th, any easier to swallow. (Le Devoir, 27-04-02, A4) This "great news" rather 
resulted in a second boom in coverage. A week after the signature, the Septiliens' group 
upped the ante: Forbes now threatened to block roads and resort to violence if it was 
necessary. (Forbes in Le Soleil, 01-05-02, A5) "Welcome to Pequistan, the new Innu 
republic"149, he stated in a news conference, while a Saguenay-based "Fondation equite 
territoriale" described the agreement as the "worse deceit or scam"150 that had ever 
occurred in Quebec history. (Le Soleil, 01-05-02, A5; Le Quotidien, 29-05-02, 17) The 
AIP had been negotiated "in secret"151; "10 000 Aboriginals had been and [would] 
continue to be consulted by their leaders, while over 380 000 Quebeckers... had not at all 
144
 "droits ancestraux" 
145
 "les descendants des Vikings, des Basques espagnols et des pecheurs normands et Bretons" 
146
 Russel Bouchard has repeatedly made the argument that he is an Aboriginal. 
147
 P Q Deputy, Normand Dugay, initially promised to bring it to Quebec. He would later retract himself and say that 
"the climate of semi-panic that has taken over the population is premature [and based] on erroneous information 
without foundation." (Le Nord-Est, 17.03.02, 5) 
148
 This term has many English equivalents: "coordination committee", "round table" or "steering committee". 
149
 "Bienvenue au Pequistan, nouvelle republique innue." 
150
 "la pire fourberie ou amaque" 
151
 "dans le plus grand secret" 
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been consulted by their government."152 (Ibid., emphasis mine) Trudel responded to these 
statements by repeating that nothing had been signed with Uashat mak Mani-Utenam -
that single Innu community in the vicinity of Sept-Iles - and there was thus "no need to 
panic."153 (Trudel in Le Soleil, 01-05-02, A5) Even elsewhere, Innu autonomy would be 
"limited".154 (Trudel in La Presse, 01-05-02, A4) The impact of Trudel's statements? A 
few days later, Forbes was calling for a referendum, demanding "equality between 
citizens with respect to their rights and duties."155 (Le Nord-Est, 05-05-02, 9, emphasis 
mine) 
The fact that Louis Bernard had reportedly stated that the Innus' rights would be 
"different, have priority and be superior"156 to non-Aboriginal's rights may have had 
something to do with the ever increasing popular outrage. (Le Quotidien, 01-05-02, 22) 
More legalistic clarifications concerning "ancestral" and "Aboriginal" rights would be 
dispensed over the next weeks in more information meetings, but again, this did nothing 
to appease what seemed to be, according to Le Soleil, Le Quotidien and Le Nord Est 
articles, the generalize mood in the Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean and Cote-Nord regions. In 
some cases, tensions had escalated to such a level that meetings had to be ended early or 
cancelled altogether. (Le Soleil, 22-05-02, A19; Le Nord-Est, 26-05-02, 5) It was true: 
the Innus would have priority hunting, fishing and trapping rights over Nitassinan lands, 
but this by no means translated into the annihilation of non-Aboriginals' rights. The 
reason this came to be the generalized belief (at least, among a core of vocal activists) 
had little to do with the provisions that actually dealt with the Nitassinan, as it has been 
152
 "10 000 membres des communautes innus [sic] ont ete e! seront encore consultees par leurs chefs alors qu'environ 
380 000 Quebecois... ne le sont pas du tout par leur gouvernement." 
153




 "l'egalite des citoyens face a leurs droits et leurs devoirs." 
156 "djfferents. superieurs et prioritaires" 
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shown in the previous section. Rather, part of the problem was that there was always 
someone to say that the agreement was a threat to Whites' rights and did create two 
classes of citizens, or as Andre Forbes put it: forced Septiliens in "enclaves." (Ibid.; Le 
Quotidien, 29-05-02, 17; Le Nord-Est, 19-05-02, 17) Another factor was, of course, that 
there was always at least one newspaper to disseminate this false information. 
157 
Like his provincial counterparts, federal negotiator, Andre Maltais , also stated 
that "White" rights and territory would not be affected by any self-government agreement 
with the Innus, but he tempered that the population had to keep in mind "that tribunals 
have decided that First Nations have rights."158 {Le Nord-Est, 23-06-02, 2) Quebec and 
Canada thus had no choice but to "harmonize them with the rights of non-Aboriginals"159 
- this was exactly how Chevrette had spinned the issue during the first media storm. 
(Ibid.; SAA, 2002a) By July, the most colourful actor in the Innu story, Saguenay/Lac-
St-Jean's self-proclaimed advocate, Russel Bouchard, was well-advanced in his 'letters to 
the editor' campaign to contradict Maltais' thesis.160 Not only did the Common Approach 
represent "a threat to the rights of Canadians"161 and were non-Aboriginals about to 
become "tenants"162 on their own lands, but the agreement itself represented 
"constitutional suicide."163 (Bouchard, 2002, D5; Le Quotidien, 21-05-02, 8) Indeed, it 
would force citizens living on the "occupied territories"164 under "the Innu constitutional 
157
 In case of confusion, Maltais was also the minister of the SAA in 2005. 
158
 "les tribunaux ont etabli que les gens des Premieres Nations ont des droits'" 
159
 "harmoniser ceux-ci avec les droits des non-autochtones" 
160
 Bouchard had already added his two cents before, but the volume of his publications greatly increased starting in 
June, coinciding with the information tours in the region. Between May and November 2002 alone, he wrote a total of 
14 letters, including 2 that were published in Le Soleil. 
161




 "derapage constitutionnel suicidaire" 
164 ' „ 
zones occupees 
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umbrella"165, which would be "superimposed, even subrogated in some areas, to the 
Canadian constitution,"166 (Ibid., emphasis mine) At this point, Bernard and Maltais 
could continue reemphasizing that no rights would be affected all they wanted, that an 
agreement would only "harmonize" them with the rights of non-Aboriginals, it was too 
late - nothing, it seemed, could dispel this new pervasive myth that Innu self-government 
would somehow translate into sovereignty over 300 000km of land. 
It was at this time that Bloc Quebecois MP, Ghislain Lebel, chose to enter the 
stage and publish his own letter to the editor, which would lead to the beginning of the 
end of the Common Approach. Indeed, the publication of this letter coincides with the 
final peak in news coverage in the 2000-2003 period. Not only where the breaches of 
non-Aboriginals' rights aberrant, Lebel wrote, but if the Parti Quebecois' plan went 
through Quebec's sovereign territories would be "reduced to the dimensions of a postage 
stamp."161 (Lebel, 2002, D5, emphasis mine) As had been the case the previous January, 
when the rumour that a map of Innu territories encompassing the whole of the Cote-Nord 
and Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean regions began circulating, negotiators and elected officials 
immediately went into damage-control, except they were now needing to state in capital 
letters that the agreement would change nothing - "R.I.E.N." (Bernard in La Presse, 13-
08-02, A3) The same arguments were launched from one side to the other: Whites will 
lose their rights/the rights of Whites will remain the same; local populations will live in 
enclaves/local population will "not see a 
difference."168 (Ibid.; La Presse, 17-08-02, B4; 
Le Nord-Est, 25-08-02, 6) More legalistic explanations concerning Aboriginal "ancestral 
165
 "sous le parapluie constitutionnel ilnut" 
166
 "qui se superpose a l'ordre constitutionnel canadien, voire raeme le subroge a certains egards" 
167
 This translation is Hilling and Venne's. (12) 
168
 "ne verront pas la difference" 
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rights" and the distinction between "extinguishment" and "harmonization" in as many 
interviews and press conferences did little to change the firmly held belief that the 
agreement amounted to nothing more than robbing Peter to pay Paul. (La Presse, 13-08-
02, A3; La Presse, 17-08-02) 
The fate of an Innu self-government final agreement was definitively sealed 
when Jacques Parizeau then presented himself as a self-government negotiations expert 
and declared to the press, in an long and carefully worded letter, that the AIP represented 
"potential dynamite"169 on Quebec's legal and territorial landscape. (La Presse, 28-08-02, 
A l ; Le Soleil, 29.08.02, A l ) It gave too much, he worried - so much that it could be 
inferred that Quebec's own sovereignty was at stake. Parizeau did not have to make this 
statement outright; it had already been made, and would continue to be made, numerous 
times for him. The Cree model of extinguishing rights, he argued, was much better. 
Indeed, it was the same model he had proposed to the Innus back in 1994, which they had 
rejected. (Ibid.) Parizeau's letter, of course, made front-page news in all the papers, much 
as Lebel's editorial two weeks earlier. The day following his call for a more "careful" 
analysis of what the AIP "actually" set out (which he knew, indeed being qualified to 
assess such documents, was only a general blueprint of a final agreement) a 
parliamentary commission was ordered in what might be seen as a fit of general 
annoyance by the government. The Commission was to take place in January of 2003. 
Guy Chevrette was invited back to the forestage, equipped with a mandate to tour the 
regions again and hear out citizens' concerns while providing them with more 
"information" such as: Innu legislative powers will only apply to the Innu Assi, or 
"ancestral rights on the Nitassinan will have to respect the constitution", as well as a good 
169
 "dynamite potentielle" 
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dose of "nothing has been signed yet"170 and the government has "no other choice but to 
negotiate."171 (Le Nord-Est, 27-10-02, 2) In the meantime, the Bouchards, Forbes and 
Lebels of the debate had the field wide open to continue perpetuating an understanding of 
172 
Innu self-government as being incompatible "with the notion of sovereignty." (Lebel in 
Le Nord-Est, 22-09-02, 5, emphasis mine) 
Sovereign Powers 
What this in-depth examination of the language of the Innu self-government 
debate has shown so far is that "self-government" has been framed as a "harmonization 
of rights" by the government, and alternately, "loss of rights", "loss of territory" and 
ultimately, "loss of Quebec sovereignty" by the various actors opposed to its 
implementation. This is because the fact that Innu ancestral rights would be protected 
over an estimated 300 000km2 was taken to mean by the public that the Innus would have 
property rights over these lands, while Innu legislative powers were seen as being 
equivalent to a third order of government, as some briefs that were submitted to the 
Commission des Institutions de l'Assemblee nationale du Quebec argue. Their closer 
examination also reveals the source of the polarization between the public's and the 
government's understanding of Innu self-government: not just the statements of few 
politicians and activists; not just the fact that some newspapers provided these statements 
ample airtime, but the text of the agreement itself. 
170
 "rien n'est encore signe" 
171
 "d 'autre alternative que de negocier" 
172
 "incompatible avec la notion de souverainete" 
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First, it should be said that the general opinion that emerges from the 88 briefs by 
some 77 organizations and persons that were submitted to the Commission is not quite as 
cut and dry as opinion expressed in the press. This view is also supported by 
anthropologist, Paul Charest (2001), who actually attended the Commission and 
submitted his own brief. (191) Indeed, presentations, on the whole, tended to be positive 
and represented the opinion of a greater variety of actors.173 The town of Roberval for 
instance, which is located closest to Mashteuiatsh (appendix 5), felt that the AIP was a 
good agreement - a necessary one, in fact. After all, Mashteuiatsh and Roberval were 
like "an old couple"174; the town was therefore eager to make its already good relations 
with neighbouring Aboriginals even more harmonious. (Ville de Roberval, 2003, 1) Its 
only criticism rested on the fact that it would likely lose some tax revenues since 10 or so 
of its properties were located on the future Innu Assi, but this was not seen as a problem 
that could not be resolved. (Ibid., 2) This attitude is reflected its local newspaper, which 
reported on the Common Approach sparingly between 2000 and 2003, never appearing to 
notice that media storms were occurring elsewhere. 
Roughly a quarter of the other briefs that were submitted to the Commission, 
however, did pick up on the same rights and territory arguments that have been outlined 
so far. For example, according to the Association de chasse et peche de Forestville, the 
AIP should "contain more elements making reference to principles of equality rather than 
notions linked to the cession of already awarded privileges."175 (Association de chasse et 
peche de Forestville, 2003, 6, emphasis mine) Indeed, their members should not have to 
173
 Briefs were submitted by various Aboriginal organisations, municipalities, regional county municipalities (MRC), 
regional development councils, fishing, trapping and hunting associations, outfitters associations, unions, political 
parties, representatives of the forestry and mining industry, and some academics and citizens. 
174
 "un vieux couple" 
175
 "devrait contenir des elements faisant reference a des principes d'egalite plus souvent qu'a des notions rattachees a 
la cession de privileges accordes." 
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give up their rights in order to give rights to the Innus. (Ibid.) Citizens of the village of 
Les Escoumins similarly felt the need to emphasize that they had "the same rights as all 
the Quebeckers of this land."176 (Comite de citoyens des Escoumins, 2003, 8, emphasis 
mine) They did not "mind [the Innus] demanding rights, but we don't want the 
177 
consequence to be us being governed by the laws of a third level of government." 
(Ibid., 9, emphasis mine) 
What impact would this new government have in practice? According to the 
Regroupement des trappeurs de la Cote-Nord, which drew on statements by Ghislain 
Lebel, it meant its members would "no longer have full ownership and sovereignty [on 
i no 
the lands encompassed by the Nitassinan]." (Regroupement des trappeurs de la Cote-
Nord, 2003, 13, emphasis mine) Instead, their possessions were about to be transformed 
179 
into "Innu property" - a view that appears to unanimously inform the opinion of the 
few, much as in the previous section, who believed Innu self-government would 
ultimately put the people of the Cote-Nord in an "enclave". (Comite de Citoyens des 
Escoumins, 14; Municipality des Bergeronnes, 2003, 20) In essence, the rationale was 
that the recognition of Innu ancestral rights amounted to a "politique du deux poids, deux 180 
mesures", or the infamous two-tiered system. If a final agreement was signed, Whites 
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would then be told by the Innus: "You are on our land," as Le Soleil had Guy 
176
 "les memes droits que tous les Quebecois sur cette terre" 
177
 "Nous ne sommes pas contre le fait [que les Innus] revendiquent des droits, mais nous ne voulons pas que cela ait 
pour consequence d'etre diriges par les lois d 'un troisieme gouvernement." 
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 "le proprietaire ne sera plus pleinement proprietaire et souverain [sur le Nitassinan]," 
179
 "propriete Innus [sic]" 
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 People who live in Quebec are well-aware of an ominous "two-tiered system." They have heard about it in the 
"reasonable accommodations" debate, in the ADQ "restructuring health care" debate and, more recently, in the Quebec 
Lucide "refinancing education" debate, to name only those few. In fact, the findings in this section appear to give 
credence to a corollary thesis that a "two-tiered system" metaphor, such as has been launched in the public imagination 
by a political, sovereignist elite here, is a very culturally-adapted weapon for halting any project or policy that goes 
against its interest. 
181
 "vous etes simplement chez nous!" 
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Bellefleur saying back in January 2001, resulting in the first media boom and the rise of a 
belief that the AIP would create "a third level of government, an Innu one, answerable to 
no one."182 (Groupe des pionniers septilliens, 2003, 2; Municipality des Bergeronnes, 16-
18) 
Russel Bouchard, the self-proclaimed defender of Lac-St-Jean's interests, 
continued with this line of argumentation during his presentation, reiterating, as he had 
done in his numerous letters to the editor, that the AIP announced nothing less than the 
1 
"dispossession of our people." Indeed, according to his colourful brief, the document 
"violated [Quebec] in its sovereignty."184 (Bouchard, 2003, 17) This opinion was shared 
by Parti Quebecois regional vice-president, Bernard Lefrangois, who similarly concluded 
that Innu governments would be allowed to pass laws that would apply "not only on their 
territory (Innu Assi) but also on the territory they share with non-Aboriginals 
(Nitassinan)."185 (Lefrangois, 2003, 4) If this was the case, Lefrangois hypothesized, 
would this not create "a kind of country in a country?"186 (Ibid.) By Bouchard's account, 
it certainly would, and in more creative terms, it meant Quebeckers would be "banished" 
from their lands "like the worse of thieves."187 (Bouchard, 17) Even if this conclusion 
could not be reached by any logical means, it did hot really matter. As Lebel had 
reminded readers when he wrote his letter to the editor, the recognition of ancestral rights 
on the Nitassinan would open the door to all Aboriginals of Quebec laying claim to the 
land. (Lebel, 2002, D5) Innu self-government, no matter its scope, was thus a "threat" to 
182
 "un troisieme niveau de gouvernement, Innu celui-la, et qui n'a de compte a rendre a personne." 
183
 "Notre people a ete dcpouille de son pays" 
184
 "viole dans sa souverainete" 
185
 "non seulement sur le territoire qui leur appartiendrait en propre (Innu Assi) mais aussi sur celui qu'ils partageraient 
avec les non autochtones (Le Nitassinan)." 
186
 "un espece de pays dans un pays?" 
187
 " banni de ses terres comme le dernier des mecreants" 
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be taken extremely seriously because it would eventually lead to a situation where 
Quebeckers would have to fend for themselves on a sovereign Aboriginal territory, "with 
for only consolation prize Saint-Denis street's washed out sidewalks and the Vieille 
Capitale's old ramparts."188 (Ibid.) This vision of things indeed had the ring of the 
"apartheid reversed" that Parti Quebecois deputy, Gabriel Yvan Gagnon, had imagined 
back in March 2000. (Gagnon in La Presse, 26-03-00, A14) 
The premise for these arguments, however, was not just Andre Forbes', Ghislain 
Lebel's, or Russel Bouchard's lucrative imaginations; it had been provided by ex-Premier 
of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau himself, who claimed, in his August 18th open letter to the 
media, that the Nitassinan was the most "complicated, ambiguous and strangest of 
territorial phenomena"189 and that "since 300 000 km2 are at stake, thus, 18% of Quebec 
territory (for 8700 inhabitants), it is useful to examine [AIP provisions] in more 
detail."190 (Parizeau, 2002, A16) What did these provisions say? As outlined in the AIP 
section, and as Parizeau took great effort to demonstrate: that the Innus would have their 
own legislative assemblies and constitutions. (Ibid.) Although Parizeau never outright 
stated that these concepts were sister-concepts of sovereignty, this is how many, like the 
town of Saguenay, would come to interpret them. Indeed, it was on that basis that 
Saguenay's mayor, Jean Tremblay191, presented his "proof' to commissioners that the 
Innus would have powers equivalent to the National Assembly's ability "to pass laws 
188
 "en guise de prix de consolation, que les trottoirs delaves de la rue Saint-Denis et les ramparts ebreches de la Vieille 
Capitale." It should be noted that Saint-Denis street's sidewalks, far from being washed-out, are actually quite flowery 
this time of year. 
189
 "le plus complique, le plus ambigu, le plus etrange des phenomenes territoriaux" 
190
 "Comme 300 000 kilometre carres sont en cause, soit 18% du territoire du Quebec (toujours pour 8700 habitants), 
cela vaut la peine qu'on s'y attarde un peu." 
191
 Some may recall his frequent and colourful interventions during the Reasonable Accomodations debate. 
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1Q 9 
regarding its territories and the citizens who live on it." (Ville de Saguenay, 2003, 12). 
This begged Fondation equite territoriale's question: did Quebec really have "the 
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constitutional capacity to give up its own powers to create autonomous governments?" 
(Fondation equite territorial, 2003, 9, emphasis mine) 
Quebec, of course, never had any intention to give up its legislative powers or 
sovereignty, but it appears that a sovereignist political elite certainly did feel that the 
Common Approach was a threat to "our sovereignist project."194 (Gagnon in La Presse, 
26-03-00 A14; Lebel, 2002, D5) Indeed, Parti Quebecois officials were the first to feed 
the myth of a two-class society to the public, as early as March 2000, when the question 
as to whether the Common Approach might lead to reversed apartheid was asked, which 
would eventually lead to an understanding of Innu self-government as a loss of rights, 
then, loss of territory for all non-Aboriginal populations also living on those 300 000km2 
of Nitassinan lands. The premise of the argument that the Innus would somehow become 
sovereign over this territory, however, which emerged in the second half of the debate, 
cannot simply be located in political partisanship. The fact that it only appeared after 
April 2002 is actually further indication that it was grounded in the text of the agreement 
itself. Indeed, had the AIP not been published, no one could have picked up on the 
language of Innu legislative assemblies and Innu constitutions that would have "the status 
of fundamental law" - terms that would turn up, again and again, in most of the briefs 
that took the position that the AIP was a threat. (Quebec, Ottawa, Mamuitun and 
Nutashkuan, s.8.1.4) 
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 "l'equivalent d'un parlement pouvant edicter des lois s'appliquant sur leurs territoires et sur les citoyens qui y 
vivent." 
193
 "On peut s'interroger si l 'Assemblee nationale possede la capacite constitutionnelle de ceder ses propres pouvoirs 
pour creer des gouvernements autonomes." 
notre projet souverainiste 
111 
Ironically, this legal terminology may have been novel for a self-government 
agreement, but it represented no novelty in practice, as Parizeau would surely have been 
aware of when he brought it up in his open-letter, being so familiar with self-government 
legislations due to his own experience negotiating the Paix des Braves with the Crees. 
Indeed, the CNQA is the Crees' constitution, except it is referred to as a "local 
government act", which governs the internal administration of incorporated Cree bands, 
like all Canadian corporations are governed by theirs. This by no means translated into 
"sovereign" corporations, or Cree sovereign powers. In the case of Cree corporations, it 
only meant that their band councils would have legislative authority over their category I 
lands, just as Innu legislative assemblies would never be empowered to govern lands 
beyond their Innu Assis. In fact, this erroneous interpretation of the AIP's legal 
provisions actually sheds more light on the source of an understanding, by Taiaiake 
Alfred and the Royal Commission, of Cree self-government as essentially amounting to 
nothing more than a "glorified municipality" model of governance. Indeed, as Innu 
constitutions have evoked State sovereign powers in this debate, it may similarly be 
speculated that the bylaw-making powers outlined in the Crees' "special legislation for 
local government" has had a role to play in the interpretation that they only practice 
powers associated to the municipal realm. 
In sum, when a Lakoffian approach is applied to the case of the Innus, it reveals 
that the Quebec government has a big share of responsibility in the shelving of what it 
called the most novel self-government arrangement in the history of Canadian 
Aboriginal-State relations - an agreement the Innu people have been waiting on for 
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nearly four decades. First, it provided the notion of Innu "rights" over 300 000km2 of 
land, as illustrated in the first article outlining the Common Approach in La Presse, which 
was informed by the minister of the SAA, Guy Chevrette, himself. (La Presse, 28-01-00, 
A10) Second, as soon as a movement of opposition emerged and began claiming that 
"White rights" would be taken away, it retaliated by framing Innu self-government as a 
"harmonization of rights", which was only an amendment of the "rights" frame that has 
proved problematic in the first place, because it evokes the very idea of "creation of two 
classes of citizens" the government was attempting to dispel. Indeed, by harmonization of 
rights is implied "balancing out of rights", which in turn raises the possibility that non-
Aboriginals' rights would weigh less in the balance. Although numerous public 
information meetings were organized to shake this belief, where consecutive SAA 
ministers and Common Approach negotiators repeatedly emphasizes that the agreement 
would not lead to a loss of non-Aboriginals' rights or Innu sovereignty over the territories 
they shared in common, this had no significant impact on public opinion, as further 
emphasized in Commission briefs, confirming, like in the previous chapter, Lakoff s first 
precept that facts alone do not alter beliefs. 
An Innu case study also provides a better demonstration of Lakoff s second and 
third precept: negating or borrowing problematic frames, such as the "rights" frame here, 
leads into the frame trap. The difference with Lakoff's Democrat/Republican example is 
that the government not only negated another frame of Innu self-government as 
"sovereignty", it, along with Innu negotiators, provided the frame itself, albeit 
unwittingly, in the form of AIPs provisions on Innu constitutions and legislative 
assemblies. This comment by Bernard Lefrangois during the Parliamentary Commission 
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illustrates the source of the "sovereignty" deduction more succinctly: "there is nothing in 
the Canadian Constitution that allows for the recognition of other constitution within the 
country."195 (Lefran^ois, 4) Indeed, had the general population been polled on this 
question, they would probably have agreed with Lefrangois' assessment and been 
outraged at the idea that some communities could enact theirs. 
Thus, as a result of a poor communications strategy, but also, and more 
importantly to this paper, a poor assessment of the impact of language in self-government 
making, an ill-informed public, outraged by the possibility that Quebec sovereignty might 
metaphorically be reduced to the size of Lebel's postage stamp, effectively caused the 
government to go back on its position and put negotiations toward a final agreement on 
hold, where they remain today. Essentially, as the American Democrats, who had 
consistently argued against the "tax-relief' frame of the Republicans, the Quebec 
government shot itself in the foot. These findings are especially instructive when we 
bring our attention back to the broader Aboriginal well-being debate. Not only have I 
shown that there is a significant polarization in understandings of self-government in this 
and the previous Cree self-government debate, but it emerges again between them. 
Indeed, an Innu model of self-government has been shown to be basically identical to a 
Cree one; it is therefore very intriguing that it would come to be interpreted as giving up 
too much sovereignty, whereas in the Cree case, for Taiaiake Alfred and the Royal 
Commission at least, the argument was that it did not make them sovereign enough. This 
finding thus demonstrates my basic thesis that a "self-government" frame is the problem 
with respect to finding practical ways to increase Aboriginal Peoples' well-being: the 
195
 "11 n'y a rien dans la Constitution canadienne qui permet la reconaissance de d'autres Constitutions a l'interieur du 
pays." 
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concept of self-government is open to whatever interpretation in which it is reframed. 
Arriving to this ultimate conclusion, however, is admittedly no more useful to self-
government debate than having misinformed or worldview-driven actors governing its 
terms. There was a strategy at the end of a Lakoffian approach and it if we have been 
convinced of the merits of a language-based approach so far, we should assess whether it 
might, as Lakoff suggests, bring all this debating to a close, as I propose to do in the next 
and final chapter. 
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Chapter IV: Conclusions 
The project of this thesis paper was based on a hunch: that there was a problem 
with the "language" of self-government. It came some time after attending two different 
conferences on Aboriginal Governance. The first, was a students' conference held back 
in December 2007, where I presented a paper on Cree self-government that met some 
strong criticism from a Dene academic by the name of Glen Coulthard, whom, I did not 
know it at the time, had been a student of Taiaiake Alfred's. To provide some context, I 
was employed as a research assistant at DIALOG, an Aboriginal research and knowledge 
network, and had been given the opportunity to examine several self-government 
legislations, most notably the JBNQA and the CNQA. Knowing nothing of the field of 
Aboriginal governance at the time, I had no preconception of what I was supposed to read 
in between the lines of legal provisions. I just outlined, as I was asked, the various 
aspects of both documents that were related to governance. The resulting paper, which I 
presented at this students' conference, concluded that the Crees were indeed self-
governing. Not only was the language clear, but I had found several Statistics Canada 
studies that showed that this increased autonomy in their affairs had had some tangible 
impacts on their quality of life. After my presentation, however, Glen Coulthard 
immediately criticised my findings on the basis that the Cree model was not an example 
of self-government. Yet, not only were there legal provisions to back my argument (most 
notably, health and education dispositions), but the Crees also had one of the highest 
levels of quality of life among Aboriginal Peoples in Canada. (Appendix 2) How could 
this not mean they were self-governing? What did self-governing mean then? I would 
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not get Coulthard's answer. 
Then, in February of 2008, I attended a second conference in Victoria, British 
Columbia, in the broader fields of Aboriginal law, rights and governance. Coulthard was 
again in attendance, but this time, as a presenter. After his presentation, I went to see him 
and asked if we could reopen our discussion on Cree "self-government" where it had 
abruptly left off the previous December. He agreed. Specifically, I asked if we could at 
least agree that the Crees indeed had significant administrative control over health and 
education and that these aspects of Cree governance were desirable in light of Statistics 
Canada data? The discussion did not go on very long. He conceded that the evidence was 
interesting, but the model was still wrong. It was as if the simple fact that it was a Cree 
model made it unacceptable - a situation reminiscent of a Taiaiake Alfred concluding 
that the models of Nisga'a and Sechelt governance were unacceptable without a priori 
having assessed their contents. 
At this time, I was already in the beginning stages of preparing this thesis paper. 
Although I did not yet know what shape it would take, I knew my goal was to refute the 
conclusion in the RCAP report (which I had also been brought to examine at DIALOG), 
that a Cree model of governance only enabled the exercise of municipal powers. After 
this second meeting with Coulthard, however, I put that idea on ice. After all, if I could 
not convince members of the very communities whose future I had at heart, I did not see 
the point of my work. I was driven by an honest desire to see the situation in Aboriginal 
communities change - not to be right. In light of empirical data in the Cree case, I 
thought the model should at least be given a second look, but as the non-Aboriginal that I 
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was, the opinion of a Dene academic mattered more to me. My assumption was that he 
must know what Aboriginal self-government was better than I. 
Meanwhile, back at DIALOG, I was asked to assess the Innu Common Approach. 
Again, I poured over legal provisions, but this time I was able to complement my 
understanding of the negotiation process by conducting a thorough press review, since 
developments were more recent. It was after essentially reading my own final analysis in 
Chapter 3, but in the form of hundreds of news articles, that I understood why I could not 
get Coulthard to make any concessions: at stake was not my understanding of Cree self-
government, but the fact that self-government was, by nature, open to interpretation, 
much as the debate that still rages on as to the specific definition of "nation" or 
"nationhood". Indeed, as it has been shown throughout this paper, self-government is 
defined very differently depending on which theoretical hat we wear. In the case of Glen 
Coulthard, I had been arguing with someone who fundamentally defined self-
government, like his ex-professor and current research collaborator Taiaiake Alfred, from 
a post-colonial perspective that sees it as the recognition of sovereignty. Yet, my 
definition of self-government had always been the government's! I had even specified 
this in footnote to my initial paper's introduction and provided the actual text of the 
Inherent Right to Self Government policy, which defined that "right" as Aboriginal 
Peoples' ability to: 
govern themselves in relation to matters that are internal to their 
communities, integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, 
languages and institutions, and with respect to their special relationship 
to their land and their resources. " (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
1995) 
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Of course, I no longer take this position. "Self-government" can obviously not be 
defined in a sentence. But my need to define it and the resulting impossibility of having 
a simple discussion on practical ways to increase Aboriginal Peoples socio-economic 
well-being was a concrete illustration of a small book I had read some time earlier, and 
which I had not given much thought to: George Lakoff s Don't Think of an Elephant! 
Know Your Values and Reframe the Debate.196 
Throughout this paper meticulous attention has been paid to the language of "self-
government." This approach was based on the premise that language matters, which is 
the argument of Lakoff s work. His language-based approach has revealed that an 
"Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap" persists in Canada because there has been dispute 
over the meaning of the only solution that has been proposed. Even a staunch opponent 
to current self-government legislations like Taiaiake Alfred has framed the "solution" in 
terms of "self-government", but which he saw as "founded on an ideology of native 
nationalism and a rejection of model of government rooted in European culture values." 
(Alfred, 2) Similarly, actors involved in the Cree and Innu self-government debates have 
conceived of self-government very differently depending on which side of the debate 
they stand. More precisely, a Lakoffian approach has shown that a debate over 
increasing Aboriginal well-being has not been centered on finding solutions, but on "who 
gets to govern the terms of the debate." The cause of the Aboriginal well-being gap is of 
course, not the language of self-government itself, but the lack of a directed, coherent and 
consistent approach toward self-government policy-making. The cause of the stagnation 
1961 am very grateful to Dr. Ed King for giving the Politics and Culture course, where this book was introduced. 
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at the policy level, however, is the concept of self-government itself. Indeed the debates 
over self-government presented here have never been debates over current self-
government agreements, or agreements in the works; they have been debates over which 
language should govern our perception of Aboriginal Peoples' relationship with the 
State. 
I have made my case by essentially "unboxing" the semantics of the arguments 
for or against a current self-government model and model-to-be. This has revealed, in the 
case of the Crees, not only different understandings of self-government, but a prevalent 
understanding as enabling only "municipal powers." Further, different understandings of 
Cree self-government have been shown to be grounded in incompatible worldviews, as 
illustrated in my own discussions with Glen Coulthard and an examination of Alfred's 
work, where a post-colonialist or dependency theory view of the world has clearly proven 
to be in conflict with a governmental, liberal view of self-government defined as "good 
governance." A Cree case study has also revealed that a view, by Papillon and the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, of self-government as representing "no panacea", 
has lead to a situation where important evidence has "bounced out" of their analysis -
evidence that painted a picture of basic socio-economic improvement. This would be in 
accordance with a Lakoffian precept that facts alone do not alter beliefs. It is also the first 
demonstration of my principal argument: if we were really dealing with a debate over 
Cree self-government, or more generally, increasing Aboriginal well-being, all the 
relevant data would have been included in these actors' analyses. 
This dichotomy in understandings of self-government has re-emerged in an Innu 
debate. The case of the Innus in particular has more clearly illustrated two other 
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Lakoffian precepts that negating and borrowing frames reinforces them and this, in turn, 
leads into the "self-government frame-trap", where a debate over Cree self-government 
also ultimately arrives. This frame trap has translated into a situation where a particular 
model of self-government has been shelved altogether - either as a solution at the 
national level, or the local, Innu level. Further, a case-study of the Innus has shown that a 
different communication strategy might have led to a different end. Indeed, the 
government's framing of self-government as a "harmonization of rights" has been shown 
to reinforce an understanding as a "loss of rights" for those who opposed the agreement. 
Although numerous public information meetings were organized to dispel this myth, this 
had no significant impact on public opinion. On the contrary, the more governmental 
officials focused on refuting erroneous claims on the meaning of Innu self-government, 
the more newspapers covered story, resulting in increased mentions of the problematic 
frames and their monopolization of the public imagination. Further, the terminology of 
the agreement itself provided the government the rope with which to finally hang itself, 
although a sovereignist political elite ultimately tightened its noose. 
This demonstration has yielded a final insight: a dichotomy not only exists within 
the Cree and Innu self-government debates, but also between them. Indeed, if we accept 
that a Cree model of self-government and an Innu model, from a legal standpoint (and 
based on rights, territory and self-government provisions), are basically identical, it is 
particularly ironic that the "winning" frames in each debate, respectively, "municipality" 
and "sovereignty", would be located on each end of what has clearly emerged as the self-
government continuum. This, in turn, reinforced my basic thesis: that self-government 
has not been enacted more consistently across Canada, despite being said to be the 
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"solution" to increasing Aboriginal Peoples' quality of life, because it is a multi-
definitional concept, which is open to whatever interpretation in which it is reframed. In 
essence, self-government is the proverbial elephant in the room. 
Some words must now be said on Lakoffs final prescription, which is appealing 
to the Utopian as myself: just change the language. It was the initially my intention to do 
just that here, by presenting a literature on "co-management", which I felt had interesting 
potential. (Berkes, 2007; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Plummer and Fennell, 2006) 
Indeed, a theory of co-management as "governance" appeared to describe a Cree model 
to a T. Co-Management Theory posits that 1) agreements are not imposed and 
negotiations are bottom-up; 2) agreements are the subject of extensive deliberation and 
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negotiations; 3) agreements include resource management joint-committees ; and 4) 
agreements represent a continuous, evolutionary process requiring constant renegotiation. 
(Berkes, 21-28) It was on this last point in particular that I saw the most potential, 
because it enabled a reconceptualization of self-government as process rather than end-
point, as has in fact been the case for the Crees since 1973.198 I thus imagined that we 
could "reframe" the debate in these terms, i.e., that I might have arrived to an agreement 
with Glen Coulthard, for instance, had I argued that the Crees had a better quality of life 
because they were in a co-managing relationship with the governments of Quebec and 
Canada, rather than "self-governing". Further, if the government changed its self-
government policy to a coherent "co-management policy" maybe this would speed up the 
process of bridging the Aboriginal/Canadian well-being gap as well, by providing a more 
197
 Although nothing has been said on this subject in chapter 2, the Crees are in fact members of such joint-committees 
(forestry for instance). 
198
 Negotiations toward the 1975 JBNQA led to negotiations toward the 1984 CNQA. Implementation and financing 
problems (among other things) led to negotiations toward the 2002 Paix des Braves. 
122 
concise framework on which to base a new approach. If this were possible, it would 
ultimately confirm Lakoff s thesis that if frames shape our understanding of the world, 
they also shape our social policies and institutions, and if framing shapes social policies 
and institutions, reframing is social change. (Lakoff, 2006, 1) There are some problems 
with this thesis, however: how would trading one conceptual term, "self-government", for 
another, "co-management", alleviate tensions over conceptual meanings? Second, how 
would reframing the debate in terms of co-management alone have impacted an Innu 
debate? Indeed, it has been shown that the principal ideas that were at stake in that case 
were rights and territory. How then, would a language of "co-management as 
governance" provide politicians with better tools to persuade the public that their rights 
and territory would not be taken away? This brings us back to Lakoff s "theory of 
framing", which posited that framing was the art of selling values. It appears that 
reframing the debate in terms of co-management is not reframing it in terms of values: it 
is dressing it up with more conceptual terms. Yet, as Lakoff has argued, to sell our 
values requires we begin by knowing them. Do we really know our values with respect to 
Canada's Aboriginal Peoples? 
Perhaps we might imagine a situation where the way in which self-government, 
co-management, whatever we want to call Aboriginal empowerment, is sold is by using 
frames that evoke that value. In the case of the Innu self-government debate, even the 
Bouchards, Forbes and Lebels of the Innu debate could concede that the situation that 
persists in Aboriginal communities is unacceptable before adding their "but: our rights". 
But here, we are again faced with the limitations of a Lakoffian approach: indeed, how 
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would one go about reframing self-government in terms of the desired end: 
empowerment? Don't Think of an Elephant! does not come equipped with a 
methodology as to how to choose "winning frames." It does, however, direct us to 
another literature, on which it is based and which I briefly outlined in Chapter 1. 
The findings of cognitive science and psychology are not surprising. It has been 
known for millennia that fables give wings to political speeches, because as Lakoff and 
Johnson put it in Conceptual Metaphors in Everyday Language - the backbone of 
Metaphors We Live by (1980), itself the theoretical framework behind Don't think of an 
Elephant - "our conceptual system, in terms of how we think and act" is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature." (Lakoff and Johnson, 454) If we go back to Lakoff and 
Johnson's example of argument as being conceptually understood as war, a tentative 
answer to the framing dilemma presents itself: indeed, a presentation of an Innu and Cree 
case-study appears to suggest that self-government is conceptualized in terms of territory, 
where the immensity of what used to be Turtle Island has been opposed to the smallness 
of a municipality - or a postage stamp. A third and final media boom arguably occurred 
after Lebel provided the stamp imagery because it activated an associated worldview, or 
rather a foundational myth: Quebec's myth of its great, white, forested and resource-rich 
North, which feeds hydroelectric dreams or resent from those who feel they have not seen 
their dividend: less socio-economically well-off regions, like the Saguenay and Cote-
Nord regions, arguing with the center not to give anything to the Innus unless they get a 
share. To argue for self-government here, was essentially to argue that citizens of Sept-
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lies and Chicoutimi should live poorly on such a rich land, as Bourassa had evoked to 
give wings to his "project of the century" three decades earlier.199 
An abundant cognitive science literature, on which a Lakoffian approach is 
based, appears to locate its beginnings as far back to ancient Greece, which might be 
argued to be the birthplace of a science of rhetoric: the art of controlling the pictures we 
put in our words. The political theory that emerged from this period provides interesting 
insights as to the power of simple metaphors like "postage stamp". They stir an anxiety, a 
fear, verbalized in an Innu self-government debate as the fear of dispossession. Yet, as 
Victor Hugo (1881) wondered in L'Ane, what solution does our traditional knowledge 
provide "concerning what shocks and frightens us?"200 (77) The contemporary discipline 
of public policy and public administration has little to say. Perhaps the key to advancing 
"stalled" policy processes then, is to dust off our discipline's foundational texts and 
rekindle with the science of rhetoric - ridden of its Machiavellian conception as the art of 
advancing the interests of princes, and instead seen as a device for advancing debates, 
such as Aristotle's Poetics suggests and today's Cognitive Science confirms. (Aristotle, 
75) 
199
 See Robert Bourassa's statement in introduction to the "Project of the Century" section of chapter 4. 
200
 "Quelle solution donne votre savoir 
Sur ce qui nous etonne ou ce qui nous effraie?" 
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Appendix 1: James Bay Hydroelectric Projects and Cree Communities. 
Chisasibi, Eastmain, Mistissini, Wemindji, Whapmagoostuim, Waskaganish, Ouje-
Bougoumou and Waswanipi. 
(Source: Blaser, Feit, McRae, 2004) 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of Selected First Nations Communities by Socio-Economic 
Weil-Being According to 1996 Census Data. 
Cree communities highlighted in red. 
(Source : Armtrong, 1999) 
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Appendix 3: Map of Innu Communities. 
The Innu and Naskapi communities of Matimekosh and Kawawachikamach are located 
on JBNQA territory, as can be seen in Appendix 4. 
(Source : Secretariat aux affaires autochtones) 
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Appendix 4 : Map of JBNQA Territory. 
Territory sui>>«t to JBNQA (sojjUfc of parallel) 
iHSl Moinler regie* 
• • I Territory under rtaptar J et the Environment Quality Act 
(Source : Ministere du Developpement durable, de l'Environnement et des Pares) 
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Appendix 5: Map of Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean Region. 
Sarr.; -t»-i'i o«-?«ill3n 
Sain-
Sairn-Amtrroise 
Saim-i"af>ccrts-3fr-Sa'.e S»r.;-Ariflrfr-iJu- LftC- Ss ;r.t - J#bfi 
Saguenay (then Chicoutimi) is located 112 kilometers from Mashteuiatsh. 
(Source : Google Maps) 
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Appendix 6: Map of Sept-Iles Region. 
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Uashat is situated at the western limit of Sept-Iles. Maliotenam is 16 kilometres east. 
Neither of these communities signed the AIP. 
(Source: Google Maps) 
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Appendix 7 : Unofficial Map of Nitassinan Territories. 
The Nitassinan was said to cover a territory of 300 000km2 to 400 000km2, 
encompassing the whole of the Saguenay/Lac-St-Jean and Cote-Nord regions. 
(Source : Mouvement estrien pour le fran£ais) 
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